Maritime Threats in the Gulf of Guinea – An Update

Background

On 09 May 2023, the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral Awwal Gambo, announced that the International Maritime Bureau had removed Nigeria from its list of “War Risk Countries”.  The move by the IMB reflects the sustained low levels of piracy and maritime criminal activity reported in the Gulf of Guinea over the last 18 months and follows the cessation of war risk premium payments by Nigeria to Lloyds of London amounting to $793 million per annum.  While this is an encouraging step for Nigeria and its neighbours, it does not mean the risks posed by highly organised criminal gangs has disappeared completely.

The discussion around the recent historical low frequency of acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and of maritime crime in the territorial waters of littoral states in the region, continues to present analysts with the interesting question of what exactly happened to the pirate gangs previously operating in the region?  Various bodies have presented credible explanations of why piracy and maritime criminality is at its lowest for several years, but are they accurate?  This report examines recent developments in the maritime operating environment in the region and revisits some of the questions posed in previous analyses.

 

The Baseline

Figures held by Arete analysts indicate that the rates of piracy and maritime crime in the region over the last five years have fallen dramatically since they peaked in 2020.  Security events are broken down into those that occurred inside territorial waters, including ports and navigable inland waterways, and those that occur in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and International Waters.  The statistics are summarised in the following table.

Table 1.  Spatial distribution of incidents between territorial and international waters 

It should be borne in mind that these figures reflect only those incidents that have been reported noting it is generally accepted that maritime crime remains under-reported in the region still.  

If we break the figures down into those that occurred in Nigerian Waters and those occurring in other territorial jurisdictions in the region, we see a stark reduction in the levels of activity in Nigerian waters.  There has also been a corresponding increase in the number of incidents in other regional waters, however, the overall trend is for a gradual reduction in those waters as well.

Table 2.  Spatial distribution of incidents between Nigerian and other nations’ waters 

2023 has seen numbers remain very low for the year to date, with just one incident reported in Nigerian waters – a robbery of a berthed vessel in Tin Can Island terminal, and 14 events occurring in other nations’ waters.  

Significantly, 2023 has seen two maritime kidnappings, with 6 crewmen taken from a hijacked product tanker (Monjasa Reformer) in March off Pointe Noire, Congo Republic and 3 crewmen taken from a bulk carrier (Grebe Bulker) in Libreville, Gabon.  The latter is interesting in that the vessel was boarded and the crew abducted while berthed in the port of Ownedo.   In the whole of 2022, there was just one maritime kidnap reported on 13 December, when pirates abducted two crewmen from an offshore support vessel (name withheld) some 48 nautical miles off Bioko, Equatorial Guinea.  Additionally, in 2023, a tanker (Success 9) was hijacked more than 300 nautical miles off Abidjan; the vessel and crew were reported safe 5 days later.  

These events highlight the latent risk that pervades the region and the fact that despite the frequency of events remaining very low, when incidents do occur, they have the potential to have a very high impact on the crew and the company’s operations.

Lloyd’s list, in a report released in early May 2023 indicated that the global trend was shifting away from deepwater operations by pirate gangs (hijacking and kidnapping of crew members) to a renewed focus on armed robbery against vessels in territorial waters.  This global trend seems to also be reflected in the Gulf of Guinea as shown in Table 1 above.  

However, the Gulf of Guinea presents a more complex array of actors and threats than can be summarised in such a broad global analysis.  The region sees opportunist thieves boarding vessels in ports and anchorages hoping to steal something they can then sell.  At the other end of the spectrum, we have the organised pirate cartels who operate deepwater capable vessels and who hunt vessels in international waters frequently more than 200 nautical miles from nearest landfall.  We have also seen a minor increase in hijacking and kidnapping in the region since December 2022.  

So, although the report acknowledges that the Gulf of Guinea is somewhat more complex than other regions due to the widespread theft of oil and a diversity of smuggling operations by organised crime groups, the picture is perhaps not as cut and dried as the Lloyds list report headline would seem to suggest (details of all known incidents in 2023 are provided at Annex A to this report).

 

What Has Driven the Pirates from Nigerian Waters?

There has been a lot of speculation as to why the pirate gangs have apparently moved into other areas of criminal activity in 2022.  In February 2023, the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dr Bashir Jamoh, said:

“This achievement is a product of a well-structured multimodal policy which has been implemented over the years to fight piracy and other criminalities in Nigerian Waters. The Legal instrument called SPOMO Act signed into Law by President Buhari in 2019, the full implementation of the Deep Blue Project by NIMASA, expanded assets and capacity of the Nigerian Navy, enhanced cooperation between NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy, and the regional collaborative efforts under the umbrella of SHADE Gulf of Guinea midwifed by NIMASA, are all policies of the current administration and the benefits are gradually coming to fruition. We are focused on ultimately improving and reducing the cost of commercial shipping in Nigeria.

Notable maritime institutions like the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International Maritime Organisation, IMO, have lauded the reduction in piracy in Nigeria following enhanced patrol and relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered by NIMASA with other security agencies.”

Much has been made of the launch of the Deep Blue Project, including the introduction of maritime surveillance aircraft and their integration into a fully integrated maritime and coastal surveillance system. This development is a significant capability multiplier alongside improving performance and evolving capability of the Nigerian Navy.  

It is also apparent that regional cooperation between states is improving, with an announcement on 10 May 2023 that the Nigerian Navy was establishing a maritime task force with other navies in the region, including those of Ghana, Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’ivoire.  The strategy includes the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (see our piece on this news here.).

Additionally, international support to regional navies is increasing.  This year has seen US participation in joint operations and training with local navies and the launch of a Japanese government initiative to cooperate with Nigerian security efforts to reduce piracy in the region.   On 21-22 May 2023, President Buhari conducted a Presidential Fleet Review of 16 Nigerian naval vessels as well as guest vessels from Ghana, Brazil and Spain.  The drive by the Nigerian Navy towards becoming a more collaborative force capable of operating in multi-national formations will aide further development of capability.

While all of the above is having a beneficial effect on the regional maritime security situation, it should be remembered that the pirate cartels were sponsored by powerful actors with strong political connections.  It cannot be overlooked that in 2022 it was suggested in some circles that the pirate cartels had been shut down very quietly after a foreign power identified the big men behind them and threatened to name them publicly and internationally unless there was an immediate improvement.  Whilst this cannot be conclusively verified, it can also not be discounted as a possibility.

 

Conclusions

NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy are improving their collaborative efforts to secure the nations maritime economy.  Greater cooperation with other nations will further improve the situation.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea remains well below 2020 levels, although we have seen a recent spike in high-impact attacks in international waters in the region.

Gangs are still operating in the region, but mostly outside Nigerian waters.  Within Nigeria, the greatest threat currently is faced by travellers and commercial users of the country’s waterways and navigable rivers. 

Whilst the likelihood of an event affecting a vessel may now much lower, in the event an incident does occur, the impact will be high, with attacks on personnel, kidnappings and injuries if the crew resist.  Theft of cargo from product tankers remains a risk, normally resulting from short-term hijackings. Companies operating in the area should not take the recent headlines as an indication that there is no longer a threat. 

As a locally owned and registered Nigerian company, Arete provide a wide range of maritime risk management services, including escort services within Nigerian EEZ as well as onboard consultants to assist with crew training and drills, voyage planning and advice on threat across the region and beyond. 

Fully ISO accredited and with a 100% track record, we have over a decade of experience operating in West Africa specifically so please reach out to us to discuss your operational requirements in the region.

