Ghana’s Navy receives Marine Protector Boats from US

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On the 17th of June, 2023, the Ghanaian Navy received two former US Coast Guard Marine Protector patrol boats supplied by the United States under its Excess Defence Articles (EDA) programme.

The vessels were delivered aboard the Ocean Giant at Takoradi Harbour. Flag-Officer Commanding the Western Naval Command, Commodore Emmanuel Kwafo, told the press that the vessels arrival will add to the Navy’s capacity to fight against armed robbery at sea, piracy, illegal bunkering, drug and human trafficking, and will help protect Ghana’s fisheries resources.

“We are very grateful of the partnership with the US,” Kwafo said. The vessels that will be named GNS Aflao and GNS Half Assini will play a critical role in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and their delivery will strengthen maritime security in the region.

US Naval Attaché to Ghana, Commander Carlton McClain said, “Ghana is our most important partner, especially in regional security for the Gulf of Guinea and for West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea…is important in terms of trade, and we are happy to assist Ghana in this partnership,”.

The Marine Protector class is 27 metres long, with a displacement of over 90 tons. Two MTU diesel engines give a top speed of 25 knots (46 km/h), a range of 1700 km and endurance of 3 days. Armament includes two 12.7 mm machineguns and the vessel can carry 10 personnel. Boarding parties can be launched while the vessel is underway, through a stern launching ramp. Ghana also received two rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBS) along with the two patrol boats.

Ghana’s Navy has been expanding in recent years, notably with the acquisition of 4 Flex Fighter offshore patrol vessels that were built in Singapore by Penguin Shipyard. They were commissioned in February 2022. These 4 vessels were bought to provide dedicated security to the country’s offshore oil and gas installations. New naval infrastructure is also being added, including multiple forward operating bases across the coastline.

Read more here.

Maritime Threats in the Gulf of Guinea – An Update

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Background

On 09 May 2023, the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral Awwal Gambo, announced that the International Maritime Bureau had removed Nigeria from its list of “War Risk Countries”.  The move by the IMB reflects the sustained low levels of piracy and maritime criminal activity reported in the Gulf of Guinea over the last 18 months and follows the cessation of war risk premium payments by Nigeria to Lloyds of London amounting to $793 million per annum.  While this is an encouraging step for Nigeria and its neighbours, it does not mean the risks posed by highly organised criminal gangs has disappeared completely.

The discussion around the recent historical low frequency of acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and of maritime crime in the territorial waters of littoral states in the region, continues to present analysts with the interesting question of what exactly happened to the pirate gangs previously operating in the region?  Various bodies have presented credible explanations of why piracy and maritime criminality is at its lowest for several years, but are they accurate?  This report examines recent developments in the maritime operating environment in the region and revisits some of the questions posed in previous analyses.

 

The Baseline

Figures held by Arete analysts indicate that the rates of piracy and maritime crime in the region over the last five years have fallen dramatically since they peaked in 2020.  Security events are broken down into those that occurred inside territorial waters, including ports and navigable inland waterways, and those that occur in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and International Waters.  The statistics are summarised in the following table.

Table 1.  Spatial distribution of incidents between territorial and international waters 

It should be borne in mind that these figures reflect only those incidents that have been reported noting it is generally accepted that maritime crime remains under-reported in the region still.  

If we break the figures down into those that occurred in Nigerian Waters and those occurring in other territorial jurisdictions in the region, we see a stark reduction in the levels of activity in Nigerian waters.  There has also been a corresponding increase in the number of incidents in other regional waters, however, the overall trend is for a gradual reduction in those waters as well.

Table 2.  Spatial distribution of incidents between Nigerian and other nations’ waters 

2023 has seen numbers remain very low for the year to date, with just one incident reported in Nigerian waters – a robbery of a berthed vessel in Tin Can Island terminal, and 14 events occurring in other nations’ waters.  

Significantly, 2023 has seen two maritime kidnappings, with 6 crewmen taken from a hijacked product tanker (Monjasa Reformer) in March off Pointe Noire, Congo Republic and 3 crewmen taken from a bulk carrier (Grebe Bulker) in Libreville, Gabon.  The latter is interesting in that the vessel was boarded and the crew abducted while berthed in the port of Ownedo.   In the whole of 2022, there was just one maritime kidnap reported on 13 December, when pirates abducted two crewmen from an offshore support vessel (name withheld) some 48 nautical miles off Bioko, Equatorial Guinea.  Additionally, in 2023, a tanker (Success 9) was hijacked more than 300 nautical miles off Abidjan; the vessel and crew were reported safe 5 days later.  

These events highlight the latent risk that pervades the region and the fact that despite the frequency of events remaining very low, when incidents do occur, they have the potential to have a very high impact on the crew and the company’s operations.

Lloyd’s list, in a report released in early May 2023 indicated that the global trend was shifting away from deepwater operations by pirate gangs (hijacking and kidnapping of crew members) to a renewed focus on armed robbery against vessels in territorial waters.  This global trend seems to also be reflected in the Gulf of Guinea as shown in Table 1 above.  

However, the Gulf of Guinea presents a more complex array of actors and threats than can be summarised in such a broad global analysis.  The region sees opportunist thieves boarding vessels in ports and anchorages hoping to steal something they can then sell.  At the other end of the spectrum, we have the organised pirate cartels who operate deepwater capable vessels and who hunt vessels in international waters frequently more than 200 nautical miles from nearest landfall.  We have also seen a minor increase in hijacking and kidnapping in the region since December 2022.  

So, although the report acknowledges that the Gulf of Guinea is somewhat more complex than other regions due to the widespread theft of oil and a diversity of smuggling operations by organised crime groups, the picture is perhaps not as cut and dried as the Lloyds list report headline would seem to suggest (details of all known incidents in 2023 are provided at Annex A to this report).

 

What Has Driven the Pirates from Nigerian Waters?

There has been a lot of speculation as to why the pirate gangs have apparently moved into other areas of criminal activity in 2022.  In February 2023, the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dr Bashir Jamoh, said:

“This achievement is a product of a well-structured multimodal policy which has been implemented over the years to fight piracy and other criminalities in Nigerian Waters. The Legal instrument called SPOMO Act signed into Law by President Buhari in 2019, the full implementation of the Deep Blue Project by NIMASA, expanded assets and capacity of the Nigerian Navy, enhanced cooperation between NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy, and the regional collaborative efforts under the umbrella of SHADE Gulf of Guinea midwifed by NIMASA, are all policies of the current administration and the benefits are gradually coming to fruition. We are focused on ultimately improving and reducing the cost of commercial shipping in Nigeria.

Notable maritime institutions like the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International Maritime Organisation, IMO, have lauded the reduction in piracy in Nigeria following enhanced patrol and relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered by NIMASA with other security agencies.”

Much has been made of the launch of the Deep Blue Project, including the introduction of maritime surveillance aircraft and their integration into a fully integrated maritime and coastal surveillance system. This development is a significant capability multiplier alongside improving performance and evolving capability of the Nigerian Navy.  

It is also apparent that regional cooperation between states is improving, with an announcement on 10 May 2023 that the Nigerian Navy was establishing a maritime task force with other navies in the region, including those of Ghana, Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’ivoire.  The strategy includes the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (see our piece on this news here.).

Additionally, international support to regional navies is increasing.  This year has seen US participation in joint operations and training with local navies and the launch of a Japanese government initiative to cooperate with Nigerian security efforts to reduce piracy in the region.   On 21-22 May 2023, President Buhari conducted a Presidential Fleet Review of 16 Nigerian naval vessels as well as guest vessels from Ghana, Brazil and Spain.  The drive by the Nigerian Navy towards becoming a more collaborative force capable of operating in multi-national formations will aide further development of capability.

While all of the above is having a beneficial effect on the regional maritime security situation, it should be remembered that the pirate cartels were sponsored by powerful actors with strong political connections.  It cannot be overlooked that in 2022 it was suggested in some circles that the pirate cartels had been shut down very quietly after a foreign power identified the big men behind them and threatened to name them publicly and internationally unless there was an immediate improvement.  Whilst this cannot be conclusively verified, it can also not be discounted as a possibility.

 

Conclusions

NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy are improving their collaborative efforts to secure the nations maritime economy.  Greater cooperation with other nations will further improve the situation.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea remains well below 2020 levels, although we have seen a recent spike in high-impact attacks in international waters in the region.

Gangs are still operating in the region, but mostly outside Nigerian waters.  Within Nigeria, the greatest threat currently is faced by travellers and commercial users of the country’s waterways and navigable rivers. 

Whilst the likelihood of an event affecting a vessel may now much lower, in the event an incident does occur, the impact will be high, with attacks on personnel, kidnappings and injuries if the crew resist.  Theft of cargo from product tankers remains a risk, normally resulting from short-term hijackings. Companies operating in the area should not take the recent headlines as an indication that there is no longer a threat. 

