Aviation workers in Nigeria to go on strike

According to the latest news reports, Nigerian aviation worker unions including the National Union of Air Transport Employee (NUATE), Air Transport Services Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN),  Association of Nigeria Aviation Professional (ANAP),  have threatened to ground flight operations nationwide on Tuesday, 8th of February.

According to Comrade Ocheme Aba, General Secretary, NUATE,  Comrade Frances Akinjole, Deputy General Secretary, ATSSSAN, the Ministry of Aviation and the aviation agencies have refused to implement the Minimum Wage and Consequential Adjustment since 2019.

The unions’ leaders said: “Our Unions variously issued ultimatums to the Federal Ministry of Aviation and the six aviation agencies over the vexed issues of failure to release negotiated Conditions of service of the Agencies since 2013 and non-implementation of Minimum Wage/Consequential Adjustment since 2019. All the ultimatums expired 31st January 2019 without the demands being met in any form.”

Read the full news report here.

EU Pledge to Continue GoG Presence

The European Union (EU) has announced that it intends to carry on with the deployment of its member states’ warships in the Gulf of Guinea to stem the recurring menace of piracy.

This announcement comes after a review of the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) pilot program. The program has facilitated the deployment of warships by EU member states to the Gulf of Guinea since 2020. 

The EU is also proposing a two-year extension of the CMP mandates starting January this year and has outlined deployments of Danish, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish warships into the region.

According to news reports, Denmark will patrol West Africa’s waters for four months, Spain for seven and a half months, France for eleven months, Italy for eight months, and Portugal for three and a half months. The deployment will ensure a continuous EU presence in the Gulf of Guinea with at least one ship in the area.

“The Gulf of Guinea continues to be particularly dangerous for seafarers. None of the coastal navies, with the partial exception of Nigeria, can operate the required high-sea patrol boats to respond to attacks,” said an EU External Action Service memo addressed to the Political and Security Committee of the EU.

Read the full article by clicking here.

Global Maritime and Piracy Report 2021

The Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center (MICA Center) of the French Navy has released its 2021 annual report on maritime piracy and robbery acts that impacted worldwide maritime security. 

The report notes that for the Gulf of Guinea, Illegal Fishing, Illegal immigration, and Drug Trafficking are the main factors impacting maritime security/piracy in the region. Our latest #AreteDeepDive (published here) touched on how these threats may develop in the coming months and we will be discussing this more in future articles. 

According to the report – 317 acts of maritime piracy and robbery were recorded worldwide in 2021 by the MICA Center. A decrease of 15% compared to 375 in 2020, with the most noticeable decrease recorded in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. In 2021 the Caribbean and Singapore  Strait were the most affected areas for incidents. 

The report notes that whilst the figures to 31st Dec 2021 seem to show a  decline in incidents in the region, the main season for incidents runs from Oct to April and thus this decline cannot yet be assumed to be a  continuing threat. 

You can read more on the report by clicking here.

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Crime – 2022 Expectations

In the last quarter of 2021, Arete released two deep-dive analyses of the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea over the 2021 period.  These analyses covered some of the key takeaways, events, and incidents of the 2021 period namely;

  • The significant reduction in reported maritime crime and piracy incidents across the region, particularly in coastal waters off Nigeria;
  • The continuation of boardings and thefts in anchorages;
  • The continued shift to deepwater operations, outside Nigerian territorial waters and EEZ, with Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) using medium-small to medium-sized vessels as mother ships;
  • The focus on the kidnapping of mariners, with numbers of victims per attack being generally higher than in previous years;
  • The increasing recognition of the strategic importance of the region among extra-regional nations;
  • Linked to the above, an increasing international naval presence in the region;
  • The launch of the NIMASA / Nigerian Navy Deep Blue project;
  • The disruption and capture of suspected pirates by the Danish Navy.

So what will change or emerge in 2022?