 

Annex A

Chronological List of Reported Maritime Crime And Piracy Events – 2023

  1. Sao Tome and Principe – Suspicious Approach – At approximately 02:00 hours local time, on Wednesday, 11 January 2023, an unnamed vessel was approached by two skiffs in approximate position 00:45N – 006:20E, approximately 27 NM northwest of Sao Tome Island.  The master took evasive action and increased the vessel’s speed causing the skiffs to abandon their approach. The crew and vessel are reported safe. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  2. Ghana Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 23:50 hrs UTC on Wednesday, 25 January 2023, the Hong Kong flagged Product tanker, MT Seaclipper, IMO number 9570101, was illegally boarded while at anchor in an unspecified position in the Takoradi Anchorage. Duty officer onboard an anchored tanker spotted three unauthorised persons on the forecastle area. Alarm raised, crew mustered, and port control notified. Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness the persons escaped without stealing anything. A patrol boat was dispatched to the location and investigated. (Source – multiple – B2)
  3. Cameroon Offshore – Hostile Approach – At approximately 03:45 hrs local time on Tuesday, 31 January 2023, two skiffs approached a Chinese fishing trawler operating off of Idenau in position 04:13N – 008:50E, approximately 31 NM from the Nigeria-Cameroon maritime border. Armed military guards onboard the trawler fired shots toward the two speed boats, which resulted in them aborting their approach and moving away from the area. The vessel, crew, and military guards have been reported as safe. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  4. Cameroon inshore – Armed Attack – At approximately 00:28 hrs local time on Thursday, 02 February 2023, an unnamed vessel was attacked off cap Debundscha, Cameroon. The vessel was attacked, but the attempted boarding was unsuccessful.  It is suspected that the vessel had an armed, military protection team on board. Vessel and crew were reported as safe. (Source – B2)
  5. Cameroon Inshore – Armed Attack – At 0400 hrs local time on Friday, 17 February 2023, an unnamed oil vessel was attacked and fired on by suspected militants while anchored off the Idabato subdivision of the Bakassi Peninsula.  The attackers boarded the vessel after shooting and killing two escorts. They then attempted to set the vessel ablaze.  The attackers escaped before Cameroonian security forces arrived. (Source media – C3)
  6. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 03:15 hrs local time on Wednesday, 01 March 2023, an unnamed container ship anchored in approximate position 06:05S – 012:14E, off Soyo, was boarded by armed men from a skiff.  The boarders threatened a crew member with a knife before stealing items from inside a container. The local authorities were alerted, and the crew was reported as safe. (Source – C3)
  7. Ghana Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 02:36 hrs UTC on Thursday, 02 March 2023, the Danish flagged product tanker Nord Stingray, IMO number 94197835, was illegally boarded while at anchor in position 04:53.70N  001:41.20W, in the Takoradi Anchorage. Duty crew onboard an anchored tanker noticed an unauthorised person near the forecastle and immediately raised the alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, the individual escaped with stolen ship’s stores. The incident was reported to Takoradi port control, and a patrol boat was sent to investigate. (Source – Multiple – B2)

 

  1. Congo Republic Offshore – Maritime Kidnap – At approximately 21:38hrs UTC on Saturday, 25 March 2023, more than ten pirates armed with guns attacked and boarded the Liberian flagged product tanker MT Monjasa reformer, IMO number 9255878, while underway in position 05:03.00S 009: 35.00E, approximately 135nm WSW of Pointe Noire. The alarm was raised, and all crew members mustered in the citadel. On being notified of the incident, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre immediately informed the regional authorities in the Gulf of Guinea and the French authorities and requested their assistance. The pirates managed to break into the citadel, took hostage all crew members, and took control of the tanker. They hijacked the tanker and sailed to another location. All communication with the tanker was lost as the pirates had destroyed the navigational and communication equipment. The IMB broadcast a missing tanker message to all ships at sea. On 30 March 2023, the French patrol boat Premier Maitre L’Her intercepted the tanker Off Bonny, Nigeria. A team boarded the vessel and treated three crew members for minor injuries. Part of the cargo was stolen and six crew were reported kidnapped. The tanker was then escorted to the port of Lome, Togo. On 08 May 2023, the Owners confirmed that the six kidnapped crew were released safely. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  2. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 0230 hrs UTC on Sunday, 26 March 2023, The Maltese flagged Tug Komodo, IMO number 9328273, was boarded by robbers who had approached the vessel in a canoe while the vessel was at anchor in position 08:44.61S 013:17.36E in the Luanda Anchorage.  Alert crew noticed the robbers and informed the OOW who raised the alarm and crew mustered resulting in the robbers escaping with stolen ship’s properties (including empty plastic food trays, an air hose which was coiled on top of the portside tugger winch, and the main deck c/w electrical extension wire in used daily for deck maintenance.  Port Authorities informed. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  3. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft – At approximately 0318 hrs local time, on Wednesday, 29 March, 2023, an unnamed container vessel was boarded while steaming in approximate position 06:08S – 012:15E off Soyo Anchorage.  The boarders threatened a duty crew member with a knife, then made their escape with items from one of the containers. Local authorities were informed of the incident and the crew were reported as safe. (Source – Multiple – B2) 
  4. Ivory Coast Inshore – Attempted Boarding – At approximately 22:00 hrs UTC on Friday, 31 March 2023, the Singapore flagged Container Ship, MV Maersk Vigo, IMO number 9401697, was approached and a boarding attempted while the vessel was anchored in position 04:44.47N 006:37.13W in the Port of San Pedro. Two unauthorised persons attempted to board the berthed ship by crawling under the razor wire while a third was assisting from their wooden canoe to move the razor wire. Alert crew detected the persons and raised the alarm. Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness, the persons escaped without stealing anything. At the time of event the pilot was still onboard. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  5. Ivory Coast Offshore – Maritime Hijack – At approximately 13:50hrs UTC on Monday, 10 April 2023, the Singapore flagged product tanker MT Success 9, IMO number 9258131, was attacked and boarded by twelve pirates armed with firearms while underway in position 00:06.90N 004:34.00W, approximately 307 nM SSW of Abidjan.  The pirates hijacked and self-navigated the tanker. On being notified of the incident, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre immediately informed the regional and French authorities in the Gulf of Guinea. A missing tanker message was broadcast to all ships to lookout for the tanker. Position updates received from all sources were communicated with the relevant authorities for their coordination. On 15 April, a French naval asset located the tanker and the tanker escorted to a safe port by an Ivory Coast Guard patrol boat. The pirates had destroyed the navigational equipment, handcuffed all 21 members of the crew with cable ties and stolen part of the cargo before escaping. All crew reported safe. (Source – Multiple  – B2)
  6. Angola Inshore Attempted Boarding – at approximately 02:30 hrs local time, on Wednesday, 19 April 2023, an unnamed refrigerated cargo ship was boarded while at anchor in approximate position 08:44S – 013:18E in the Luanda Anchorage. The duty watchman noticed an unauthorized person climb up the anchor chain and through the hawse pipe while another individual waited below on a small boat. The watchman raised the alarm and mustered the crew. Upon seeing the alerted crew, the perpetrator jumped into the water and escaped in the small boat. The master confirmed that all crew were safe and that nothing was reported stolen. (Source – Single security source – C3)
  7. Angola Inshore – Boarding Theft  – At approximately 02:30 hrs UTC on Tuesday, 25 April 2023, the Panama flagged crew change vessel, MV Bourbon Shamal, IMO number 9656931, was boarded while anchored in position 08:47.06S 013:14.85S in the Luanda Inner Anchorage.  Alert crew noticed unauthorised persons onboard attempting to steal an outboard engine of the FRC. The alarm was raised and ship’s horn sounded resulting in the robbers escaping. Authorities informed and the police boarded the vessel for investigation. (Source – Multiple – B2)
  8. Lagos Inshore – Illegal Boarding – At approximately 05:00 hrs UTC on Tuesday, 28 April 2023, the Liberia flagged general cargo ship MSC Wave F, IMO number 9232462, was boarded by approximately 8 persons armed with knives while berthed in position 06:25.76N 003:20.53E in the Tin Can Island Terminal.   Alert crew on rounds spotted the persons resulting in the persons escaping empty handed in their boat.  (Source – Multiple – B2)

16. Gabon Inshore – Maritime Kidnapping – At approximately 02:00 hrs local time on Tuesday, 02 May 2023, Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier MV Grebe Bulker, IMO number 9441312, was boarded while at anchor in approximate position 00:16N – 009:29E in the Owendo Inner Anchorage in Libreville.  Three crew members were kidnapped. The remaining crew members and vessel were reported safe. The vessel notified the local authorities of the kidnapping. (Source – Multiple – B2)

US Consular Team Attacked in Anambra, Four Dead – An Initial Analysis

During the afternoon of 16 May 2023, a US consular team travelling in Anambra State was attacked and 4 personnel were killed.  No US citizens were involved in the incident, but the significance of the event should  not be understated.   It is clear that this is a key escalation in the violence that is affecting the region, and Anambra State in particular, and the response from the Nigerian Security Forces is likely to be substantial.  

The impact of this event will be significant on most organisations operating in the area, or that will potentially operate in the area, and all concerned parties should look to review their risk assessments and security risk mitigation strategies for the area.

What Do We Know So Far?

At approximately 15:30 hrs local time on Tuesday 16 May 2023, a convoy of vehicles from the US Consulate was attacked on Osamale Road in the Atani area of the Ogbaru Local Government Area.  The location is south of the main urban centre of Onitsha and close to the Niger River. 

The gunmen killed 2 x local nationals who were employed as the vehicle driver and co-driver, and 2 x Nigerian nationals employed by USAID were also killed.  The gunmen then set the vehicle containing the bodies on fire.  No US citizens were involved in the incident.

The vehicle carrying the USAID personnel was reportedly marked accordingly and would have been identifiable from the outside as being associated with the US consular mission.

On identifying the security forces team in the second vehicle, the attackers then abducted the driver and 2 police officers, escaping with them and the vehicle.