As a locally owned and registered Nigerian company, Arete provide a wide range of maritime risk management services, including escort services within Nigerian EEZ as well as onboard consultants to assist with crew training and drills, voyage planning and advice on threat across the region and beyond. 

Fully ISO accredited and with a 100% track record, we have over a decade of experience operating in West Africa specifically so please reach out to us to discuss your operational requirements in the region.

 

Annex A

Chronological List of Reported Maritime Crime And Piracy Events – 2023

  1. Sao Tome and Principe – Suspicious Approach – At approximately 02:00 hours local time, on Wednesday, 11 January 2023, an unnamed vessel was approached by two skiffs in approximate position 00:45N – 006:20E, approximately 27 NM northwest of Sao Tome Island.  The master took evasive action and increased the vessel’s speed causing the skiffs to abandon their approach. The crew and vessel are reported safe. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  2. Ghana Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 23:50 hrs UTC on Wednesday, 25 January 2023, the Hong Kong flagged Product tanker, MT Seaclipper, IMO number 9570101, was illegally boarded while at anchor in an unspecified position in the Takoradi Anchorage. Duty officer onboard an anchored tanker spotted three unauthorised persons on the forecastle area. Alarm raised, crew mustered, and port control notified. Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness the persons escaped without stealing anything. A patrol boat was dispatched to the location and investigated. (Source – multiple – B2)
  3. Cameroon Offshore – Hostile Approach – At approximately 03:45 hrs local time on Tuesday, 31 January 2023, two skiffs approached a Chinese fishing trawler operating off of Idenau in position 04:13N – 008:50E, approximately 31 NM from the Nigeria-Cameroon maritime border. Armed military guards onboard the trawler fired shots toward the two speed boats, which resulted in them aborting their approach and moving away from the area. The vessel, crew, and military guards have been reported as safe. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  4. Cameroon inshore – Armed Attack – At approximately 00:28 hrs local time on Thursday, 02 February 2023, an unnamed vessel was attacked off cap Debundscha, Cameroon. The vessel was attacked, but the attempted boarding was unsuccessful.  It is suspected that the vessel had an armed, military protection team on board. Vessel and crew were reported as safe. (Source – B2)
  5. Cameroon Inshore – Armed Attack – At 0400 hrs local time on Friday, 17 February 2023, an unnamed oil vessel was attacked and fired on by suspected militants while anchored off the Idabato subdivision of the Bakassi Peninsula.  The attackers boarded the vessel after shooting and killing two escorts. They then attempted to set the vessel ablaze.  The attackers escaped before Cameroonian security forces arrived. (Source media – C3)
  6. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 03:15 hrs local time on Wednesday, 01 March 2023, an unnamed container ship anchored in approximate position 06:05S – 012:14E, off Soyo, was boarded by armed men from a skiff.  The boarders threatened a crew member with a knife before stealing items from inside a container. The local authorities were alerted, and the crew was reported as safe. (Source – C3)
  7. Ghana Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 02:36 hrs UTC on Thursday, 02 March 2023, the Danish flagged product tanker Nord Stingray, IMO number 94197835, was illegally boarded while at anchor in position 04:53.70N  001:41.20W, in the Takoradi Anchorage. Duty crew onboard an anchored tanker noticed an unauthorised person near the forecastle and immediately raised the alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, the individual escaped with stolen ship’s stores. The incident was reported to Takoradi port control, and a patrol boat was sent to investigate. (Source – Multiple – B2)

 

  1. Congo Republic Offshore – Maritime Kidnap – At approximately 21:38hrs UTC on Saturday, 25 March 2023, more than ten pirates armed with guns attacked and boarded the Liberian flagged product tanker MT Monjasa reformer, IMO number 9255878, while underway in position 05:03.00S 009: 35.00E, approximately 135nm WSW of Pointe Noire. The alarm was raised, and all crew members mustered in the citadel. On being notified of the incident, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre immediately informed the regional authorities in the Gulf of Guinea and the French authorities and requested their assistance. The pirates managed to break into the citadel, took hostage all crew members, and took control of the tanker. They hijacked the tanker and sailed to another location. All communication with the tanker was lost as the pirates had destroyed the navigational and communication equipment. The IMB broadcast a missing tanker message to all ships at sea. On 30 March 2023, the French patrol boat Premier Maitre L’Her intercepted the tanker Off Bonny, Nigeria. A team boarded the vessel and treated three crew members for minor injuries. Part of the cargo was stolen and six crew were reported kidnapped. The tanker was then escorted to the port of Lome, Togo. On 08 May 2023, the Owners confirmed that the six kidnapped crew were released safely. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  2. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 0230 hrs UTC on Sunday, 26 March 2023, The Maltese flagged Tug Komodo, IMO number 9328273, was boarded by robbers who had approached the vessel in a canoe while the vessel was at anchor in position 08:44.61S 013:17.36E in the Luanda Anchorage.  Alert crew noticed the robbers and informed the OOW who raised the alarm and crew mustered resulting in the robbers escaping with stolen ship’s properties (including empty plastic food trays, an air hose which was coiled on top of the portside tugger winch, and the main deck c/w electrical extension wire in used daily for deck maintenance.  Port Authorities informed. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  3. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 0318 hrs local time, on Wednesday, 29 March, 2023, an unnamed container vessel was boarded while steaming in approximate position 06:08S – 012:15E off Soyo Anchorage.  The boarders threatened a duty crew member with a knife, then made their escape with items from one of the containers. Local authorities were informed of the incident and the crew were reported as safe. (Source – Multiple – B2) 
  4. Ivory Coast Inshore – Attempted Boarding – At approximately 22:00 hrs UTC on Friday, 31 March 2023, the Singapore flagged Container Ship, MV Maersk Vigo, IMO number 9401697, was approached and a boarding attempted while the vessel was anchored in position 04:44.47N 006:37.13W in the Port of San Pedro. Two unauthorised persons attempted to board the berthed ship by crawling under the razor wire while a third was assisting from their wooden canoe to move the razor wire. Alert crew detected the persons and raised the alarm. Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness, the persons escaped without stealing anything. At the time of event the pilot was still onboard. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  5. Ivory Coast Offshore – Maritime Hijack – At approximately 13:50hrs UTC on Monday, 10 April 2023, the Singapore flagged product tanker MT Success 9, IMO number 9258131, was attacked and boarded by twelve pirates armed with firearms while underway in position 00:06.90N 004:34.00W, approximately 307 nM SSW of Abidjan.  The pirates hijacked and self-navigated the tanker. On being notified of the incident, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre immediately informed the regional and French authorities in the Gulf of Guinea. A missing tanker message was broadcast to all ships to lookout for the tanker. Position updates received from all sources were communicated with the relevant authorities for their coordination. On 15 April, a French naval asset located the tanker and the tanker escorted to a safe port by an Ivory Coast Guard patrol boat. The pirates had destroyed the navigational equipment, handcuffed all 21 members of the crew with cable ties and stolen part of the cargo before escaping. All crew reported safe. (Source – Multiple  – B2)
  6. Angola Inshore Attempted Boarding – at approximately 02:30 hrs local time, on Wednesday, 19 April 2023, an unnamed refrigerated cargo ship was boarded while at anchor in approximate position 08:44S – 013:18E in the Luanda Anchorage. The duty watchman noticed an unauthorized person climb up the anchor chain and through the hawse pipe while another individual waited below on a small boat. The watchman raised the alarm and mustered the crew. Upon seeing the alerted crew, the perpetrator jumped into the water and escaped in the small boat. The master confirmed that all crew were safe and that nothing was reported stolen. (Source – Single security source – C3)
  7. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft  – At approximately 02:30 hrs UTC on Tuesday, 25 April 2023, the Panama flagged crew change vessel, MV Bourbon Shamal, IMO number 9656931, was boarded while anchored in position 08:47.06S 013:14.85S in the Luanda Inner Anchorage.  Alert crew noticed unauthorised persons onboard attempting to steal an outboard engine of the FRC. The alarm was raised and ship’s horn sounded resulting in the robbers escaping. Authorities informed and the police boarded the vessel for investigation. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  8. Lagos Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 05:00 hrs UTC on Tuesday, 28 April 2023, the Liberia flagged general cargo ship MSC Wave F, IMO number 9232462, was boarded by approximately 8 persons armed with knives while berthed in position 06:25.76N 003:20.53E in the Tin Can Island Terminal.   Alert crew on rounds spotted the persons resulting in the persons escaping empty handed in their boat.  (Source – Multiple – B2)

16. Gabon Inshore – Maritime Kidnapping – At approximately 02:00 hrs local time on Tuesday, 02 May 2023, Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier MV Grebe Bulker, IMO number 9441312, was boarded while at anchor in approximate position 00:16N – 009:29E in the Owendo Inner Anchorage in Libreville.  Three crew members were kidnapped. The remaining crew members and vessel were reported safe. The vessel notified the local authorities of the kidnapping. (Source – Multiple – B2)

Africa’s Biggest Refinery Launched in Nigeria

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On Monday, May 22, 2023, Africa’s biggest oil refinery was launched in Nigeria. The $19bn (£15.2bn) refinery, owned by Africa’s richest man, Aliko Dangote, is situated in the Lekki Free Trade Zone, Lekki area of Lagos.