There are a number of key factors that can affect the way the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea may evolve including;

  • Where – Where will the pirates go next and what is the geospatial trend?
  • What – What will the pirates focus on, and will they develop a new business model?
  • When – When will the pirates strike, i.e. are current trends likely to change?
  • Who – Who will be the main actors in the region going forward?

Firstly, let us consider the likely geographic hot spots in 2022.  Historically, the pirate gangs have concentrated their activities in certain areas until such time as the security environment changes and those areas become high(er) risk for the pirates to operate in forcing them to shift to a new area.  

Such a shift was seen in 2011 when pirates moved from targeting vessels and oil platforms in the shallow waters of the Niger Delta fan, a littoral shelf lying south of the Niger Delta, to targets in the adjacent waters of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.  This shift was met with a robust response by the Cameroonian security forces resulting in the pirates then shifting their activities to the waters off Benin, Togo, and Ghana.  

This see-saw shift repeated itself a number of times until the pirate groups changed their modus operandi to the use of mother ships which enabled them to operate in deeper waters further offshore.  This also allowed them to operate far further from their main bases in the Niger Delta and the Bakassi Peninsula.  This model has persisted today as exampled in 2021 where gangs are witnessed operating off Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe.  

Recent operations by warships from outside the region have changed the operating environment in the central and eastern Gulf of Guinea and therefore it is possible that the early months of 2022 will see a switch across to the waters to the west of Nigeria – potentially as far west as Ivory Coast or Liberia, i.e. where the security environment is more permissive and the offshore industry is ramping up, presenting an increasing number of potential targets of opportunity.

It has also been postulated that pirate groups will be scared off the high seas and into the riverine systems of the Niger Delta, e.g. the November 2021 attack on a work crew from AGIP in Bayelsa State is already being viewed as evidence of this hypothesis (noting we do not believe this to be the case as per our previous #AreteDeepDive which you can read here).  The action by the Danish Navy in November 2021 has also generated much speculation about whether patrolling by international navies will drive the pirates from the seas into the riverine areas of the Niger delta.  

Ultimately it should be appreciated that pirate groups have suffered setbacks in the past, notably in Cameroonian waters in 2010 and more recently in 2020.  Nigerian pirate groups are resilient and readily adapt to changes in their operating environment and this single event is unlikely to dampen their enthusiasm to pursue the rich pickings to be gained from large-scale kidnap for ransom operations.

Thus, our assessment is that any spike in activity in the riverine environment will more likely be driven by other factors, i.e. relating to onshore issues, rather than due to a step-change in the security environment offshore.  Ultimately, Nigeria is suffering from escalating inflation, placing further pressure on populations that are already victims of grinding poverty.  Other socio-political drivers are also generating a worsening security environment throughout the country and the Niger Delta is no exception to this trend. (Read more about this here)  It is established beyond doubt that riverine crime and other crimes on coastal waters are driven by such factors, so in a situation where people are suffering increasing hardship it is likely that crime levels will escalate including in the maritime domain.  

One interesting development in the last few days has been the freeing of the suspected pirates taken on board the Danish Frigate (read the story here), noting the Danish authorities were unable to find a single country in the Gulf of Guinea that was prepared to take them into custody.  This led to calls from several international maritime organisations and shipping bodies for Gulf of Guinea states to take responsibility for punishing pirates in their own courts. Read more about the incident by clicking here and here, (noting a fourth detainee was treated in a Ghana hospital before being taken to Denmark where he appeared in court on 07 January 2022 – Read the full story by clicking here.). The outcome of his trial will likely determine the future of international action in the region in 2022 (this will be analysed in further Arete Deep Dives).

Read More: Gulf of Guinea Piracy, a symptom not a cause

In summary, it is assessed from events last year that the tempo of pirate activity will likely escalate in the first half of 2022.  The attacks will likely occur more than 150 nautical miles from Nigeria’s coastline and will occur to both the east and west of Nigerian waters.  The pirate groups will test the capability of the Deep Blue project and possibly also the resolve and reach of international navies operating in the region.  The resolve of western navies will also have been affected by the inability of the Danish authorities to convince a regional state to prosecute the three suspected pirates on one of their frigates potentially lessening the international community’s motivation to involve themselves in piracy matters in the region in the future.  Indeed, this failure will likely embolden the pirates and generate uncertainty among the western navies operating in the region.