The reason for the journey being undertaken is not clear at this time, and we await clarification as to which specific consular elements were involved, however, Tobechukwu Ikenga, the spokesperson for the Anambra State Police Command, issued a statement in which he said that neither the Anambra State Police Command nor any other security agency in the State had been aware of the entry into the State by the US team.  Ikenga went on to add that security forces were mounting a follow up operation to rescue the abducted personnel.

Further details will likely emerge in the coming hours / days.  

 

The Risk Environment

The security environment in Anambra State has been steadily deteriorating over the past 3 months.  This trend has accelerated in the last 2 weeks, with an emerging pattern of attacks on members of the security forces, some political actors, notable community members as well as on infrastructure. 

Anambra generally is known to present a high risk to travellers and the specific area where the attack took place is assessed to present a high to extreme level of risk.  

Given that members of the security forces are frequently attacked on sight, the presence of a police escort team might have actually drawn attention to the movement and elevated the risk of the convoy being targeted.  

 

Who Were the Perpetrators?

In the second part of our recent Deep Dive Analysis of terrorism in Nigeria here, we examined the characteristics and capabilities of extremist elements and groups operating in the South-East geopolitical zone.   

The area where the attack took place is a known operating area for the Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB) and its associated paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN).  It is most likely that elements of the ESN were responsible for the attack.

The above notwithstanding, this is the second attack in recent days in which the victims have been shot dead and the bodies burned in the vehicles.  It begs the question as to whether this is just coincidence or an emerging modus operandi that is the signature of a specific and highly lethal group.

The Biafran Government in Exile, an extra-territorial group that exists among the Igbo diaspora, was quick to dissociate itself from the attack.  In a rambling statement in which he referred to Islamic State and Boko Haram, Simon Ekpa, the group’s Prime Minister, stated that the movement condemned the attack on the convoy.

 

Was This a Statement Attack against the US?

It has been speculated that the attack was a retaliation for the US imposing visa restrictions on a list of Nigerian political and electoral actors believed to be responsible for undermining the democratic processes in the recent federal and state level elections in the country.  

Our analysis indicates that the links between this list and any named individual close to or within the Biafran separatist movements is tenuous to non-existent.  Therefore, this is not believed to be the motive for the attack.   

Similarly, the US has not designated IPOB as a terrorist group – unlike the UK and the Nigerian governments.  

Given the above it is highly unlikely that this was an attack specifically being made against a US target.

 

Assessment

Given the levels of violence employed and the location, the attackers are most likely members of an element of the ESN.

At this time it is also assessed that the convoy possibly entered the area without any pre-emptive liaison with local security forces commanders. This would have limited the security mitigation measures being employed to the small security detachment that was organic to the US team, which would have been (and evidently was) quickly overwhelmed once the attack commenced.  There would not have been a quick reaction force in the area, or even a second escort vehicle to protect the convoy.

It is also assessed that the convoy was a target of opportunity and was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.  There is no evidence or indication that the team was attacked because of its association with the US Government.  It is notable that the attackers were not deterred by the reported markings on the US vehicle and this also indicates that they either didn’t know who or what the vehicle represented, or that they were not concerned by the fact that they were attacking a US government asset.  If the latter is the case, it indicates a level of confidence and boldness that represents a significant elevation of the threat in the area.

Looking ahead, the area will become extremely challenging for movement in the immediate future as the Nigerian security forces respond aggressively to this event.  This will be characterised by the deployment of large numbers of uniformed personnel, the establishment of multiple roadblocks and an aggressive posture being adopted by security forces personnel.  The general targeting of uniformed personnel means the security forces will be on high levels of alert which could increase tensions yet further as the boldness of this attack, and the significance of its target, will only serve to heighten their nervousness.  This increase in tension and nervousness among personnel might present an elevated threat to travellers approaching roadblocks and checkpoints if they are not extremely cautious and completely compliant. 

Arete is a private risk management company providing turnkey risk management solutions to clients throughout the complex and often challenging environment of West and East Africa.

We provide a variety of secure journey management services to enable safe movement throughout the high-risk environments found in Africa.  This includes services such as the provision of Personal Security Details (PSDs) for secure transportation and movement as well as risk and threat assessments prior to any such travel.  Arete’s journey management specialists are highly trained in all aspects of protective movement and are practised in undertaking dynamic and detailed threat analysis and route assessment to ensure all movements are undertaken securely.

The Indigenous People of Biafra – The Southeast’s Own Terrorist Group

Background and Context

Designated as a terrorist group in 2017 by Federal Government, the Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist movement comprising of numerous factions and associated groups.  It operates in a similar manner to that of the now defunct Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which became a franchised social justice movement and a flag of convenience under which numerous criminal groups operated.  IPOB has a similar character, which allows criminals to attain a sense of self-justification by attaching themselves to a more widely recognised and widely supported socio-political activist movement. 

According to the report published by the US think-tank the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), IPOB is the 10th most deadly terrorist group globally, with 40 attacks in 2022 in which 57 people were killed and 16 injured.  This is a significant increase on the 26 attacks and 34 deaths inflicted by the group in 2021.  While these numbers might not seem particularly high, they reflect a trajectory that indicates a steady escalation of violence in the South-East in the last two years.  

In 2020, IPOB created an armed paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), which is implicated in the deaths of civilians and members of the security forces as well as attacks on state infrastructure and property.  The UK government also designated the movement as a terrorist organisation in May 2022 and excluded members of IPOB from eligibility to claim asylum in UK territories.  Its statement read: 

“IPOB is proscribed as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government, and members of the group and its paramilitary wing – the Eastern Security Network (created in December 2020) – have reportedly committed human rights violations in Nigeria (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) and various media articles in Activities and Clashes between state and IPOB).  If a person has been involved with IPOB (and/or an affiliated group), MASSOB or any other ‘Biafran’ group that incites or uses violence to achieve its aims, decision-makers must consider whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses under the Refugee Convention is applicable. Persons who commit human rights violations must not be granted asylum. If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.”

The recent elections held in Nigeria, at the federal and state levels, were fiercely contested, and the Igbo leader of the Labour Party (LP), Peter Obi, was surprisingly successful, breaking the stranglehold of the binary political system that has prevailed since independence.  His success took many by surprise, to the extent that Obi has launched a legal challenge to the outcome of the presidential vote.  While there is no suggestion that the LP has any connection to IPOB, the surge in support for the party across the southern half of the country was significant. Nevertheless, the LP is a nation-wide party, and its agenda and manifesto should not be confused with that of the separatists of IPOB and its paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network. 

Arrest, Evolution and Escalation

In 2021, the then leader of IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, was arrested and remains in prison to date, despite a Nigerian court ordering his release in October 2022 after ruling that he had been illegally arrested in Kenya and extradited to Nigeria.  Kanu’s arrest and detention dislocated the leadership and disrupted the cohesion of the movement and its political objectives, resulting in a leadership contest that led to a factionalised movement with competing and centrifugal internal forces.  Nevertheless, the movement became more lethal in 2022 than in any previous year.

IPOB and the ESN have been accused of causing fatalities among the civilian population – indeed, among their ethnic Igbo brethren.  The movement has an established track record of inflicting stay at home orders on the population, requiring people to stay in their houses for periods up to and sometimes exceeding seven days.  This causes extreme hardship in a population that survives to a significant extent as street traders and small business owners.  Many people are unable to afford to stockpile supplies of food and potable water ahead of such orders.  The movement routinely issues threats against breaches of the order and there are recorded instances of people who have breached the orders being attacked, and in some instances killed, by members of ESN.   

The activities of IPOB and the ESN have provoked a heavy response from the Nigerian security forces and Amnesty International has accused the security forces of using excessive force and claim as many as 115 people were killed in a four-month period in 2021 alone.  The government of Imo State, as well as many civilians and the security forces themselves, claim that many of the killings of civilians are actually attributable to the ESN.  Many civilians claim that the ESN is targeting them, extorting money and material support while the security forces target them for allegedly supporting the ESN and IPOB.  Security forces have also been accused of inflicting civilian causalities as highlighted by the security forces action at Okporo on 02 August 2021, when homes, businesses and vehicles belonging to people suspected of supporting the separatists were destroyed by security forces.  Other properties were burned by members of the ESN who accuse their owners of failing to support them. The impact on the population has been significant, and while many people support the idea of an independent Biafra, many people do not support IPOB and the ESN. 