In one of his last commitments before the inauguration of the new President yesterday (Monday 29th May), the then Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari was present at the event together with the Presidents other West African countries including Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo), Nana Akufo-Addo (Ghana), Macky Sall (Senegal), Mohamed Bazoum (Niger Republic) and Mahamat Déby (Chad) among others.

The refinery is expected to become operational in July 2023 and at the launch, Mr Dangote outlined his hopes for the refinery by saying: “Our first goal is to ramp up production of the various products to ensure that within this year, we are able to fully satisfy the nation’s demand for quality products.”

“We have built a refinery with a capacity to process 650,000 barrels per day in a single train — which is the largest in the world … We decided on a plant designed with state-of-the-art technology and a scale in a capacity that will be a game-changer in Africa and the global market,” Dangote added. 

Head of Nigeria’s Central Bank Godwin Emefiele said the refinery “is more than able to meet all of Nigeria’s domestic fuel consumption, given its processing capacity. Nigeria can be self-sufficient in all products that we consume and at the same time export our excess output to the rest of the world.”

Dangote expects to begin refining crude in June but London-based research consultancy Energy Aspects said commissioning was an intricate process and expects operations to start later this year, reaching 50-70% next year, with a staggered process of other units into 2025.Data in a document obtained from the Dangote company, shows that the Dangote Refinery could support the establishment of 26,716 fillings stations, create 100,000 direct and indirect jobs, and provide a $21bn market for Nigerian crude oil annually.

Read more about it here and here.

Nigerian FG Commissions New Assets to Ramp up Maritime Security

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On Sunday, May 21, 2023, the Nigerian Federal Government commissioned 14 enforcement and security boats belonging to the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency. These facilities were part of the $195m deep blue projects aimed at enhancing the nation’s maritime security and capacity in line with the best global practices.

Speaking during the commissioning at Kirikiri, Lagos, the Minister of Transportation, Muazu Sambo, said the completed projects were part of the government’s commitment to good governance and institutionalised policies for improved maritime safety and security. 

Other projects commissioned by the minister include five fully bulletproof patrol/security boats, five refurbished search and rescue/pollution control boats, four 35-seater staff ferries, a search and rescue clinic and an administrative building.

“These projects will enable the country to achieve and sustain safe and secure shipping, cleaner oceans and enhanced maritime capacity. The search and rescue clinics will enable the agency to fulfill its obligations to seafarers and the general public by providing top-notch medical care facilities,” Sambo said.

The Director General, NIMASA, Dr Bashir Jamoh, said the inclusion of the security/patrol to the deep blue project assets will help improve security on the waterways, especially considering the recent proliferation of oil theft.

“The successful reduction of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be credited to the tremendous effort of the Federal Government in terms of provision of infrastructures, through the deep blue project, investment towards vessels, maritime domain awareness platforms, as well as land, air and sea assets. Beyond the strides at overcoming maritime crime at the Gulf of Guinea, the management and safety of the nation’s inland waterways equally deserve attention,” Jamoh said. He stated that NIMASA is committed to ensuring the waterways are safe for local transportation and other leisure activities, so that more internal revenues are generated. 

“It is important to keep the inland waterways free of waste and pollutants so as to ensure they remain navigable in addition to keeping them secured from perpetrators of maritime crime.

“Notwithstanding the foregoing giant strides and the current state of security, the golden rule is that one must be persistent to remain successful. It is within the bearing of this frame of mind that we hinge the significance of today’s launching.

Read more here.

US Consular Team Attacked in Anambra Update 1 – Further Details and Analysis

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Further to our report dated 17 May 2023, additional details have been made public regarding the attack on a US diplomatic convoy on Tuesday, 16 May 2023 in Anambra State.

Statements by the US Government’s Secretary of State and the Governor of Anambra State, Professor Charles Chukwuma Soludo, and law enforcement personnel provided the following additional information.

Incident Details

  • The US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken issued a public statement on the incident in which he revealed the following;
    • The personnel in the convoy comprised of 5 employees of the US Mission to Nigeria and 4 members of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF).
    • At least 4 personnel of the convoy were killed in the attack.
  • The Inspector General of Police, Usman Alkali Baba, issued a statement condemning the attack and stating that 7 people were killed and burned in the attack. He also claimed that 2 persons had been abducted.  Other details stated that;
    • The journey was an advanced visit in support of a planned mission to a US-funded project on the right bank – Anambra State side – of the river Niger.
    • Although no motive for the attack had yet been identified, there was no indication that the convoy was specifically targeted.
  • The Governor of Anambra State, Prof Charles Chukwuma Soludo, issued a statement which stated that;
    • The attack took place along the Atani-Osamala Road in Ogbaru LGA. The location was described as a remote, riverine community.
    • The location was a known criminal hotspot where oil theft and other crime are common. The Governor stated that the sight of police uniforms can sometimes provoke an attack.
  • The Anambra State Police Commissioner, Echeng Echeng, revealed that the personnel in the convoy comprised of 5 male officials of the US Consulate and 4 armed Mobile Police escorted from Lagos. The purpose of the task was to assess the impact of erosion in Ogbaru LGA.
    • When questioned about the mission’s protocols, The Commissioner of Police (CP) Echeng stated that it is not the appropriate time to assign blame regarding whether the officials sought security clearance from the command before their arrival.  He did emphasise that that the US embassy has been helpful, providing the command with necessary information regarding the officials and their mission in Anambra.

Follow Up Action By The Nigerian Government

On 17th May, a joint operation involving NPF tactical teams and Nigerian Army elements was mounted against a criminal hideout in Ogwuaniocha in Ogbara LGA which was suspected of being the base from which the criminals who attacked the convoy were operating.  Two persons were arrested and are in custody assisting security forces personnel in their investigation. The arrested individuals’ telephones are being examined and their phone conversations analysed to gather more information.

Members of the US Mission to Nigeria are working with Nigerian security personnel to gather information as to the whereabouts and condition of those members of the convoy who are as yet unaccounted for.  The US Mission is also working with the Nigerian authorities to ensure that the perpetrators are identified and brought to justice.

Statement By The US State Department

“Unknown assailants yesterday attacked a convoy of two U.S. government vehicles in the Ogbaru Local Government Area of Anambra state, Nigeria. The convoy was carrying nine Nigerian nationals: five employees of the U.S. Mission to Nigeria and four members of the Nigeria Police Force. They were traveling in advance of a planned visit by U.S. Mission personnel to a U.S.-funded flood response project in Anambra.

We do not yet know the motive for the attack, but we have no indications at this time that it was targeted against our Mission. The assailants killed at least four members of the convoy, and U.S. Mission personnel are working urgently with Nigerian counterparts to ascertain the location and condition of the members of the convoy who are unaccounted for.

We condemn in the strongest terms this attack. We will work closely with our Nigerian law enforcement colleagues in seeking to bring those responsible to justice.

The United States has no greater priority than the safety and security of our personnel. We express our heartfelt condolences to the families of those killed in the attack, and pledge to do everything possible to safely recover those who remain missing. We deeply value our relationship with our Locally Employed Staff and our partnership with Nigeria.

The United States reaffirms its commitment to the people of Nigeria to assist in the fight against violence and insecurity”.

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State

Statement From The Inspector General of Police

“The Inspector-General of Police, IGP Usman Alkali Baba, CFR, has condemned in its totality the callous attack on a United States Consulate convoy and the killing and burning beyond recognition of seven (7) persons including US Embassy local staff and Police Mobile Force Officers, and their vehicles, as well as the likely abduction of two (2) others, at Atani Osamale Road, Ogbaru Local Government Area of Anambra State, who were visiting the area to assess its proneness to erosions as part of their humanitarian efforts.

The IGP, while expressing astonishment at the attack, described it as a clear indication of the attackers’ and/or non-state actors’ callousness and an act of wickedness to humanity, most especially to their kinsmen who have been considered to enjoy aids and palliatives from the attacked diplomats. The act is indeed evil and inhuman.

The IGP has ordered an immediate full-scale investigation into the attacks and has charged the investigative team to ensure the culprits and their sponsors are arrested and brought to book at the earliest possible time. Similarly, the IGP warns all non-state actors to cease their nefarious actions as the Nigeria Police Force, in synergy with other security agencies, will not hesitate to clamp down on them and their sponsors to rid the nation of their unpatriotic and disruptive activities.