On this basis, it is believed the pirate groups will maintain and possibly increase the tempo of their activities.  Whether that tempo will be maintained throughout the year will become evident.  The geographic concentration of activity will also be revealed in time and will potentially swing between two or more areas. 

Over the last two years, pirate groups have proven their methodology and logistic systems in the taking, holding, and releasing of large numbers of kidnap victims.  It is likely they will continue to develop these capabilities and is therefore possible that we will see single pirate action groups taking even larger numbers of victims in each deployment. 

Conversely, the long-awaited Deep Blue Project has been operational for six months now.  However, we have yet to see the full effectiveness of the multiple systems and capabilities deployed under the project’s umbrella.  If the Deep Blue Project proves to be successful, we will likely see it push the pirates into more peripheral areas and make it harder for other criminal gangs to operate in coastal waters.  

In past years, pirate action dropped off in the middle four months of the year as sea conditions made small boat operations untenable.  However, the shift to the use of mother ships has given the pirates the potential for all-weather, year-round capability.  This will likely remain unchanged in 2022.

The major pirate groups in the region, believed to number between four and six, will remain predominantly sponsored, led, and manned by Nigerian nationals.  That notwithstanding, we have seen such groups operate out of neighbouring countries with the support of Nigerian diaspora fishing communities (noting the Cameroonian authorities clamped down very heavily on such activity in Cameroon).  However, Nigerian fishing communities also exist in other regional states, and it is possible these communities will provide support to the pirate groups, adding further reach and endurance to their operations.

Conclusion

Piracy is a lucrative and proven business model in the region.  The more serious and most well-organised gangs are unlikely to be deterred by the launch of the Deep Blue Project or the presence of international warships in the region as the risk vs reward still mainly swings in their favour.  

Therefore, it is likely that piracy will expand across the region in 2022 and the risk of kidnap will continue to remain very high for mariners in waters as far as 300 nautical miles from the Nigerian coast.  Finally, the inability or lack of will among regional states to prosecute the suspected pirates captured by the Danish Navy could further increase the risk of piracy in the region.

Denmark drops piracy case against suspects

In November 2021, we reported that Danish military personnel responded to an attack upon a Danish Frigate – Esbern Snare – operating in the Gulf of Guinea.  You can read the news by clicking here.
According to an AFP News Agency report, the three suspected pirates detained on the Danish navy vessel will not face prosecution in Denmark over allegedly attacking the Danish personnel, according to their lawyers.
On Thursday, January 6, 2022, one of the lawyers for the suspects, Niels Anker Rasmussen, said that the prosecutor has decided not to prosecute his client and that he will be released “shortly”.  Two more lawyers representing the other two suspects told Danish media that the case against their clients had also been dropped and they too would be released.
Rasmussen also said that the decision not to prosecute the suspects was likely due to fears that, after any prosecution, his client would/could not be sent back home due to Denmark’s obligations, (i.e. under international conventions), and that if he did remain then this might inspire others to follow suit.
You can read the full news report by clicking here.

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Insecurity: Are Local Waters Safer?

2021 has witnessed a reduction in the overall level of reported maritime criminality in Nigerian waters, but is this reported decline a reality or simply an illusion?  

Arete examined this question in detail in our #AreteDeepDive piece on 28 October 2021, where we deconstructed the various trend indicators and their underlying factors as highlighted in the ICC IMB ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the period 01 Jan 2021 – 30 Jun 2021’ report.  Click here to read it.

Our assessment and analysis showed that while there was indeed a reduction in reported piracy activity levels, the figures being quoted by various sources were possibly more a reflection of the systemic weakness in information gathering and ‘careful management’ of reporting of piracy and maritime crime by local agencies, as opposed to a genuine reduction in piracy activity levels (noting of course that a drop in incidents in Nigeria may also be due to a shift in the modus operandi of the pirate groups operating out of Nigeria, i.e. their now operating outside of Nigerian territorial waters and EEZ).