A Complex Landscape of Movements

IPOB and the associated ESN are not the only separatists or insurgents operating in the South-East.  Other movements include:

  • The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSSOB).  This movement pre-dates IPOB, having been formed in 1999 under the leadership of Ralph Uwazuruike.  Although it is accused of acts of violence by the Nigerian government, according to its leaders it is a movement dedicated to peaceful agitation with the aim of achieving an independent Biafran state.  Some of its agitations have been deliberately provocative and aimed at the Abuja regime.  Its campaign is designed to generate sympathy and support among international audiences and it is widely supported in the Igbo diaspora.  MASSOB is not proscribed as a terrorist group.
  • The Biafra Zionist Front (BZF), formerly known as the Biafra Zionist Movement, broke away from MASSOB in 2010 under the leadership of Benjamin Onwuka.  The group agitates for the restoration of Biafra and its independence from Nigeria. The group claims to be supported by Israel and the United States.  Its official ideology is Zionism.  Despite its claim to be a peaceful agitation movement, the group was responsible for an attack on the Enugu Government House on 07-08 March 2014.  Onwuka issued a threat to non-Igbo Nigerians living in Biafran territory ordering them to vacate their land by 31 March 2014 or “face the bloodbath that will come afterward.”  Three months later, on 05 June 2014, 13 members of the BZF attacked the Enugu State Broadcasting Service (ESBS).  Their intention was to make a public announcement via the Service’s radio and television channels declaring the sovereign state of Biafra.  Onwuka, a lawyer who also practiced in the UK, was arrested following this attack and detained but was released in 2017.  He immediately returned to leading the BZM, and in June 2017 the group proclaimed the independence of Biafra and named Onwuka as president.
  • The Biafran Government In Exile (BGIE) is an extra-territorial group that exists among the Igbo diaspora.   Its website claims it was established in the US in 2001 and that it is the reincarnation of the exiled leadership of General Ojukwu and other survivors of the Nigerian Civil War.  It also praises Nnamdi Kanu and espouses a peaceful agitation for secession and independence.
  • The Biafran Liberation Army is a movement about whom very little is known, although Simon Ekpa, posted a Tweet on 06 April 2023 in which he stated that “The Biafra Liberation Army BLA has launched and commenced OPERATION SANCTITY across Biafraland and Biafra territory. This operation tackle (sic) the illegal road block by the terrorist @HQNigerianArmy  where they facilitates (sic) kidnapping of Biafrans at checkpoints, it is also a place where we have noticed many disappearances of Biafra youths”.

The entire structure of IPOB is loose and reflects a more franchised aggregation of local agitation groups, criminal gangs, and quasi-political movements.  As stated above, the IPOB name is a flag of convenience and a rallying call for a wide ranging, but still relatively small, movement for independence.  

The New Political Paradigm

 

While there is a long-standing and strong desire among Igbo people to see an Igbo President lead the country, the best chance of that becoming a reality was the recent surge in the political fortunes of the Labour Party (LP) under Peter Obi.  That opportunity now seems to have been missed.

Obi is not affiliated to IPOB in any overt or identifiable way, and has a wider, federal political agenda according to his manifesto.  Had he won the presidency, it is possible that the result would have impacted heavily on the momentum for Biafran independence, with many agitators seeing an opportunity to exploit his Igbo credentials and sympathies.  

In November 2022 Obi stated that he would enter into a dialogue with IPOB (among other terrorist and separatist groups in the country) if he became President.  As a former governor of Anambra State, he would have had more exposure to the various agitators and independence movements calling for an independent Biafran state than either of the other two main candidates.  Further indicating his sympathies with the Igbo agitators, in January 2023, he also stated that he would remove IPOB from the list of proscribed groups in the country.  However, he went on to say that he is committed to “One United and Secured Progressive Nigeria”.  

The balance of these seemingly contradictory signals from Obi generates uncertainty as to how the separatists and agitators might react if he becomes President.  Whatever the outcome, it is likely that the Biafra movements will increase their agitation in the coming months.

Equally, the win by the All Progressive Congress (APC) nominee, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, might also galvanise the separatist movement to agitate more aggressively in the face of another President who reportedly has strong links to organisations such as the Oodua Peoples’ Congress, a youth organisation that sometimes acts as a militia and which has a history of confrontation with Igbo people in Yorubaland.  Many will see the win by Tinubu as a provocation and a marginalisation of the Igbo people – especially in the context of an extant legal challenge by the Igbo front-runner, Peter Obi.

For its part, ahead of the elections, IPOB issued a statement through its spokesperson, Emma Powerful, on 02 January 2023, in which he stated during an interview with media that IPOB:

“Has no interest whatsoever in the 2023 Nigerian selection process. The enemies of Biafra, however, keep on linking IPOB to those criminals who wish to demonise IPOB and ESN. This strategy of trying to drag IPOB into a process that ab initio is programmed to produce a particular result is simply to give legitimacy to a flawed process and IPOB will not be part of it”.

Powerful went on to state that IPOB has no link to Simon Ekpa.  His words exposed the deep factional fault lines that divide the various Biafra movements, fault lines that effectively weaken the overall strategy and momentum of the separatist goals they all share.  

Recent Developments

In his January 2023 statement, Peter Obi said that “I live in Onitsha, and I can tell you they are not terrorists. They (IPOB members) are people I pass on the road every time, (and) every day.  I meet them and live with them. In fact, I usually see (IPOB) people gathering, and not one day has there been a threat or molestation or anything from them, even when they gather.”  He insisted that IPOB is not a threat to Nigeria, saying that the violence in the South-East is only credited to IPOB by the Nigerian Police.  However, accounts of violence in the region by local people suggest that the ESN is behind much of the violence.  When addressing the Chatham House think-tank in London on 17 January, Obi stressed that he is not a supporter of IPOB, saying that leadership failure in Nigeria was responsible for agitations in many parts of the country.

“You are not following me, even yesterday, I spoke about Biafra being ended 53 years ago. It’s all over the place in the space. I condemned all agitators but in condemning them, you have to look at what brought about these agitations all over the place. So, we have IPOB, we have the Yoruba Nation movement, we have all sorts.  When you have created this level of massive poverty, where 63 percent of your population is poor, you’re going to create all sorts of problems. I was speaking to a British minister this morning, I said we have about 40 percent unemployment, about 60 percent youth unemployment, young people in their productive age doing nothing, if you have 15 percent unemployment in Britain today, you’re going to have massive agitation. Nobody will be able to leave his house.  What you have seen is a cumulative effect of leadership failure over the years, which will be solved by good governance, When people start seeing justice, fairness, and inclusive government and doing the right thing, all those things will start reversing itself (sic)”.

In February 2023, as Nigeria prepared itself for a critical Presidential and Senatorial election process, one of the successor leaders, Simon Ekpa, a Finnish citizen of Nigeria origin was arrested in Finland on charges of financial misconduct.  He was released after a short time in custody.  The Nigerian government has repeatedly called upon the Finnish government to move against Ekpa, who leads one of the factions within the broader IPOB movement and uses social media to mobilise opinion and incite violence in the south-east and parts of the south-south geopolitical zones.

Police said that IPOB was responsible for an attack in Enugu on 22 February 2023 in which a senatorial candidate for the opposition Labour Party, Oyibo Chukwu, was killed while he was returning from the campaign trail. The car containing his body was then set on fire.  Armed men also attacked the governorship candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), and a campaign bus of the main opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), killing the driver.

On 11 April 2023, IPOB claimed the failure of the Supreme Court to set a date to hear the appeals against the continued detention of Nnamdi Kanu was politically contrived and a reflection of the absence of impartiality on the part of the Court.  It was referring to the delays in his release following the 13 October 2022 Court of Appeal ruling that the IPOB leader was brought back to Nigeria from Kenya in an act of extra-ordinarily rendition that was a violation of the country’s extradition treaty and also a breach of Kanu’s fundamental human rights.

On the political front, on the weekend of 15-16 April, 2023, IPOB issued a statement dissociating itself from the Biafran Government In Exile (BGIE), and its associated Liberation Army, saying these organisations were created and sponsored by the Federal Government to deter and distract people from supporting IPOB. 

Among the most recent attacks mounted by the movement, it was reported on 20 April 2023, that a firefight had taken place at Ubah Agwa/Izombe tropical rain Forest in Oguta Local Government Area (LGA).  Police claim to have wounded several members of the ESN.

Conclusions

While the GTI report holds IPOB as the tenth most dangerous terrorist group in the world, the actual numbers of incidents and victims remains relatively low when compared to the impact of attacks in the country by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa.  The impact of IPOB/ESN activity is most keenly felt by fellow Igbo indigenes, with a Federal Government response that has been unsubtle and sometimes heavy-handed.  The latter will only act as a recruiting sergeant for the separatist movements and their armed wings and supporters.

The various Biafran secessionist movements will likely ramp up their rhetoric and agitation for independence in coming months.  The outcome of the February Presidential elections is unlikely to calm the situation, even in the extremely unlikely event that Peter Obi wins his lawsuit against INEC and the APC and is inaugurated as President.

The fragmented and factionalised secessionist landscape will remain highly competitive.  This internecine struggle will ultimately render the struggle a failure and the status quo will endure.