In the same vein, the Inspector-General of Police, while commiserating with the US Consulate on the brazen murder and abduction of her local staff, and the families of the officers who paid the supreme price, assures that all hands are on deck to ensure the rescue of those abducted. The IGP while expressing the openness of the NPF to working with all foreign presence in the country to ensure the security of their assets and personnel, assures that the Nigeria Police is committed to the safety and security of all and sundry, including visitors and diplomats within the country”.

CSP OLUMUYIWA ADEJOBI, mnipr, mipra,
FORCE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER,
FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ABUJA

17th May 2023

Statement By The Governor of Anambra State

OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY ANAMBRA STATE GOVERNMENT ON THE UNPROVOKED KILLINGS OF UNITED STATES (US) EMBASSY STAFF, OTHERS IN ANAMBRA STATE*

“On behalf of the government and great people of Anambra State, the Governor, Prof Charles Chukwuma Soludo, CFR, expresses deep condolences to the bereaved families and organisations, particularly the US Embassy, over the death of their staff and policemen who were attacked by gunmen along Atani-Osamala Road, Ogbaru Local Government Area on Tuesday, 16th May 2023 while they were on a mission in Anambra State.

We strongly condemn the heinous and unprovoked attack. Over the last one year, we have worked very hard with our gallant security forces to massively degrade criminality and restore law and order. We can proudly assert that Anambra is currently one of the safest states in Nigeria.

Only two weeks ago, the dreaded and notorious criminal gang leader operating mostly in a neighboring state was gunned down with four of his team members when they made incursion into Anambra and recovered huge deadly weapons. The criminals are largely on the run or feeling the heat of our zero tolerance to criminality.

This incident in a remote riverine community in Ogbaru local government is a reminder that patches of these criminal gangs can still unleash senseless and murderous acts.

Whatever the identity or motive of the attackers, Anambra State government will actively work with the security agencies to smoke out the criminals and bring them to justice.

We call on anyone with information on the identity or whereabouts of the criminals to offer same on our secured security phone numbers or to any of the security agencies and such informant will be handsomely rewarded. Investigations are underway.

We assure our residents and visitors of our continued commitment to law and order. If anything, this incident has emboldened our drive.

As the investigation continues, it is important to highlight an important preliminary takeaway from the facts so far. It is evident from reports by the various security agencies in the state that the visiting team made their own security arrangements and totally bypassed the existing security architecture in the state and the state government was not aware of the “humanitarian mission” of the visiting team. 

In a place like parts of Ogbaru where security forces have been fighting the criminals and oil bunkerers, the sight of few policemen can indeed attract vengeance from the criminal gangs. Correcting such lapses and ensuring better coordination will help prevent such avoidable incidents in the future.

The Government of Anambra State once again, expresses its deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims. We reassure the United States Embassy in Nigeria of our unwavering commitment to the safety and security of its officials in our State.

Together, we will prevail over those who seek to disrupt the peace and stability of our society”.

Christian Aburime
Press Secretary to the Governor of Anambra State

Extracts from the Anambra State Police Commissioner’s Statement 

“As you are probably aware, a team of officials from the Lagos Consulate of the United States of America and their police escorts (USA) were ambushed on 16/05/2023.

Consequently, a joint team of Mobile Policemen and troops of the Nigerian Navy stationed in Onitsha was immediately deployed to the area. Upon arrival at the scene of the incident, the joint security team sighted and engaged the assailants in a shot-out, but they escaped through a nearby forest.

Yesterday – 17/05/2023, joint security forces comprising police tactical teams from the command and troops of the Nigerian Army as well as the Nigerian Navy raided a camp in Ogwuaniocha community of Ogbaru LGA, which was suspected to be the hideout of the assailants but discovered that it had been deserted. Two persons of interest were arrested and they currently assisting the police in the investigation. The criminal camp was razed down by the joint security team.”

 

Further Analysis

The project site area where the attack took place is in an area known to harbour organised crime gangs involved in crude oil theft (bunkering) and known camps believed to harbour armed criminal elements.  These facts underline the need for accurate and timely risk intelligence assessments when operating in many parts of Nigeria.

It is also essential to ensure that the circle of knowledge regarding mission plans, routes, timings and security protocols are shared with the appropriate authorities – subject to a full risk assessment and application of the ‘Need To Know’ principle.

Arete provide a variety of secure journey management services to enable safe movement throughout the high-risk environments found in Africa.  This includes services such as the provision of Personal Security Details (PSDs) for secure transportation and movement as well as risk and threat assessments prior to any such travel.  Arete’s journey management specialists are highly trained in all aspects of protective movement and are practised in undertaking dynamic and detailed threat analysis and route assessment to ensure all movements are undertaken securely.

US Consular Team Attacked in Anambra, Four Dead – An Initial Analysis

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During the afternoon of 16 May 2023, a US consular team travelling in Anambra State was attacked and 4 personnel were killed.  No US citizens were involved in the incident, but the significance of the event should  not be understated.   It is clear that this is a key escalation in the violence that is affecting the region, and Anambra State in particular, and the response from the Nigerian Security Forces is likely to be substantial.  

The impact of this event will be significant on most organisations operating in the area, or that will potentially operate in the area, and all concerned parties should look to review their risk assessments and security risk mitigation strategies for the area.

What Do We Know So Far?

At approximately 15:30 hrs local time on Tuesday 16 May 2023, a convoy of vehicles from the US Consulate was attacked on Osamale Road in the Atani area of the Ogbaru Local Government Area.  The location is south of the main urban centre of Onitsha and close to the Niger River. 

The gunmen killed 2 x local nationals who were employed as the vehicle driver and co-driver, and 2 x Nigerian nationals employed by USAID were also killed.  The gunmen then set the vehicle containing the bodies on fire.  No US citizens were involved in the incident.

The vehicle carrying the USAID personnel was reportedly marked accordingly and would have been identifiable from the outside as being associated with the US consular mission.

On identifying the security forces team in the second vehicle, the attackers then abducted the driver and 2 police officers, escaping with them and the vehicle.

The reason for the journey being undertaken is not clear at this time, and we await clarification as to which specific consular elements were involved, however, Tobechukwu Ikenga, the spokesperson for the Anambra State Police Command, issued a statement in which he said that neither the Anambra State Police Command nor any other security agency in the State had been aware of the entry into the State by the US team.  Ikenga went on to add that security forces were mounting a follow up operation to rescue the abducted personnel.

Further details will likely emerge in the coming hours / days.  

 

The Risk Environment

The security environment in Anambra State has been steadily deteriorating over the past 3 months.  This trend has accelerated in the last 2 weeks, with an emerging pattern of attacks on members of the security forces, some political actors, notable community members as well as on infrastructure. 

Anambra generally is known to present a high risk to travellers and the specific area where the attack took place is assessed to present a high to extreme level of risk.  

Given that members of the security forces are frequently attacked on sight, the presence of a police escort team might have actually drawn attention to the movement and elevated the risk of the convoy being targeted.  

 

Who Were the Perpetrators?

In the second part of our recent Deep Dive Analysis of terrorism in Nigeria here, we examined the characteristics and capabilities of extremist elements and groups operating in the South-East geopolitical zone.   

The area where the attack took place is a known operating area for the Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB) and its associated paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN).  It is most likely that elements of the ESN were responsible for the attack.

The above notwithstanding, this is the second attack in recent days in which the victims have been shot dead and the bodies burned in the vehicles.  It begs the question as to whether this is just coincidence or an emerging modus operandi that is the signature of a specific and highly lethal group.

The Biafran Government in Exile, an extra-territorial group that exists among the Igbo diaspora, was quick to dissociate itself from the attack.  In a rambling statement in which he referred to Islamic State and Boko Haram, Simon Ekpa, the group’s Prime Minister, stated that the movement condemned the attack on the convoy.

 

Was This a Statement Attack against the US?

It has been speculated that the attack was a retaliation for the US imposing visa restrictions on a list of Nigerian political and electoral actors believed to be responsible for undermining the democratic processes in the recent federal and state level elections in the country.  

Our analysis indicates that the links between this list and any named individual close to or within the Biafran separatist movements is tenuous to non-existent.  Therefore, this is not believed to be the motive for the attack.   

Similarly, the US has not designated IPOB as a terrorist group – unlike the UK and the Nigerian governments.  

Given the above it is highly unlikely that this was an attack specifically being made against a US target.

 

Assessment

Given the levels of violence employed and the location, the attackers are most likely members of an element of the ESN.

At this time it is also assessed that the convoy possibly entered the area without any pre-emptive liaison with local security forces commanders. This would have limited the security mitigation measures being employed to the small security detachment that was organic to the US team, which would have been (and evidently was) quickly overwhelmed once the attack commenced.  There would not have been a quick reaction force in the area, or even a second escort vehicle to protect the convoy.