Since October’s analysis, we have witnessed several interesting developments in the overall security operating environment in the region, particularly in the Niger Delta.  Key among these developments have been;

  • Multiple attacks on and abductions of oil workers in the riverine environment in Bayelsa State;
  • The action by the Danish frigate led to the deaths of four pirates, the wounding of a fifth, and arrest of others;
  • Reports by the Nigerian Navy of widespread arrests of vessels carrying stolen crude oil; 
  • A report that Nigeria’s ports and anchorages have witnessed 27 attacks against vessels in the third quarter of 2021. 

As is usual in the region, national and international media reported each of these developments according to their own interpretation and knowledge of the events and their significance, and the political or social leanings of the publication and individual journalists involved.  

Given this, the aim of this latest analysis is to examine the events highlighted above and try to place them in the context of the overall pattern and evolution of security in Nigeria, its territorial waters, and beyond in the wider Gulf of Guinea.

 

Bayelsa and the Riverine / Onshore Context

On 27 November 2021, criminals, labelled in the Nigerian media as “sea pirates”, attacked workers of the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) at the Obama Manifold.  It is claimed they killed seven workers and two members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).  

The next day, they abducted four people working for NAOC in the Okoroma and Ogbokiri-Akassa communities in Bayelsa State, read it here.  The attackers also reportedly shot dead two other workers as well as a member of the NSCDC.  The boat driver, an indigene of Okoroma community, was reported missing after the incident while two other members of the NSCDC were declared missing but later found alive.  It was also reported that gunmen abducted four people from the Imbikiri community in two separate attacks earlier in November.

While it has been suggested on local social media that these incidents might be evidence that pirates who traditionally operate offshore are now focusing their efforts in the riverine areas of Nigeria – implying that the threat offshore is now diminished – this assumption needs to be taken with a strong degree of caution.  

Firstly, it is too simplistic and inaccurate to characterise that every group in the Niger Delta has the capability and intent to operate offshore. Indeed, the proliferation of small arms in the region means that armed criminal gangs are ubiquitous with many operating according to numerous, diverse ‘business’ models – including ones that only sees certain gangs operating in the riverine areas alone.

Many of these gangs that operate solely on the rivers and in the riverine communities have no need to operate offshore given the profits gleaned from conducting armed robbery against passenger boats, extorting protection money from communities, acting as protection teams for gangs stealing crude oil from pipelines (and escort the barges carrying stolen crude) etc.  

In short not all gangs operating in or out of Nigeria are ‘sea pirates’ (as the media portray them) meaning the increased attacks in the riverine areas does not necessarily indicate that the gangs operating offshore have ‘gone away’ or changed their modus operandi at all.

Furthermore, and examining this incident against a historical context, it must also be noted that the area where these incidents took place is particularly active in terms of organised theft of crude oil and also that for one reason or another NAOC is targeted more than other operators in that part of the Niger Delta.  

Indeed, and as reported by the local media, there may be other drivers that might have triggered the attacks, including dissatisfaction with contract delivery and payment of local youths working on NAOC security contracts.  This is a credible assertion.  

Historically, attacks on NAOC people and infrastructure in the region has frequently been attributed to issues with contract award, rollout or delivery.  It is perhaps interesting that Total Exploration and Production Nigeria (TEPN), which also operates in the area, suffers far fewer attacks on people and assets.  This would seem to support the hypothesis that NAOC’s problems are specific to that company rather than generic attacks on the industry as a whole.

Summarising all of the above it is assessed that the spike in activity in Bayelsa is very likely part of a cycle of activity that is linked to NAOC operations and is not a reflection of a change in the modus operandi of all pirate gangs that traditionally operate offshore. 