IPOB/ESN violence will continue to impact on ordinary Nigerian citizens, including the Igbo people they claim to represent and on whose behalf they claim to be waging their struggle against the State.

Operations by the Nigerian Security Forces will likely also escalate after, as seems likely, Tinubu is inaugurated as President.  This will provoke a backlash as well as claim and counter-claim as to which side is responsible for any resultant deaths and destruction of property.

An Oodua Peoples’ Congress and other Yoruba youth groups will be emboldened by a Tinubu presidency.  This has the potential to lead to further violence and communal conflict in states outside those identified by IPOB as being constituents of the Biafran State.  Likely hotspots for such activity are located in the major metropolitan and urban areas of Lagos and other cities in the South-West.  Additionally, any attacks by IPOB/ESN on non-Igbo citizens in the South-East will probably trigger retaliatory pogroms in Kaduna and Kano.  

 

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Introduction

The recently published Global Terrorism Index (GTI) survey of terrorism around the world in 2022 highlights a number of important trends and developments in the fight against Islamist terrorism in Nigeria.  This Deep Dive reviews the key points from the report against historical and regional context, and examines the current situation and possible future developments.

The report indicates that Nigeria has seen an improvement in the number of terrorist attacks and related fatalities, but other sources indicate an expanding footprint, with Islamist terrorist activity spreading from the extreme north-east of the country to more central and southern areas. 

Having suffered at least 865 fatalities in 2020, Nigeria reported a 43% decrease in terrorist deaths in 2021 and a further 35% in 2022. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat posed by Islamist groups Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) remains severe in some areas and significant across the country.

The report indicates that Nigeria lies in eighth position on the table of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2022 – three places lower than in 2021.  Burkina Faso and Mali sit in second and third positions on the same table.  Complicating this assessment, the Global and International Terrorism Research/Analysis Group in its half yearly report for January-June 2022 assessed that Nigeria was the second most attacked and terrorized country in the world with Iraq being the first and Syria being the third.  Their report stated that while Iraq recorded 337 terrorist attacks, Nigeria recorded 305 attacks with Syria coming third following 142 terrorist’s attacks.  

This apparent divergence in assessment highlights the problem of using statistical analysis when examining a subject where the definitions of what are relevant or not differ significantly.  Some sources quote attacks by herdsmen on farming communities as being terrorist in nature.  Other sources attribute the attacks by roving bands of motorcycle mounted bandits in the North West as being terrorism. This problem is also compounded by unreliable reporting of incidents and casualties, with authorities manipulating data to represent a specific operational, social or political agenda point.  

Key to note is this analysis does not examine the additional terrorist threats posed by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east region, the issue of marauding bandit gangs in the north-west or itinerant cattle herders in the mid-belt and southern states.  Each of these additional elements carry out attacks on communities that are very similar in nature to many of the attacks carried out by Islamist groups however the drivers and motivation behind these attacks are frequently very different, ranging from simple gangsterism to the struggle for grazing rights for cattle herders.  Designated as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government in 2017, IPOB has a socio-political agenda and aims to achieve independence from the Federal state, however, IPOB is not a homogenous, singular entity, but more of a franchised brand comprising of numerous factions, each with its own aims and strategy.  Additionally although many of the small groups flying the IPOB flag are simply gangsters and extortionists, IPOB elements still accounted for over 40 attacks in 2022 resulting in 57 deaths – its most active and lethal year of operations to date.  The threat posed by IPOB will be examined in our next Deep Dive. 

Overview

The impact of terrorism in Nigeria continues to decline in terms of both the number of incidents and deaths with the latter falling by 23% from the figures recorded in 2021 and the former falling by 120 attacks as compared with 2021.  Overall this represents the lowest attack rate per annum since 2011.

Despite a dramatic reduction in the number of attacks carried out by ISWA (57 attacks resulting in 211 deaths), the group’s lethality increased with 3.7 deaths per attack in 2022 compared to 3.0 in 2021 making it the most lethal terrorist group in the country for the third consecutive year.

Boko Haram (BH) activity also decreased substantially in 2022.  Attacks almost halved from 91 attacks in 2021 to 48 in 2022 – the lowest incident rate for more than a decade, but deaths attributable to BH increased slightly from 69 in 2021 to 72 in 2022 – again, and like ISWA, reflecting an increased lethality of their operations.  

Terrorist target selection also notably shifted from the police to the Nigerian Army.  Nigerian military personnel were targeted in 25 percent of all attacks with civilians the second most targeted group following closely at 24 percent of targeted attacks.   The police, previously the preferred target, fell to third place, being targeted in just 18 percent of attacks.

The lethality of attacks increased considerably for civilians, seeing them suffer 196 deaths in 2022, an increase of 78% over the previous year.  Conversely, the military, despite becoming the target of choice, suffered 74% fewer deaths in 2022 (58 fatalities) compared to the previous year.

The epicentre of Islamist associated terrorist activity remains the extreme north-east of the country – primarily in Borno State which saw a significant reduction (12%) in terrorism related deaths in 2022.  This is largely attributable to the decline of BH, as large numbers of its fighters and supporters surrender to security forces.  The erosion of BH combat power is attributable to powerful and well-supported opposition and competition from ISWA, which is now the preeminent terrorist group in Borno State.  Severe defeats, mass defections of its members to ISWA, and much improved counter-terrorism efforts by the Nigerian government and foreign military forces generated a perfect storm of challenges for BH, which its dwindling numbers and collapsing support in the indigenous population also significantly undermined its position.   

In a reflection of this shift in power between the two groups, in Borno State, ISWA mounted 40 attacks resulting in 168 deaths in 2022.  BH mounted just 6 incidents causing 63 deaths.   The greater lethality of BH attacks is deceptive as the group is more inclined to carry out mass casualty attacks on soft (civilian) targets than ISWA, which remains focussed on security forces targets.  Despite the improving overall trend in the statistics for terrorism, Borno State remains the most kinetic and lethal state in the country.  The most lethal terrorist attack of the year occurred in the state when 50 civilians were massacred by gunmen who accused the community of harbouring informants for the security forces. 

 

Contest Between ISWA and BH

The struggle for supremacy between ISWA and BH has its roots in philosophical differences between the Islamic State philosophy and that of BH.   ISWA was opposed to mass killings of Muslim civilians, whereas BH used such attacks as a tactic to subdue the indigenous population and force them to support the movement with food, shelter and wives.  ISWA was focussed on the broader aims of jihad and the establishment of Islamism throughout West Africa.  The two divergent philosophies generated tensions that deteriorated into open conflict between the two factions.  

This contest between the two groups is better understood when one examines their origins.  Following the 2002 emergence of Boko Haram officially known as Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (Group of the People of Sunnah for Dawah and Jihad), the group underwent several evolutions, growing from a small, rag-tag band of proselytising Wahabi idealists armed with spears, bows and arrows and primitive home-made firearms to a well organised insurgent group that uses sophisticated firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drones.  By 2014, the group had evolved sufficiently to enable it to seize control of most of Borno State and large tracts of neighbouring Adamawa and Yobe as they strived to establish their own caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin.  Indeed, in 2014, BH proved to be a more deadly threat than ISIS, reportedly killing as many as 6,664 people.  The insurgency spread into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic, reflecting its essentially Kanuri tribal origins and support base. 

The group was responsible for a number of high-profile attacks on communities and security force bases.   In 2015, a South African led private military company (PMC), STTEP International, led a successful surge operation that drove BH and ISWA elements out of many areas, pushing them back towards Lake Chad.  This setback, saw BH on the defensive, coming under attack by an increasingly well trained (mainly by foreign military training teams) Nigerian Army.  In 2016, Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) announced that it had appointed Abu-Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of the group.  The existing BH leader at that time, Abubakar Shekau, refused to accept the new leader, creating division within the group between those that supported Barnawi and those loyal to Shekau.  Those loyal to Barnawi adopted the name of Province (ISWAP), later changing to Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA).  This development introduced significant increased complexity into the security environment in Nigeria.  

Following the factionalisation of BH, attacks by Shekau loyalists on communities, farmers and schools escalated, triggering an internationally supported effort to mount a counter-insurgency campaign by Nigerian security forces.   Nevertheless, the attacks continue.  Estimates indicate that by March 2022 the insurgency had resulted in the deaths of at least 350,000 people and 3 million had become internally displaced persons (IDPs).    Despite the hard-core members of BH continuing the insurgency, large numbers of less committed fighters have surrendered to security forces.  Between July 2021 and May 2022, a total of 13,360 BH fighters and 13,468 BH family members surrendered to security forces.  This flow of surrendering BH fighters has continued into 2023 and continues to weaken the group.  Even in the face of a steady erosion of its combat power, BH remains a potent threat and is capable of mounting complex and ‘spectacular’ attacks at times and places of its choosing.