It is also assessed that the convoy was a target of opportunity and was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.  There is no evidence or indication that the team was attacked because of its association with the US Government.  It is notable that the attackers were not deterred by the reported markings on the US vehicle and this also indicates that they either didn’t know who or what the vehicle represented, or that they were not concerned by the fact that they were attacking a US government asset.  If the latter is the case, it indicates a level of confidence and boldness that represents a significant elevation of the threat in the area.

Looking ahead, the area will become extremely challenging for movement in the immediate future as the Nigerian security forces respond aggressively to this event.  This will be characterised by the deployment of large numbers of uniformed personnel, the establishment of multiple roadblocks and an aggressive posture being adopted by security forces personnel.  The general targeting of uniformed personnel means the security forces will be on high levels of alert which could increase tensions yet further as the boldness of this attack, and the significance of its target, will only serve to heighten their nervousness.  This increase in tension and nervousness among personnel might present an elevated threat to travellers approaching roadblocks and checkpoints if they are not extremely cautious and completely compliant. 

Arete is a private risk management company providing turnkey risk management solutions to clients throughout the complex and often challenging environment of West and East Africa.

We provide a variety of secure journey management services to enable safe movement throughout the high-risk environments found in Africa.  This includes services such as the provision of Personal Security Details (PSDs) for secure transportation and movement as well as risk and threat assessments prior to any such travel.  Arete’s journey management specialists are highly trained in all aspects of protective movement and are practised in undertaking dynamic and detailed threat analysis and route assessment to ensure all movements are undertaken securely.

Nigerian Navy to set up Maritime Taskforce

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On Tuesday, May 2nd, 2023 the Bulk carrier GREBE BULKER was reportedly attacked by pirates at Owendo Anchorage, Gabon in the Gulf of Guinea. According to the TradeWinds report, 3 crew members were kidnapped, including the Captain, Second and Third Officers. However the other 17 members of the crew were unharmed. The ship had arrived at Owendo Anchorage on Apr 30 from Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

There has been a spike in attacks in the Gulf of Guinea in recent weeks including the kidnap of 6 crew members of the Monjasa Reformer as we earlier reported here. It was reported on 8th May that the kidnapped crew had been released.

In response to the recent attacks, the Nigerian Navy said on 15th April that the service would sustain its presence in the Gulf of Guinea region as well as directing its “operational bases” to “enhance efforts to dominate their area of operations”.

On Wednesday, May 10th, the Nigerian Navy disclosed plans to set up a Maritime Task Force with other countries in the Gulf of Guinea in order to boost security and rid the region of criminalities and other emerging threats. The Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Awaal Gambo, made this known during a press conference on the Nigerian Navy Presidential Fleet Review (PFR) 2023, in Abuja.

The Naval Chief, who was represented by Rear Admiral Saidu Garba, Chief of Policy and Plans, said that the formation of the task force would be discussed on Saturday, 18th May, 2023 during the scheduled activities to mark the Presidential Fleet Review (PFR) which is expected to have heads of Navies and other key stakeholders in attendance. 

“One of the deliverables of that engagement would be a formation of a task force, Once we form it, it would be conducted among the nations across the entire Gulf, in which there is information sharing, joint operations at sea; all these will ensure we create a proper architecture that we will use to fight criminalities in our waters”, he said, while noting that incidents of piracy have crept up in the last few months. He explained that Nigeria would take the lead on this and bring other countries to setup the force, leveraging existing legal instruments such as the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2015), and an African Union resolution for the formation of maritime task forces across the regions of Africa. 

The PFR will run from Friday 19th Monday 22nd May 2023 in Lagos. “The PFR involves 16 NN warships, 3 x AW109E Nigerian Navy helicopters and a mix of Nigerian Air Force (NAF) Aircraft,” Garba noted. He said some foreign warships from allied nations including Spain, Brazil and Ghana are also expected to participate in the exercise.

Read more here.

Turkish National Abducted in Abuja

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On Wednesday May 3, a 52-year-old Turkish national, Erdogan Guler, and one other yet-to-be-identified man were reportedly abducted by three gunmen in the Kubwa area of Abuja, Nigeria’s federal capital territory.

According to a report from the Saturday PUNCH newspaper, the incident happened around 7pm on Wednesday, May 3, 2023, and was reported to the Byazhin Police Division, Abuja.

A police source was reported as saying –  “A furniture maker, Babagana Usman, reported that around 7pm on Wednesday, May 3, three unknown gunmen in a Toyota Prado SUV, whose registration number is yet unknown, abducted his foreign partner, Erdogan Guler, 52-year-old male, who is a Turkish national, alongside one other person whose name and address have yet to be known, at his (Guler’s) premises on Leaner Estate, Brickcity, Kubwa. However, the anti-kidnapping arm of the SCID is investigating the incident and efforts are being made by the police to rescue the victims and arrest the hoodlums.”

No further information on the incident as at the time of this report.

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The Indigenous People of Biafra – The Southeast’s Own Terrorist Group

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Background and Context

Designated as a terrorist group in 2017 by Federal Government, the Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist movement comprising of numerous factions and associated groups.  It operates in a similar manner to that of the now defunct Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which became a franchised social justice movement and a flag of convenience under which numerous criminal groups operated.  IPOB has a similar character, which allows criminals to attain a sense of self-justification by attaching themselves to a more widely recognised and widely supported socio-political activist movement. 

According to the report published by the US think-tank the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), IPOB is the 10th most deadly terrorist group globally, with 40 attacks in 2022 in which 57 people were killed and 16 injured.  This is a significant increase on the 26 attacks and 34 deaths inflicted by the group in 2021.  While these numbers might not seem particularly high, they reflect a trajectory that indicates a steady escalation of violence in the South-East in the last two years.  

In 2020, IPOB created an armed paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), which is implicated in the deaths of civilians and members of the security forces as well as attacks on state infrastructure and property.  The UK government also designated the movement as a terrorist organisation in May 2022 and excluded members of IPOB from eligibility to claim asylum in UK territories.  Its statement read: 

“IPOB is proscribed as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government, and members of the group and its paramilitary wing – the Eastern Security Network (created in December 2020) – have reportedly committed human rights violations in Nigeria (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) and various media articles in Activities and Clashes between state and IPOB).  If a person has been involved with IPOB (and/or an affiliated group), MASSOB or any other ‘Biafran’ group that incites or uses violence to achieve its aims, decision-makers must consider whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses under the Refugee Convention is applicable. Persons who commit human rights violations must not be granted asylum. If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.”

The recent elections held in Nigeria, at the federal and state levels, were fiercely contested, and the Igbo leader of the Labour Party (LP), Peter Obi, was surprisingly successful, breaking the stranglehold of the binary political system that has prevailed since independence.  His success took many by surprise, to the extent that Obi has launched a legal challenge to the outcome of the presidential vote.  While there is no suggestion that the LP has any connection to IPOB, the surge in support for the party across the southern half of the country was significant. Nevertheless, the LP is a nation-wide party, and its agenda and manifesto should not be confused with that of the separatists of IPOB and its paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network. 

Arrest, Evolution and Escalation

In 2021, the then leader of IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, was arrested and remains in prison to date, despite a Nigerian court ordering his release in October 2022 after ruling that he had been illegally arrested in Kenya and extradited to Nigeria.  Kanu’s arrest and detention dislocated the leadership and disrupted the cohesion of the movement and its political objectives, resulting in a leadership contest that led to a factionalised movement with competing and centrifugal internal forces.  Nevertheless, the movement became more lethal in 2022 than in any previous year.

IPOB and the ESN have been accused of causing fatalities among the civilian population – indeed, among their ethnic Igbo brethren.  The movement has an established track record of inflicting stay at home orders on the population, requiring people to stay in their houses for periods up to and sometimes exceeding seven days.  This causes extreme hardship in a population that survives to a significant extent as street traders and small business owners.  Many people are unable to afford to stockpile supplies of food and potable water ahead of such orders.  The movement routinely issues threats against breaches of the order and there are recorded instances of people who have breached the orders being attacked, and in some instances killed, by members of ESN.   

The activities of IPOB and the ESN have provoked a heavy response from the Nigerian security forces and Amnesty International has accused the security forces of using excessive force and claim as many as 115 people were killed in a four-month period in 2021 alone.  The government of Imo State, as well as many civilians and the security forces themselves, claim that many of the killings of civilians are actually attributable to the ESN.  Many civilians claim that the ESN is targeting them, extorting money and material support while the security forces target them for allegedly supporting the ESN and IPOB.  Security forces have also been accused of inflicting civilian causalities as highlighted by the security forces action at Okporo on 02 August 2021, when homes, businesses and vehicles belonging to people suspected of supporting the separatists were destroyed by security forces.  Other properties were burned by members of the ESN who accuse their owners of failing to support them. The impact on the population has been significant, and while many people support the idea of an independent Biafra, many people do not support IPOB and the ESN. 