 

International warship operations in the Gulf of Guinea

In a widely reported incident, on 24 November 2021, the Danish naval vessel HDMS Esbern Snare encountered a speedboat with a number of armed men on board.  Read about the incident here. The skiff was also carrying equipment characteristic of piracy operations in open water.  In the ensuing encounter, a warning shot was fired by the Danish crew, which was responded to by the pirates with a volley of shots from assault rifles.  The warship crew opened fire, killing four pirates, and capturing four others – one of whom was seriously wounded.  The injured man was treated on board the ship and all four detained on board.  They are now facing a trial in Denmark. Read the fuller story by clicking here.

The incident sparked a significant debate about jurisdiction, sovereignty and rules of engagement.  Amid the debate about the legality of the engagement, there arose several questions among social media commentators concerning the impact of the incident.  Some of the key questions asked were:

  • Would this act as a strong deterrent to Nigerian based pirate groups and force them to operate closer inshore (or even move their operations to the riverine areas as theorise above)?
  • Will this incident drive pirate gangs to arm themselves more heavily and act more aggressively in the future?
  • Will this encourage pirates to attack international warships in the hope they will survive and then face trial in the vessel’s home nation – with the hope of being allowed to remain in the country after sentencing?

Clearly, these questions remain unanswered at the present time, but they do raise significant concerns for the shipping industry.   Indeed, it is guaranteed that pirate gangs operating in the region will be carefully assessing what the presence of foreign warships in the region now means for their operations and criminal business models.   Whilst the presence of international warships may deter some individuals, it is highly unlikely that well-organised pirate groups will cease operating.  

One key point of this incident is the fact that the Danish vessel was responding to an intelligence report relating to an elevated threat of piracy in a specific area.  The value of good intelligence is heavily underlined by this, and it is likely that the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA are now considering how their own intelligence capability measures up to that which drove this event (noting the country has invested heavily in the Deep Blue Project, which ironically is designed to undertake the kind of interdiction operations the Danish vessel was undertaking).

Another key point is this incident occurred despite a series of Nigerian Navy exercises that culminated in the 04 November Exercise Grand African NEMO 2021, which saw participation of 13 naval vessels as well as elements of four foreign navies. Read about the exercise by clicking here.

What is clear is that the Gulf of Guinea’s strategic significance to a number of states beyond Africa is increasing, and with as many as six foreign naval vessels operating in the region currently, the Nigerian based pirates appear to now be facing a significantly elevated threat to their own operations.  What is yet unknown is whether the Danish incident will affect foreign navies appetites to undertake operations in the Gulf of Guinea moving forwards.  

 

Illegal Bunkering and the Export of Stolen Crude Oil

On 07 December, media reported that the Nigerian Navy had intercepted four wooden boats laden with 16 thousand litres of illegally refined diesel, click here to read the story. This is just the latest report highlighting an enduring aspect of the kaleidoscope of criminality that endures throughout the Niger Delta region.  Earlier in the year, other reports reflect the scale and scope of the illegal refining as well as the industrial levels of theft from Nigeria’s pipeline networks in the region.  Arrests and seizures were made in Rivers State in September, read about some of them by clicking here. and in May 2021 the Nigerian Navy said it had intercepted about 128,612 barrels of crude oil valued at about N2,598,219,624 (approximately USD $6.24 million at today’s exchange rate) and 15,317,150 litres of AGO valued at over N3 Million (USD $7,200) between January and May.  

This level of criminality is sustained by poverty and weak security along the region’s pipelines and rivers.  The arrests and seizures represent a very small percentage of the overall levels of theft from the pipeline networks and well-heads in the region, but it goes some way to illustrate the diversity of security challenges and the degree of overstretch faced by the country’s security forces including the Nigerian Navy.  

What is also clear is interdicting this type of criminality impinges heavily on the Nigerian Navy’s ability to secure the country’s riverine and maritime environment as scarce resources and over-tasked assets are stretched.  The knock-on from this is the creation of greater operating space and freedom to operate for the piracy gangs that remain operating offshore.