On 24 January 2023, more than 200 Boko Haram fighters surrendered to security forces at military barracks in Konduga and Banki in Borno state following an attack on the group by the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP).  ISWAP attacked BH camps in Mantari and Maimusari in Bama, also in Borno State.  The attack continued a sequence of attack and counterattack by the two groups on one another’s positions that began in early 2020. The clashes have claimed at least 1,320 lives from both groups in a prolonged battle for supremacy.

Terrorists Embrace New Technology

In the period preceding the conflict between BH and ISWA, the latter embraced their fellow Islamists to the extent that BH fighters were being trained at terrorist training camps in the Sahel and Middle East.  This allowed the group to exploit the use of IEDs and more advanced tactics techniques and procedures.  Their attacks became more lethal and effective in overrunning and defeating the Nigeria security forces.  While the IEDs being used by BH were relatively primitive compared to the very advanced technology seen in Iraq and Syria, their introduction changed the way the campaign was being fought.  Security forces suddenly found the roads to be a much more dangerous proposition as several vehicles were destroyed by IEDS and lives were lost.  Additionally, the introduction of person-borne, suicide IEDs introduced a major new threat to security check points, as well as civilian targets such as markets and places of worship. 

Boko Haram also introduced drone technology into its arsenal of weapons and operating systems.  Using drones for both reconnaissance purposes and also to deliver explosives to security forces targets was yet another gamechanger.  According to the GTI report, 65 non-state actors are now assessed to be capable of employing drones as weapon systems.  The technology can be purchased easily in open markets.  Modern drones have long-ranges – up to 1,500 kilometres – and can be used in swarm attacks where the sheer number of drones ensures that some will evade security forces defences.  They can also be used in targeted assassinations.  Operators can be trained easily and quickly.  While effective countermeasures to drone technology do exist, it is believed that the Nigerian security forces are yet to introduce such systems, although there are moves to identify a suitable system for deployment in high-risk areas.

An Expanding Operational Footprint

According to a separate analysis based on data from sources close to the Nigerian security forces, in 2022, ISWA claimed responsibility for 25 percent of Islamic State attacks worldwide.  The group mounted 517 attacks in Nigeria and a further 30 in the Lake Chad region.  The death toll from these attacks amounted to 1,589 deaths.

Within Nigeria, the group has claimed least 25 attacks beyond the North East geopolitical region, supporting the assessment that the group has developed and positioned several well organised and resilient cells beyond its North East / Lake Chad Basin main footprint.  

Attacks were mounted in 8 states in 4 geopolitical zones (North West, South-South, North Centre and the South West).   The majority of attacks took place in the Middle Belt, with a main effort in Kogi State and single attacks in Taraba, Niger and the FCT.   The main area of operations is in the centre of Kogi State. The tempo and variety of attacks indicates that a well-trained and well-resourced cell exists in or close to Lokoja.

The Kogi cell mounted 13 attacks over a 12-month period.  Within Kogi State, attacks occurred in Adavi, Okene, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Kabbah Bunu and Lokoja Local Government Areas (LGA).  Most took place within 40 kilometres of Okene Town in the Okene LGA.  Two attacks were mounted further afield in the vicinity of Owo Town, Owo LGA, approximately 85km away. The cell also carried out attacks in Edo and Ondo States.  

Attacks in Taraba were concentrated around Jalingo, indicating the presence of an active terrorist cell in or in the environs of the city.  The Taraba cell is likely smaller and less resilient than the Kogi cell. A series of arrests in June 2022 disrupted its operations.  However, the contiguous borders with the north-eastern states and the survival of some members of the cell mean that it has the potential to be reconstituted and reactivated rapidly and easily.   

In both areas, a small majority (56%) of attacks targeted civilians, with bars in both Taraba and Kogi State being the most frequently targeted.  Security forces – primarily police vehicle patrols, checkpoints and police stations – were also targeted.  Additionally, 3 large scale attacks were mounted against high profile targets – a train, a prison and a military holding facility.  Overall, attacks comprised of 2 instances of kidnap for ransom (each with multiple victims), 15 complex attacks with small arms and IEDs, 8 attacks mounted using just IEDS, 1 assassination and 2 prison breaks.  The attacks resulted in 100 deaths, 51 injuries and 177 people being abducted.

Civilian target locations were apparently selected because they would allow the inflicting of mass casualties and were mostly frequented by people whose characteristics and behaviours made them more likely to be targeted by fundamentalists – e.g. Christians and alcohol drinkers.  No individual tribal or ethnic group was specifically targeted, but the purpose of the attacks was probably to inflict mass casualties to frighten and intimidate the civilian population and influence the behaviour and decisions of other audiences including federal and local government, local community and political thought leaders and finally, other Islamist groups.  

During the attacks and their aftermath, the attackers exhibited very little selectivity in the way the treated their victims.  In the case of the Abuja-Kaduna train attack, middle class Nigerians were targeted irrespective of tribe or religion.  Muslims were killed, abducted, abused and ransomed alongside Christians.  

In all instances, the attackers killed without restraint. IEDs were also used as part of complex attacks against the Wawa Cantonment, Owo, Kuje, Kaduna-Abuja Train and other targets.  Nevertheless, most casualties were caused by small arms fire.  Apart from the large-scale attacks such as at Wawa and Kuje, the cells employed weapons that can be easily obtained, hidden, moved, or even manufactured.

ISWA has demonstrated a sophisticated use of the information space in its campaign, with information exploitation being a key component of its operational cycle. They rapidly disseminate detailed claims covering the location and number of casualties of their attacks.  These statements are accompanied by high-quality imagery.  It is assessed that ISWA reports their attacks immediately in order to dominate the information space, confirm their actions and achieve greater influence over their target audiences.  It is probable that the cells exploit local languages using multiple mediums and channels.

Regional Context

As ISWA surges to pre-eminence in Nigeria and beyond, the spatial dynamics of terrorism in the region have shifted.  The primary area of terrorist activity in the Sahel region currently lies in the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (also known as Liptako-Gourma).  Whilst this region does not feature in western news media as prominently as Syria and Iraq did during the height of ISIS activity, the Sahel is currently the region of the world most affected by terrorism.  In contrast to Nigeria and Niger, which have seen falling rates of terrorist activity in 2022, the tri-border region has seen a dramatic deterioration in security.  Burkina Faso and Mali occupy the second and third slots in the GTI report table of countries most impacted by terrorism.  The two countries saw terrorism deaths increasing by 50% and 56% to 1,135 and 944 deaths respectively.   Additionally, four of the ten countries in the Sahel feature in the ten worst scores in the GTI report. 

 

Benin and Togo are also impacted, with both recording more than ten deaths for the first time.  Furthermore, reporting also indicates the spread of Islamist extremism into northern Ghana and Ivory Coast. 

With regards to BH while their eminence peaked in 2014, i.e., when the group controlled huge swathes of territory in north-east Nigeria as well as areas in neighbouring countries around the Lake Chad Basin, its conflict with ISWA has seen many of its fighters displaced into neighbouring countries.  While this has seen its power and influence severely eroded in Nigeria, the group remains relatively stable in other areas of the Lake Chad Basin.  In neighbouring Niger, deaths in the Diffa region rose by 38% to their highest level in two years and it is believed this rise has been driven by the displacement of BH elements from Borno State due to pressure from ISWA attacks.  The displacement of BH fighters elevated the group’s position in Niger, making it the country’s most deadly terrorist group in 2022. 

Conclusions

Although BH continues to atrophy within Nigeria, ISWA remains a potent threat and has shown an intent to expand its operations both geographically and in terms of its targeting.  

The conflict between the two groups continued throughout 2022 and is likely to persist throughout 2023.  The trajectory of this conflict indicates that BH will be reduced to a mere shadow of its former strength in Nigeria and ISWA will continue to be the dominant Islamist group in the country.  Given the wider, regional connectivity that ISWA enjoys, it will likely prove an even tougher opponent for the Nigerian Security Forces than BH has been historically.  

The outcome of the 2023 Presidential and Senate elections in the country are yet to be settled, with robust lawsuits filed against the President Elect and INEC.  Whether or not the President Elect is inaugurated in May, the security environment in Nigeria will remain complex, dynamic and extremely unstable for the foreseeable future.

Nigeria Decides – The 2023 Nigerian Elections

The Electoral Process – Successes and Enduring Systemic Challenges

Following the electoral victory of the All Progressive Congress nominee for the presidency on 25 February, observers and critics have continued to discuss the alleged shortcomings in the electoral system.  Widely described as a flawed process, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) also wrestled with the same challenges faced during the second round of elections at State level on 18 March. Despite the criticism of the process, it is expected that Bola Ahmed Tinubu will be inaugurated as President on 29 May.  So where will a federal government led by the septuagenarian veteran of Nigerian politics take the country?  Against this background, other observers and analysts identify some encouraging outcomes of the federal elections.  