A Complex Landscape of Movements

IPOB and the associated ESN are not the only separatists or insurgents operating in the South-East.  Other movements include:

  • The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSSOB).  This movement pre-dates IPOB, having been formed in 1999 under the leadership of Ralph Uwazuruike.  Although it is accused of acts of violence by the Nigerian government, according to its leaders it is a movement dedicated to peaceful agitation with the aim of achieving an independent Biafran state.  Some of its agitations have been deliberately provocative and aimed at the Abuja regime.  Its campaign is designed to generate sympathy and support among international audiences and it is widely supported in the Igbo diaspora.  MASSOB is not proscribed as a terrorist group.
  • The Biafra Zionist Front (BZF), formerly known as the Biafra Zionist Movement, broke away from MASSOB in 2010 under the leadership of Benjamin Onwuka.  The group agitates for the restoration of Biafra and its independence from Nigeria. The group claims to be supported by Israel and the United States.  Its official ideology is Zionism.  Despite its claim to be a peaceful agitation movement, the group was responsible for an attack on the Enugu Government House on 07-08 March 2014.  Onwuka issued a threat to non-Igbo Nigerians living in Biafran territory ordering them to vacate their land by 31 March 2014 or “face the bloodbath that will come afterward.”  Three months later, on 05 June 2014, 13 members of the BZF attacked the Enugu State Broadcasting Service (ESBS).  Their intention was to make a public announcement via the Service’s radio and television channels declaring the sovereign state of Biafra.  Onwuka, a lawyer who also practiced in the UK, was arrested following this attack and detained but was released in 2017.  He immediately returned to leading the BZM, and in June 2017 the group proclaimed the independence of Biafra and named Onwuka as president.
  • The Biafran Government In Exile (BGIE) is an extra-territorial group that exists among the Igbo diaspora.   Its website claims it was established in the US in 2001 and that it is the reincarnation of the exiled leadership of General Ojukwu and other survivors of the Nigerian Civil War.  It also praises Nnamdi Kanu and espouses a peaceful agitation for secession and independence.
  • The Biafran Liberation Army is a movement about whom very little is known, although Simon Ekpa, posted a Tweet on 06 April 2023 in which he stated that “The Biafra Liberation Army BLA has launched and commenced OPERATION SANCTITY across Biafraland and Biafra territory. This operation tackle (sic) the illegal road block by the terrorist @HQNigerianArmy  where they facilitates (sic) kidnapping of Biafrans at checkpoints, it is also a place where we have noticed many disappearances of Biafra youths”.

The entire structure of IPOB is loose and reflects a more franchised aggregation of local agitation groups, criminal gangs, and quasi-political movements.  As stated above, the IPOB name is a flag of convenience and a rallying call for a wide ranging, but still relatively small, movement for independence.  

The New Political Paradigm

 

While there is a long-standing and strong desire among Igbo people to see an Igbo President lead the country, the best chance of that becoming a reality was the recent surge in the political fortunes of the Labour Party (LP) under Peter Obi.  That opportunity now seems to have been missed.

Obi is not affiliated to IPOB in any overt or identifiable way, and has a wider, federal political agenda according to his manifesto.  Had he won the presidency, it is possible that the result would have impacted heavily on the momentum for Biafran independence, with many agitators seeing an opportunity to exploit his Igbo credentials and sympathies.  

In November 2022 Obi stated that he would enter into a dialogue with IPOB (among other terrorist and separatist groups in the country) if he became President.  As a former governor of Anambra State, he would have had more exposure to the various agitators and independence movements calling for an independent Biafran state than either of the other two main candidates.  Further indicating his sympathies with the Igbo agitators, in January 2023, he also stated that he would remove IPOB from the list of proscribed groups in the country.  However, he went on to say that he is committed to “One United and Secured Progressive Nigeria”.  

The balance of these seemingly contradictory signals from Obi generates uncertainty as to how the separatists and agitators might react if he becomes President.  Whatever the outcome, it is likely that the Biafra movements will increase their agitation in the coming months.

Equally, the win by the All Progressive Congress (APC) nominee, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, might also galvanise the separatist movement to agitate more aggressively in the face of another President who reportedly has strong links to organisations such as the Oodua Peoples’ Congress, a youth organisation that sometimes acts as a militia and which has a history of confrontation with Igbo people in Yorubaland.  Many will see the win by Tinubu as a provocation and a marginalisation of the Igbo people – especially in the context of an extant legal challenge by the Igbo front-runner, Peter Obi.

For its part, ahead of the elections, IPOB issued a statement through its spokesperson, Emma Powerful, on 02 January 2023, in which he stated during an interview with media that IPOB:

“Has no interest whatsoever in the 2023 Nigerian selection process. The enemies of Biafra, however, keep on linking IPOB to those criminals who wish to demonise IPOB and ESN. This strategy of trying to drag IPOB into a process that ab initio is programmed to produce a particular result is simply to give legitimacy to a flawed process and IPOB will not be part of it”.

Powerful went on to state that IPOB has no link to Simon Ekpa.  His words exposed the deep factional fault lines that divide the various Biafra movements, fault lines that effectively weaken the overall strategy and momentum of the separatist goals they all share.  

Recent Developments

In his January 2023 statement, Peter Obi said that “I live in Onitsha, and I can tell you they are not terrorists. They (IPOB members) are people I pass on the road every time, (and) every day.  I meet them and live with them. In fact, I usually see (IPOB) people gathering, and not one day has there been a threat or molestation or anything from them, even when they gather.”  He insisted that IPOB is not a threat to Nigeria, saying that the violence in the South-East is only credited to IPOB by the Nigerian Police.  However, accounts of violence in the region by local people suggest that the ESN is behind much of the violence.  When addressing the Chatham House think-tank in London on 17 January, Obi stressed that he is not a supporter of IPOB, saying that leadership failure in Nigeria was responsible for agitations in many parts of the country.

“You are not following me, even yesterday, I spoke about Biafra being ended 53 years ago. It’s all over the place in the space. I condemned all agitators but in condemning them, you have to look at what brought about these agitations all over the place. So, we have IPOB, we have the Yoruba Nation movement, we have all sorts.  When you have created this level of massive poverty, where 63 percent of your population is poor, you’re going to create all sorts of problems. I was speaking to a British minister this morning, I said we have about 40 percent unemployment, about 60 percent youth unemployment, young people in their productive age doing nothing, if you have 15 percent unemployment in Britain today, you’re going to have massive agitation. Nobody will be able to leave his house.  What you have seen is a cumulative effect of leadership failure over the years, which will be solved by good governance, When people start seeing justice, fairness, and inclusive government and doing the right thing, all those things will start reversing itself (sic)”.

In February 2023, as Nigeria prepared itself for a critical Presidential and Senatorial election process, one of the successor leaders, Simon Ekpa, a Finnish citizen of Nigeria origin was arrested in Finland on charges of financial misconduct.  He was released after a short time in custody.  The Nigerian government has repeatedly called upon the Finnish government to move against Ekpa, who leads one of the factions within the broader IPOB movement and uses social media to mobilise opinion and incite violence in the south-east and parts of the south-south geopolitical zones.

Police said that IPOB was responsible for an attack in Enugu on 22 February 2023 in which a senatorial candidate for the opposition Labour Party, Oyibo Chukwu, was killed while he was returning from the campaign trail. The car containing his body was then set on fire.  Armed men also attacked the governorship candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), and a campaign bus of the main opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), killing the driver.

On 11 April 2023, IPOB claimed the failure of the Supreme Court to set a date to hear the appeals against the continued detention of Nnamdi Kanu was politically contrived and a reflection of the absence of impartiality on the part of the Court.  It was referring to the delays in his release following the 13 October 2022 Court of Appeal ruling that the IPOB leader was brought back to Nigeria from Kenya in an act of extra-ordinarily rendition that was a violation of the country’s extradition treaty and also a breach of Kanu’s fundamental human rights.

On the political front, on the weekend of 15-16 April, 2023, IPOB issued a statement dissociating itself from the Biafran Government In Exile (BGIE), and its associated Liberation Army, saying these organisations were created and sponsored by the Federal Government to deter and distract people from supporting IPOB. 

Among the most recent attacks mounted by the movement, it was reported on 20 April 2023, that a firefight had taken place at Ubah Agwa/Izombe tropical rain Forest in Oguta Local Government Area (LGA).  Police claim to have wounded several members of the ESN.

Conclusions

While the GTI report holds IPOB as the tenth most dangerous terrorist group in the world, the actual numbers of incidents and victims remains relatively low when compared to the impact of attacks in the country by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa.  The impact of IPOB/ESN activity is most keenly felt by fellow Igbo indigenes, with a Federal Government response that has been unsubtle and sometimes heavy-handed.  The latter will only act as a recruiting sergeant for the separatist movements and their armed wings and supporters.