The above being said the Nigerian Navy response to this persistent criminality is becoming more robust and proactive.  On 12 December 2021, the Navy reported that it had deployed 10 warships, two helicopters, and elements of the Nigerian Special Boat Service and other military units in an exercise in the Onne area of the Bonny River.  

This deployment, like that of Grand African Nemo 2021 last month, is focused on the riverine and inshore environment.  The Navy statement revealed that exercise participants will conduct anti-piracy operations, protection of offshore oil and gas facilities, fleet manoeuvres and communication and gunnery as well as Maritime Interdiction Operations, including, vessel board search and seizure, opposed boarding, search and rescue and operations to curtail the activities of pirates/sea robbers, oil thieves, pipeline vandals and illegal bunkerers.    This ambitious program includes tactics and techniques that have recently been practiced alongside Royal Marines from the British Royal Navy’s HMS Trent, a Batch 2 River-class offshore patrol vessel, read about it by clicking here.

 

Persistent Crime in Nigeria’s Ports and Anchorages

On 08 December 2021, NIMASA revealed that there had been a total of 27 security incidents involving ships in various ports and anchorages in the country during the third quarter of the year.  This is an interesting revelation as the vast majority of these incidents had previously gone unreported.  Whilst no details of the nature of the incidents was given, they are likely to include illegal boardings and theft.  Such attacks represent lucrative chances for opportunistic thieves who live and work in and around the ports and anchorages.  They are relatively low risk enterprises as most historical data shows the perpetrators escaping and remaining at large after the events.   Very few crews will tackle boarders directly due to the safety concerns for themselves.  This leaves the thieves free to escape when detected.  Whilst they do contribute to the overall levels of risk facing seafarers and shipping companies, these attacks are separate and distinct from the sea piracy that occurs on open waters in both the nature of the crime and the perpetrators involved.  However, some analysts include them in piracy statistics, which can be misleading.

Whilst the human impact of such incidents is low, the financial impact on the shipping companies is potentially significant.  Any vessel that is declared a scene of crime will incur additional costs if forced to remain in the port where the incident occurred.  The impact on insurance premiums, and other costs (replacement of equipment and stores etc), is cumulative though and the overall levels of criminality drive up insurance premiums – but only if the incidents are reported or a claim made.  It is likely that, for these reasons, many incidents remain unreported, and the true rate of crime in ports and anchorages is much higher than that reported by NIMASA.

 

Further Incidents Deep Offshore

On 13 December, it was reported that at 14:27 hrs UTC a Liberian flagged container vessel was attacked and boarded by armed men in a position approximately 48 nautical miles southwest of Luba on Boko Island, Equatorial Guinea, and due south of Opobo in Rivers State. Read the news report by clicking here. 

The vessel managed to send a mayday message and a helicopter responded from the Danish warship HMDS Esbern Snare, which was in the area.  On arriving at the vessel under attack, the helicopter crew observed a speedboat alongside the vessel with both pirates and abducted crewmembers on board.  After throwing unidentified objects into the water, the speedboat departed to the north with the helicopter shadowing from a safe distance until it returned to the warship.  

As soon as the pirates had departed, the warship received a message that a crew member had been injured during the attack on the merchant vessel.  Images seen by Arete analysts confirm other reports that the attack was very violent with the injured crewman receiving gunshot wounds to his lower leg.  He was evacuated to the Danish warship where he received medical treatment.  The warship remained on station and assisted in a search for two missing crew members.

Elsewhere in the region, in the early hours of 13 December, two vessels reported being approached by a small boat with armed men on board while they lay at anchor in the Owendo Anchorage in Gabon.  

In the first incident, 5 men armed with assault rifles boarded a cargo vessel.  The crew took refuge in the citadel.  Nothing was reported stolen. 

In the second incident, 12 armed men were seen on board a boat, which approached to within 15 metres of the unnamed tanker before being deterred by an alert crew shining lights on the boat.  