Perhaps the principal development that could take Nigeria forward as a mature and credible democracy is the emergence of a third force in the political fabric of the country.  The emergence of the Labour Party led by Peter Obi was bolstered by a groundswell of support among the youth, who are desperate for change.  The momentum began in late 2020 when the #ENDSARS movement emerged, showing the power that social media could have in bringing people together to protest for change.  As the Nigerian population surges towards becoming the second most populous democracy within a generation, the emergence of a largely youth supported party could prove critical in the mid to long term.  

The second important factor in these elections is that for the first time since the end of military rule in 1999, no former military general was on the ballot.

Thirdly, the ruling party won only 36 percent of the vote, 20 percent less than in 2019.

Finally, in more than half the states, the winning presidential candidate represented a different party than that of the incumbent governor, demonstrating that incumbency is no longer a guarantee of success at the polls.

Nevertheless, Nigeria and in particular INEC, needs to address an array of shortcomings in the way the election was conducted if the country is to become the democratic benchmark for West Africa.  International and domestic observers reported a number of issues that INEC should address before the next round of elections at the weekend, including:

  • Reports in the months preceding the polls of at least 18 assassinations or assassination attempts on candidates and party leaders.
  • Widespread delays in polling station opening, particularly in opposition voting areas. Conversely, in many ruling party strongholds, there were reports from election observers and civil society organizations, that voting started early, turnout was higher, and results were reported more quickly.
  • At a small number of polling stations voting was not conducted at all.
  • Violent disruptions to the voting process, including attacks on polling stations and tabulation centres.
  • Theft and destruction of ballot boxes. 
  • Questions of manipulation of results in some states. 
  • INEC’s lack of transparency throughout the election.  Challenges with the electronic transfer of results and their upload to a public portal in a timely manner undermined citizen confidence at a crucial moment of the process. Moreover, inadequate communication and lack of clarity by INEC about the cause and extent of these problems created confusion and eroded voters “’trust in the process.”

Observers reported that many voters – even those supporting winning candidates – expressed frustration and disappointment. A major question mark remains over the participation figures.   With almost 94 million registered voters, 10 million of whom were eligible to vote for the first time, fewer than 25 million votes were cast.

One aspect of the challenges facing voters was the currency crisis which was perceived by some to have a political undercurrent.  The shortage of available hard currency impacted on voters’ ability to travel to polling centres, further contributing to voter disenfranchisement and low turnout.

The National Executive Council of AnyiAnyi, an international group of powerful Igbo professionals and experts, led by Anthony Olisa Okolo and Peter Agba Kaluhas, drew attention to the apparent failure of the INEC to gain the trust of the public by conducting free, fair and credible elections.

The group claimed that Igbo people across the country and in Lagos especially have “…been made the scapegoat of widespread rejection of a party and their candidate, leading to the disruption of Igbo businesses, destruction of our people’s shops, properties, and wilful damage and intimidation of voters, leading even to grievous bodily harm.” 

Major Errors of Judgement by the Central Bank?

Nigeria has previously and successfully introduced new banknotes several times since independence in 1960. So what caused the issues this time? 

The CBN announced the introduction of new banknotes in November 2022, with the changeover to new notes scheduled for mid-December.  The transition rapidly disintegrated leaving millions of Nigerians without access to cash, triggering protests and attacks on banks and ATM machine facilities.  

The rollout of the currency change was disastrous. The fallout included:

  • Severe shortages of the new banknotes.
  • Massive decline in business transactions (especially in the informal sector).
  • People queueing for hours at banks and ATM machines.
  • Attacks on bank staff and destruction of bank property, including ATMs that failed to dispense cash.

The policy also led to lawsuits by some state governors against the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Federal Government.

The CBN seemingly failed to carry out a full cost-benefit analysis.  It promoted the benefits of the project without apparently making a serious effort to assess the cost – not least of which was the huge impact on economic activity – especially in the informal economy upon which millions of Nigerians rely for sustenance.

It also failed to adequately inform the general population of the aims and the details of the process for the transition to new bank notes, but also appeared to have not carried along the commercial banks, which were left uncertain as to the procedures for transitioning.  This extends to failing to issue policy guidelines following the Supreme Court ruling that some old bank notes should continue to be legal tender.  This fundamental failure of planning and execution triggered confusion and anger as merchants and businesses continue to reject the old notes, despite the court’s rulings.

The timing of the implementation could hardly have been worse and the timeline for completion of the transition was unrealistic and unsupported by a logical explanation as to why it was so compressed.

The CBN also failed to adequately explain why old and new notes could not coexist.  This has now been enforced by the Supreme Court, which has ordered the Bank to comply and implement their earlier ruling.

Undermining the entire process was an opaque strategy with no clear prioritisation of the aims and objectives.  This led to conflicting priorities and requirements.  

Had the CBN opted for a tandem system of using both sets of notes, it could have withdrawn the old notes over a period and avoided the hardship inflicted on millions of traders and citizens.  The aim of reducing the amount of currency circulating outside the banking system has probably been thoroughly undermined, as Nigerians now do not trust the banks to make their hard-earned cash accessible on demand and by default may be even less likely to deposit their cash.

The policy also completely failed to take into account the fact that the Nigerian economy is currently in a state of crisis, with 22% inflation, 33% unemployment– 43% among young Nigerians – and a growth rate of 3%, interest rates at 17.5%, steep declines in the value of the Naira, and burgeoning poverty.

Speculation and commentary in Nigeria and abroad has alluded to the suspicion that the timing of the changeover was politically inspired to suppress vote buying and electoral fraud.  While that was achieved – to some extent – the election is still subject to allegations of influencing of INEC officials using hard foreign currency.

The net effect was that Nigerians were already suffering unprecedented hardship when the CBN effectively removed their ability to withdraw cash on demand.  To do so during what is perhaps the most heavily contested election in the country’s recent history was reckless and ruined the credibility of the banking system for many Nigerians.

Moving to a Dual Currency System

On 13 March 2023, the CBN announced that it had extended the timeline to withdraw its old currency for redesigned notes.  The old notes of 200 naira (43 U.S. cents), 500 naira ($1.08) and 1,000 naira ($2.16) will now remain legal tender until 31 December 2023, which begs the question as to why this could not have been done in the first instance.  It is perhaps important to note that the Bank announced that this move was taken in order to comply with a directive from the Supreme Court, which ruled on 3rd March 2023 that the program’s failed implementation was in breach of the law.

However, on 14 March, thousands still queued at banks as neither old nor new notes were available in sufficient volume to meet demands.  To date, according to the Lagos-based Centre for the Promotion of Private Enterprises, the impact on the Nigerian economy of the failed process is estimated to have cost 20 trillion naira ($43 billion) as a result of the catastrophic impact on trading activities, the stifling of the informal economy and contraction of the agricultural sector.

Meanwhile, President Elect Tinubu’s Director of Media and Publicity, Bayo Onanuga, has asked President Buhari to sack CBN Governor Emefiele, arguing that his continued governorship of the bank is in conflict with the suspension of the cashless policy by the Supreme Court.

The State Elections

Elections for governors and state assemblies were postponed by a week allegedly due to pending legal cases in the presidential vote by opposition parties who have filed lawsuits demanding the right to examine ballot papers and voting machines from the 25 February 2023 presidential polls. 

INEC filed a countersuit saying it needed to reconfigure the Bimodal Voter Accreditation Systems (BVAS) ahead of the gubernatorial elections that had been planned for 11 March.  The Supreme Court directed INEC to upload information in the BVAS onto a secure server for opposition parties to review.  INEC said the ruling came far too late for the commission to adequately prepare for the elections, while the opposition Labour Party (LP) stated that it wanted to “keep close eye and watch what is happening within the INEC and BVAS.”  Amid argument and counterargument, the court has heard allegations of corruption from the LP and a fear that voter confidentiality will be breached if the opposition is granted full access to its Cloud storage system from the INEC.  Both opposition parties threatened to protest if access were denied.

Recent activity and trend analysis showed that electoral violence was most likely to occur in Rivers, Lagos and Kano States.  It is perhaps significant that these three states are the most important economically and also have the three largest urban populations in the country.

As the country prepared for the 18 March round of election in 28 states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), including 28 governorship and 993 assembly seats, expectations were high regarding the performance of INEC.  The Commission did manage to achieve some improvements in the conduct of the polls compared to the earlier Presidential elections, with particular enhancements in the deployment of security officers to the various polling units, more efficient distribution of election materials, and more timely opening of the polling centres.  According to a board member of Yiaga Africa, Ezenwa Nwagwu, during the Governorship and State Assembly elections the INEC Result Viewing portal (IReV) functioned optimally and electronic  voter accreditation using the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) was successfully implemented in a significant number of polling stations.