The various Biafran secessionist movements will likely ramp up their rhetoric and agitation for independence in coming months.  The outcome of the February Presidential elections is unlikely to calm the situation, even in the extremely unlikely event that Peter Obi wins his lawsuit against INEC and the APC and is inaugurated as President.

The fragmented and factionalised secessionist landscape will remain highly competitive.  This internecine struggle will ultimately render the struggle a failure and the status quo will endure.

IPOB/ESN violence will continue to impact on ordinary Nigerian citizens, including the Igbo people they claim to represent and on whose behalf they claim to be waging their struggle against the State.

Operations by the Nigerian Security Forces will likely also escalate after, as seems likely, Tinubu is inaugurated as President.  This will provoke a backlash as well as claim and counter-claim as to which side is responsible for any resultant deaths and destruction of property.

An Oodua Peoples’ Congress and other Yoruba youth groups will be emboldened by a Tinubu presidency.  This has the potential to lead to further violence and communal conflict in states outside those identified by IPOB as being constituents of the Biafran State.  Likely hotspots for such activity are located in the major metropolitan and urban areas of Lagos and other cities in the South-West.  Additionally, any attacks by IPOB/ESN on non-Igbo citizens in the South-East will probably trigger retaliatory pogroms in Kaduna and Kano.  

 

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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Introduction

The recently published Global Terrorism Index (GTI) survey of terrorism around the world in 2022 highlights a number of important trends and developments in the fight against Islamist terrorism in Nigeria.  This Deep Dive reviews the key points from the report against historical and regional context, and examines the current situation and possible future developments.

The report indicates that Nigeria has seen an improvement in the number of terrorist attacks and related fatalities, but other sources indicate an expanding footprint, with Islamist terrorist activity spreading from the extreme north-east of the country to more central and southern areas. 

Having suffered at least 865 fatalities in 2020, Nigeria reported a 43% decrease in terrorist deaths in 2021 and a further 35% in 2022. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat posed by Islamist groups Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) remains severe in some areas and significant across the country.

The report indicates that Nigeria lies in eighth position on the table of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2022 – three places lower than in 2021.  Burkina Faso and Mali sit in second and third positions on the same table.  Complicating this assessment, the Global and International Terrorism Research/Analysis Group in its half yearly report for January-June 2022 assessed that Nigeria was the second most attacked and terrorized country in the world with Iraq being the first and Syria being the third.  Their report stated that while Iraq recorded 337 terrorist attacks, Nigeria recorded 305 attacks with Syria coming third following 142 terrorist’s attacks.  

This apparent divergence in assessment highlights the problem of using statistical analysis when examining a subject where the definitions of what are relevant or not differ significantly.  Some sources quote attacks by herdsmen on farming communities as being terrorist in nature.  Other sources attribute the attacks by roving bands of motorcycle mounted bandits in the North West as being terrorism. This problem is also compounded by unreliable reporting of incidents and casualties, with authorities manipulating data to represent a specific operational, social or political agenda point.  

Key to note is this analysis does not examine the additional terrorist threats posed by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east region, the issue of marauding bandit gangs in the north-west or itinerant cattle herders in the mid-belt and southern states.  Each of these additional elements carry out attacks on communities that are very similar in nature to many of the attacks carried out by Islamist groups however the drivers and motivation behind these attacks are frequently very different, ranging from simple gangsterism to the struggle for grazing rights for cattle herders.  Designated as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government in 2017, IPOB has a socio-political agenda and aims to achieve independence from the Federal state, however, IPOB is not a homogenous, singular entity, but more of a franchised brand comprising of numerous factions, each with its own aims and strategy.  Additionally although many of the small groups flying the IPOB flag are simply gangsters and extortionists, IPOB elements still accounted for over 40 attacks in 2022 resulting in 57 deaths – its most active and lethal year of operations to date.  The threat posed by IPOB will be examined in our next Deep Dive. 

Overview

The impact of terrorism in Nigeria continues to decline in terms of both the number of incidents and deaths with the latter falling by 23% from the figures recorded in 2021 and the former falling by 120 attacks as compared with 2021.  Overall this represents the lowest attack rate per annum since 2011.

Despite a dramatic reduction in the number of attacks carried out by ISWA (57 attacks resulting in 211 deaths), the group’s lethality increased with 3.7 deaths per attack in 2022 compared to 3.0 in 2021 making it the most lethal terrorist group in the country for the third consecutive year.

Boko Haram (BH) activity also decreased substantially in 2022.  Attacks almost halved from 91 attacks in 2021 to 48 in 2022 – the lowest incident rate for more than a decade, but deaths attributable to BH increased slightly from 69 in 2021 to 72 in 2022 – again, and like ISWA, reflecting an increased lethality of their operations.  

Terrorist target selection also notably shifted from the police to the Nigerian Army.  Nigerian military personnel were targeted in 25 percent of all attacks with civilians the second most targeted group following closely at 24 percent of targeted attacks.   The police, previously the preferred target, fell to third place, being targeted in just 18 percent of attacks.

The lethality of attacks increased considerably for civilians, seeing them suffer 196 deaths in 2022, an increase of 78% over the previous year.  Conversely, the military, despite becoming the target of choice, suffered 74% fewer deaths in 2022 (58 fatalities) compared to the previous year.

The epicentre of Islamist associated terrorist activity remains the extreme north-east of the country – primarily in Borno State which saw a significant reduction (12%) in terrorism related deaths in 2022.  This is largely attributable to the decline of BH, as large numbers of its fighters and supporters surrender to security forces.  The erosion of BH combat power is attributable to powerful and well-supported opposition and competition from ISWA, which is now the preeminent terrorist group in Borno State.  Severe defeats, mass defections of its members to ISWA, and much improved counter-terrorism efforts by the Nigerian government and foreign military forces generated a perfect storm of challenges for BH, which its dwindling numbers and collapsing support in the indigenous population also significantly undermined its position.   

In a reflection of this shift in power between the two groups, in Borno State, ISWA mounted 40 attacks resulting in 168 deaths in 2022.  BH mounted just 6 incidents causing 63 deaths.   The greater lethality of BH attacks is deceptive as the group is more inclined to carry out mass casualty attacks on soft (civilian) targets than ISWA, which remains focussed on security forces targets.  Despite the improving overall trend in the statistics for terrorism, Borno State remains the most kinetic and lethal state in the country.  The most lethal terrorist attack of the year occurred in the state when 50 civilians were massacred by gunmen who accused the community of harbouring informants for the security forces. 

 

Contest Between ISWA and BH

The struggle for supremacy between ISWA and BH has its roots in philosophical differences between the Islamic State philosophy and that of BH.   ISWA was opposed to mass killings of Muslim civilians, whereas BH used such attacks as a tactic to subdue the indigenous population and force them to support the movement with food, shelter and wives.  ISWA was focussed on the broader aims of jihad and the establishment of Islamism throughout West Africa.  The two divergent philosophies generated tensions that deteriorated into open conflict between the two factions.  

This contest between the two groups is better understood when one examines their origins.  Following the 2002 emergence of Boko Haram officially known as Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (Group of the People of Sunnah for Dawah and Jihad), the group underwent several evolutions, growing from a small, rag-tag band of proselytising Wahabi idealists armed with spears, bows and arrows and primitive home-made firearms to a well organised insurgent group that uses sophisticated firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drones.  By 2014, the group had evolved sufficiently to enable it to seize control of most of Borno State and large tracts of neighbouring Adamawa and Yobe as they strived to establish their own caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin.  Indeed, in 2014, BH proved to be a more deadly threat than ISIS, reportedly killing as many as 6,664 people.  The insurgency spread into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic, reflecting its essentially Kanuri tribal origins and support base. 

The group was responsible for a number of high-profile attacks on communities and security force bases.   In 2015, a South African led private military company (PMC), STTEP International, led a successful surge operation that drove BH and ISWA elements out of many areas, pushing them back towards Lake Chad.  This setback, saw BH on the defensive, coming under attack by an increasingly well trained (mainly by foreign military training teams) Nigerian Army.  In 2016, Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) announced that it had appointed Abu-Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of the group.  The existing BH leader at that time, Abubakar Shekau, refused to accept the new leader, creating division within the group between those that supported Barnawi and those loyal to Shekau.  Those loyal to Barnawi adopted the name of Province (ISWAP), later changing to Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA).  This development introduced significant increased complexity into the security environment in Nigeria.  