These three incidents, when taken together, underline the fact that the pirate gangs have not retired, adopted a new modus operandi or shifted their operating footprint.  The threat remains extant throughout the Gulf of Guinea and all shipping companies should continue to operate accordingly. 

 

Summary

The maritime and riverine environments in Nigeria remain high-risk operating environments for shipping companies, seafarers, oil company employees, and local commercial boat operators and their customers.  

Indeed, this analysis shows the multi-faceted nature of the environment with its different layers of actors and diverse forms of criminality.  What is clear is the pirate gangs have not gone away despite the IMB reporting a decrease in the number of reported incidents. 

It is also evident the ‘sea pirates’ remain focussed on deep water interdiction and undertaking hijack operations with the primary intent of kidnapping crew and thus remain a potent threat to all mariners in the region.  

Finally, the oversimplification of the threat picture by the media more often hinders, not helps, shipping operator’s decision making and thus, as always, we advise key stakeholders to seek the advice and assistance of professional risk management experts such as Arete to help keep vessels and crew safe while operating in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly in Nigeria.

Pirates kidnap NSCDC personnel, 4 oil workers in Nigeria

According to news reports by various sources including Nigeria’s Vanguard newspaper, suspected pirates have abducted an operative of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) and four contract staff working at the Conoil field in Koluama 1 in Bayelsa. A Spokesman of the NSCDC in Bayelsa, Solomon Ogbere, confirmed the development, saying:

“I can confirm that we are in receipt of the report of kidnap. One of our officers and four civilians were kidnapped while heading to their location where they protect Conoil facilities. They were all in mufti while returning to their base when they were attacked. Investigation is ongoing to track down the culprits.” Read the full report by clicking here.

Of additional note on October 20, 2021, the Bayelsa state government was forced to impose a curfew and ban the use of speed boats with 200 Horse Power Engines on all waterways in the state as a response to increasing pirate attacks.

With these latest incidents in mind, alongside the recently reported killing of four pirates by a Danish frigate (read that news update by clicking here), what does this mean for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea? Our next #AreteDeepDive analyses these developments and examines the ‘so what’ for shipping operators in the region.

Follow us on social media (@areteafrica on Instagram and Arete Africa on Facebook and LinkedIn) to get an update once it is published.

Omicron variant: Latest Nigerian Travel Updates

The recent emergence of the Omicron variant has led to rapid changes in international travel restrictions. Nigeria and other African countries have been affected by these restrictions and have also created new entry requirements themselves. As of the 6th of December, 2021, these were the latest updates:

Arete will continue to closely monitor the situation and provide updates. Where you require travel management services, send us an email at info@arete-group.com or click here to contact us.

NIMASA Determined to Remove War Risk Insurance Surcharge

On 15 November, Mr. Ubong Essien, Special Assistant on Communication and Strategy to the Director-General of NIMASA, disclosed that NIMASA remains committed to achieving the lifting of the War Risk Insurance (WRI) Additional Premium, often referred to as a ‘surcharge’, imposed on international shipping operating in part of the Gulf of Guinea by the Joint War Risk Committee. (JWRC)

In September 2021, Arete reported the same ambition still being held by the Director-General of NIMASA, Dr. Bashir Jamoh, despite a rebuff by the JWRC following a previous lobbying attempt by NIMASA in June.  The position of NIMASA is premised on the apparent reduction in piracy and other acts of maritime criminality in Nigerian and littoral waters of other Gulf of Guinea states.  

While the piracy figures in the region have indeed fallen in 2021 compared to previous years, there are many variables and numerous underlying factors that may explain the drop in the number of reported piracy incidents other than an increase in regional maritime security.  Arete published its own analysis of these factors, including a review of the current rate and intensity of maritime criminality in the region, in October 2021, you can read it here.

The key issue behind the drive to remove the surcharge is the economic impact on Nigeria’s macro-economic situation, as shipping operators seek other options other than to use/enter Nigeria’s congested ports.  Additionally, the inflationary pressure felt in the domestic markets as suppliers pass on the additional costs of shipping goods into the country is significant.

The rapid response by the JWRC to Nigeria’s previous lobbying in June 2021 reflects the conservative position of the Committee. The JWRC is a grouping of underwriting representatives from the Lloyds Market and other insurance underwriters’ associations.  The body meets quarterly to represent the interests of marine hull insurance business and identifies so-called ‘Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas’.  Listed Areas are defined as those areas where risks are elevated to the point where additional insurance cover is required to protect shippers against those risks.

The Committee sets the Listed Areas purely for business reasons and does not have any political or security function.  This is an important point as it means the Committee’s decisions are purely pragmatic and driven by metrics.  What that means for Nigeria is that although the country has invested heavily in securing its territorial waters, the strong evidence that acts of piracy outside those waters, in the EEZ and beyond, are still being carried out by Nigerian organised crime groups (OCGs) generates a view that there remains a latent risk inside Nigerian waters.  Furthermore, the listed area encompasses the territorial waters and EEZs of other littoral states in the region.  It is unlikely that the JWRC will lift the Listed Area status for Nigerian waters when Nigerian gangs continue to prey on shipping in neighbouring states’ waters.

Arete sources reported that in the last two weeks the Nigerian Senate approved the borrowing of a further $16 billion by the Federal Government, $1 billion of which will go into defence and security budgets.  It is hoped that some of this will trickle down to projects and procurement programs aimed at defeating maritime criminality in the region.  However, the extensive, diverse, and relentless instability onshore is possibly of greater priority – or certainly of a higher profile at the moment.

While it is evident that the Nigerian Government has serious intentions of dealing with the threats in the Gulf of Guinea, there remains much work to be done onshore to defeat the fundamental drivers of the criminality that pervades the region’s waters.  Meanwhile, the JWRC will seek evidence that the apparent reduction in maritime crime is genuine and sustainable before any real prospect of lifting the Listed Area status of the Gulf of Guinea is likely.  For now, Dr. Bashir Jamoh’s ambitions will likely remain just that, with little prospect of any substantial change. 

However, there is a possibility that a political initiative might move the problem forward.  In 2010, a new form of maritime crime emerged.  Several cartels operating out of Nigeria began extended hijackings of oil products tankers and chemical tankers for the purpose of extended cargo theft in ship-to-ship transfers.  The stolen cargo was being sold into storage tank farms in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.  This very lucrative criminal enterprise continued until early 2014 when the US government revealed to the Nigerian Government that it had detailed and accurate intelligence on the identities of the criminals behind the trend.  It was suggested in media reporting at the time that the list of names included people close to the government.  The practice of hijacking tankers and stealing of cargoes ended almost overnight.  

Perhaps if the economic cost to the country caused by piracy in the region is deemed to be sufficiently damaging, the Federal Government might exert the same pressure that shut down the cargo theft cartels.  This would be a game-changing step forward for Mr. Jamoh and Nigeria.

Danish frigate kills four pirates in Gulf of Guinea

The Danish Navy has released a statement that the Frigate Esbern Snare currently operating in the Gulf of Guinea, was able to respond to reports issued of an increased threat of piracy in the South of Nigeria. The Naval Frigate deployed the Seahawk helicopter to carry out advance observations.

The crew of the helicopter identified a speeding motorboat with eight (8), suspicious persons, onboard, with tools associated with piracy, including ladders. The Esbern Snare launched her RHIB’s manned by members of the Frogman Corps to board the suspicious motorboat. The Esbern Snare made attempts to hail the motorboat to instruct and allow the Frogman to board, no response was received the Danish Soldiers fired warning shots which immediately resulted in the suspected pirates returning fire.
The Danish Soldiers reacted in self-defense and returned fire. It was reported that the pirate motorboat was sunk with five pirates being hit. Four (4) were confirmed as dead and one injured. The remaining three (3) were captured. All eight (8) pirates have been taken aboard the Frigate Esbern Snare, with medical treatment being issued to the injured man.
As more information becomes available and verified, we will update further.