Following the factionalisation of BH, attacks by Shekau loyalists on communities, farmers and schools escalated, triggering an internationally supported effort to mount a counter-insurgency campaign by Nigerian security forces.   Nevertheless, the attacks continue.  Estimates indicate that by March 2022 the insurgency had resulted in the deaths of at least 350,000 people and 3 million had become internally displaced persons (IDPs).    Despite the hard-core members of BH continuing the insurgency, large numbers of less committed fighters have surrendered to security forces.  Between July 2021 and May 2022, a total of 13,360 BH fighters and 13,468 BH family members surrendered to security forces.  This flow of surrendering BH fighters has continued into 2023 and continues to weaken the group.  Even in the face of a steady erosion of its combat power, BH remains a potent threat and is capable of mounting complex and ‘spectacular’ attacks at times and places of its choosing.

On 24 January 2023, more than 200 Boko Haram fighters surrendered to security forces at military barracks in Konduga and Banki in Borno state following an attack on the group by the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP).  ISWAP attacked BH camps in Mantari and Maimusari in Bama, also in Borno State.  The attack continued a sequence of attack and counterattack by the two groups on one another’s positions that began in early 2020. The clashes have claimed at least 1,320 lives from both groups in a prolonged battle for supremacy.

Terrorists Embrace New Technology

In the period preceding the conflict between BH and ISWA, the latter embraced their fellow Islamists to the extent that BH fighters were being trained at terrorist training camps in the Sahel and Middle East.  This allowed the group to exploit the use of IEDs and more advanced tactics techniques and procedures.  Their attacks became more lethal and effective in overrunning and defeating the Nigeria security forces.  While the IEDs being used by BH were relatively primitive compared to the very advanced technology seen in Iraq and Syria, their introduction changed the way the campaign was being fought.  Security forces suddenly found the roads to be a much more dangerous proposition as several vehicles were destroyed by IEDS and lives were lost.  Additionally, the introduction of person-borne, suicide IEDs introduced a major new threat to security check points, as well as civilian targets such as markets and places of worship. 

Boko Haram also introduced drone technology into its arsenal of weapons and operating systems.  Using drones for both reconnaissance purposes and also to deliver explosives to security forces targets was yet another gamechanger.  According to the GTI report, 65 non-state actors are now assessed to be capable of employing drones as weapon systems.  The technology can be purchased easily in open markets.  Modern drones have long-ranges – up to 1,500 kilometres – and can be used in swarm attacks where the sheer number of drones ensures that some will evade security forces defences.  They can also be used in targeted assassinations.  Operators can be trained easily and quickly.  While effective countermeasures to drone technology do exist, it is believed that the Nigerian security forces are yet to introduce such systems, although there are moves to identify a suitable system for deployment in high-risk areas.

An Expanding Operational Footprint

According to a separate analysis based on data from sources close to the Nigerian security forces, in 2022, ISWA claimed responsibility for 25 percent of Islamic State attacks worldwide.  The group mounted 517 attacks in Nigeria and a further 30 in the Lake Chad region.  The death toll from these attacks amounted to 1,589 deaths.

Within Nigeria, the group has claimed least 25 attacks beyond the North East geopolitical region, supporting the assessment that the group has developed and positioned several well organised and resilient cells beyond its North East / Lake Chad Basin main footprint.  

Attacks were mounted in 8 states in 4 geopolitical zones (North West, South-South, North Centre and the South West).   The majority of attacks took place in the Middle Belt, with a main effort in Kogi State and single attacks in Taraba, Niger and the FCT.   The main area of operations is in the centre of Kogi State. The tempo and variety of attacks indicates that a well-trained and well-resourced cell exists in or close to Lokoja.

The Kogi cell mounted 13 attacks over a 12-month period.  Within Kogi State, attacks occurred in Adavi, Okene, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Kabbah Bunu and Lokoja Local Government Areas (LGA).  Most took place within 40 kilometres of Okene Town in the Okene LGA.  Two attacks were mounted further afield in the vicinity of Owo Town, Owo LGA, approximately 85km away. The cell also carried out attacks in Edo and Ondo States.  

Attacks in Taraba were concentrated around Jalingo, indicating the presence of an active terrorist cell in or in the environs of the city.  The Taraba cell is likely smaller and less resilient than the Kogi cell. A series of arrests in June 2022 disrupted its operations.  However, the contiguous borders with the north-eastern states and the survival of some members of the cell mean that it has the potential to be reconstituted and reactivated rapidly and easily.   

In both areas, a small majority (56%) of attacks targeted civilians, with bars in both Taraba and Kogi State being the most frequently targeted.  Security forces – primarily police vehicle patrols, checkpoints and police stations – were also targeted.  Additionally, 3 large scale attacks were mounted against high profile targets – a train, a prison and a military holding facility.  Overall, attacks comprised of 2 instances of kidnap for ransom (each with multiple victims), 15 complex attacks with small arms and IEDs, 8 attacks mounted using just IEDS, 1 assassination and 2 prison breaks.  The attacks resulted in 100 deaths, 51 injuries and 177 people being abducted.

Civilian target locations were apparently selected because they would allow the inflicting of mass casualties and were mostly frequented by people whose characteristics and behaviours made them more likely to be targeted by fundamentalists – e.g. Christians and alcohol drinkers.  No individual tribal or ethnic group was specifically targeted, but the purpose of the attacks was probably to inflict mass casualties to frighten and intimidate the civilian population and influence the behaviour and decisions of other audiences including federal and local government, local community and political thought leaders and finally, other Islamist groups.  

During the attacks and their aftermath, the attackers exhibited very little selectivity in the way the treated their victims.  In the case of the Abuja-Kaduna train attack, middle class Nigerians were targeted irrespective of tribe or religion.  Muslims were killed, abducted, abused and ransomed alongside Christians.  

In all instances, the attackers killed without restraint. IEDs were also used as part of complex attacks against the Wawa Cantonment, Owo, Kuje, Kaduna-Abuja Train and other targets.  Nevertheless, most casualties were caused by small arms fire.  Apart from the large-scale attacks such as at Wawa and Kuje, the cells employed weapons that can be easily obtained, hidden, moved, or even manufactured.

ISWA has demonstrated a sophisticated use of the information space in its campaign, with information exploitation being a key component of its operational cycle. They rapidly disseminate detailed claims covering the location and number of casualties of their attacks.  These statements are accompanied by high-quality imagery.  It is assessed that ISWA reports their attacks immediately in order to dominate the information space, confirm their actions and achieve greater influence over their target audiences.  It is probable that the cells exploit local languages using multiple mediums and channels.

Regional Context

As ISWA surges to pre-eminence in Nigeria and beyond, the spatial dynamics of terrorism in the region have shifted.  The primary area of terrorist activity in the Sahel region currently lies in the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (also known as Liptako-Gourma).  Whilst this region does not feature in western news media as prominently as Syria and Iraq did during the height of ISIS activity, the Sahel is currently the region of the world most affected by terrorism.  In contrast to Nigeria and Niger, which have seen falling rates of terrorist activity in 2022, the tri-border region has seen a dramatic deterioration in security.  Burkina Faso and Mali occupy the second and third slots in the GTI report table of countries most impacted by terrorism.  The two countries saw terrorism deaths increasing by 50% and 56% to 1,135 and 944 deaths respectively.   Additionally, four of the ten countries in the Sahel feature in the ten worst scores in the GTI report. 

 

Benin and Togo are also impacted, with both recording more than ten deaths for the first time.  Furthermore, reporting also indicates the spread of Islamist extremism into northern Ghana and Ivory Coast. 

With regards to BH while their eminence peaked in 2014, i.e., when the group controlled huge swathes of territory in north-east Nigeria as well as areas in neighbouring countries around the Lake Chad Basin, its conflict with ISWA has seen many of its fighters displaced into neighbouring countries.  While this has seen its power and influence severely eroded in Nigeria, the group remains relatively stable in other areas of the Lake Chad Basin.  In neighbouring Niger, deaths in the Diffa region rose by 38% to their highest level in two years and it is believed this rise has been driven by the displacement of BH elements from Borno State due to pressure from ISWA attacks.  The displacement of BH fighters elevated the group’s position in Niger, making it the country’s most deadly terrorist group in 2022. 

Conclusions

Although BH continues to atrophy within Nigeria, ISWA remains a potent threat and has shown an intent to expand its operations both geographically and in terms of its targeting.  

The conflict between the two groups continued throughout 2022 and is likely to persist throughout 2023.  The trajectory of this conflict indicates that BH will be reduced to a mere shadow of its former strength in Nigeria and ISWA will continue to be the dominant Islamist group in the country.  Given the wider, regional connectivity that ISWA enjoys, it will likely prove an even tougher opponent for the Nigerian Security Forces than BH has been historically.  

The outcome of the 2023 Presidential and Senate elections in the country are yet to be settled, with robust lawsuits filed against the President Elect and INEC.  Whether or not the President Elect is inaugurated in May, the security environment in Nigeria will remain complex, dynamic and extremely unstable for the foreseeable future.