The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room raised concern over attacks being carried out in some parts of the country and noted that there was still a long way to go before the country achieves a truly credible and transparent electoral system.  A well-respected civil society monitoring organisation, Yiaga Africa, stated that its observers had recorded 216 critical incidents, including vote-trading, violence, ballot-snatching and voter-suppression.  The body reported irregular activity in approximately 5% of polling units, including destruction of election materials, arguments and quarrels between party agents, and fighting among party supporters, among others.  Given the country’s election history, irregularities in just one in twenty polling centres is testament to the focus INEC has placed on delivering a credible election.

Other reporting indicates that killings occurred in Benue, Kano, Ebonyi, Cross Rivers, Gombe, and Rivers State, with some of the fatalities recorded resulting from security forces responding to acts of violence and ballot box snatching by political thugs and voter intimidation. Suppression by non-state elements was reported in Lagos, Gombe, Edo, Kano, Enugu, Imo, Bayelsa, and Rivers.  The elections took on an ethnic character in Lagos where some voters claimed they were prevented from voting because of their ethnicity and/or perceived party affiliation.  Similar activity was reported in Sokoto state in the north-west, Kano in the north, and Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta.

Some vote buying is alleged to have occurred in several states and this is supported by reports of party officials being arrested in possession of very large amounts of cash in Lagos and Rivers states.  Party agents were observed in some location asking voters to declare who they had voted for.

Security forces personnel generally performed well during the state gubernatorial and senate elections, with notable successes in Lagos, where a ballot box snatcher was rescued from a lynch mob, and in Imo State where abducted INEC personnel were rescued.  One observer organisation reported that almost all voting centres had at least two security personnel present.  The State saw incumbent Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu of the APC win a solid victory.  Nevertheless, Lagos State experienced some irregularities.  Unconfirmed media reports suggest the security forces responded to 24 calls for assistance in the State between the opening of the polling centres at 08:30 am and 13:30 pm.  The areas of the city affected included Oshodi, Jakande Estate, Ejigbo, Ajao and Oke-Afa.  The resounding victory of Sanwo-Olu, with more than 736,000 votes over the second place Labour Party candidate, Gbadebo Rhodes-Vivour, who secured 292,000 votes, raises an interesting discussion about how the APC managed to turn the vote around in a state where the LP voted solidly against the APC and for the LP in the presidential elections.

Despite a generally good performance by security forces personnel in Rivers State, a total of at least 12 people were killed in election related acts of violence, including 3 political thugs in Ogbakiri in the Emohua LGA.  However, voting commenced early in Woji, Rumuomasi, Rumobaikani and Elelenwo in the Obi Akpor LGA.  Low voter turnout reportedly led to the polling centres closing mid-afternoon, potentially disenfranchising some voters who intended to vote later in the day.  Furthermore, reports indicated that voting did not occur in the Asari-Toru, Gokana and Khana LGAs.  In other reports, numerous videos circulated on social media apparently showing ballot box snatching, including at Uniport where a lecturer allegedly led a gang of thugs who stole ballot boxes.

Social media carried numerous reports and videos in which Igbo commentary claimed the Igbo voting areas of Lagos state were subject to harassment and voter suppression.  Given that this also occurred in areas such as Surulere, Oniru and Yaba in the 2019 elections, the reports may well be credible.  

Additionally, unconfirmed reports claimed that security forces arrested a total of 140 political thugs in Enugu State at a hotel in Nsukka and political thugs destroyed ballots in Birnin Ruwa in Zamfara State.

Some states, including Lagos, allowed voting to resume on Sunday, 19 March.

What Next for Nigeria?

The APC retains a slightly diminished, but still solid, majority in the Nigerian Senate and a slim majority in the House of Representatives. The new National Assembly is significantly different in terms of parties represented and individual members to the outgoing legislature.  At least eight parties will be represented. The APC won 57 senatorial seats, the PDP 29, the LP 6, New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) 2 each, and the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) and Young Progressive Party (YPP) 1 seat each, according to the breakdown.

While the PDP remains the leading opposition party, Nigeria’s first-past-the-post electoral system has meant that many of the gains by the LP and smaller parties came at its expense: it has lost at least fifteen Senate seats. While the momentum for change was insufficient to overturn the Nigerian political system, it has ensured that numerous long-standing presences in the assembly have come to an end.  The downside to this is that 3 of the 6 sitting female parliamentarians will depart.

Tinubu has pledged to end the fuel subsidy that costs Nigeria some $15 billion annually and use the money “more productively in joint investments with the private sector to create jobs in infrastructure, health care, education and agriculture.” He plans to focus investments in industrialization, technological innovation, improved infrastructure, and agricultural development.  

To achieve this, he will face a wall of vested interests that have defeated such an initiative by every Nigerian president before him.  If he forges ahead with his plan, Nigeria will face further fuel shortages and civil unrest as ordinary Nigerians run out of fuel and businesses are forced to shut down.  

Restoring security will also need to be a top priority. The country faces a mosaic of security challenges, including:

  • Islamist terrorism in the northeast
  • Banditry and criminal gangs in the northwest, 
  • Separatists in the oil-rich southeast,
  • Industrialised theft of oil and condensate by transnational cartels led by powerful Nigerian actors,
  • Herder-farmer conflicts in the middle belt, 
  • Increasing levels of poverty driven violence in cities. 

While Nigerian oil and gas do not have the importance for the United States it once had, events in Nigeria are still of strategic importance in Washington.  Conversely, as the European Union tries to realign its strategic energy relationships away from Russia, the importance of Nigeria, already the source of about 14 percent of EU imports of gas, has increased immeasurably. Furthermore, as Nigeria’s population explodes from its current 216 million to 375 million by 2050, making the country the third most populous in the world after India and China, it will become a regional and continental heavyweight that will increasingly matter to the West.  All of these factors should be major drivers of Tinubu’s new foreign policy.

Whatever he does, Tinubu will have to move fast to address the many challenges that his presidency will face.  Failing to demonstrate to the youth that he is serious about developing the economy and creating opportunities for work and prosperity will likely result in a stronger Labour Party and significant social unrest.  Fuel shortages, poverty, unemployment and insecurity must attract his attention as the key issues to be addressed from day one of his tenure.

Nigeria’s New Banknote Crisis – A Case Study in Self-Harm or a Shrewd Step towards Modernising the Economy

On 26 October, 2022, Godwin Emefiele, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), announced that the bank had redesigned NGN200, NGN500, and NGN1,000 naira notes.  It announced that the new designs would replace the old notes over a very compressed timeline in early 2023.  The principal reasons for the move were given by the CBN as:

  • More than 80% of all banknotes were in public hands – characterised by the CBN as hoarding.
  • High rates of, and increasing ease of, counterfeiting of NGN500 and NGN1,000 banknotes
  • An excess of bank notes in circulation – having risen from N1.46 trillion in December 2015 to N3.23 trillion in September 2022
  • The ambition to fully implement a cashless policy
  • To enable security agencies to track anyone who withdraws huge (undefined) sums to determine its use
  • The shortage of clean and fit banknotes
  • To moderate inflation
  • To curtail the activities of kidnappers and bandits by making ransom payments more difficult and to allow tracking of new notes.

Many commentators have, in recent weeks, suggested that the timing of the strategic move is very revealing.  It has been suggested that the withdrawal of the old bank notes from legal tender was timed to forestall the payment of huge amounts of cash to influence the outcome of the imminent elections.  Some have been more outspoken and claimed it is a direct attack on the APC nominee for the Presidency, Mr Bola Ahmed Tinubu.  

President Buhari officially unveiled the new NGN200, NGN500, and NGN1,000 notes on November 23, 2022, at the Presidential Villa in Abuja.  On 15 December, 2022, the newly redesigned naira notes were released into circulation as they were dispensed through ATM machines mixed with the old banknotes.   However, many commercial banks failed to issue the new notes and seemed to operate an unofficial policy of withholding the new notes until the deadline for the withdrawal of the old notes – 31 January 2023.  This had the effect of seeing people deposit the old notes and then being issued with the same old currency.  The stage was set for widespread discontent among ordinary Nigerians who were not yet ready to join the cashless society desired by the CBN.

In response, on 04 January 2023, the CBN banned over the counter cash withdrawals in an attempt to ameliorate the effect of a dramatic shortage of the new notes.  Compounding the difficulties experienced by millions of Nigerians, the CBN governor ordered commercial banks to set the withdrawal limit of the new notes at NGN100,000 (c.$135) for individuals and NGN500,000 (c.$660) for corporate bodies.  Moreover, the maximum cash withdrawal via ATM per day was pegged at NGN20,000 (c.$25) and NGN100,000 (c.$135) per week.  This strategy triggered a wave of economic hardship for small businesses, traders, and individuals, leading to an outburst which forced the CBN to increase the limit to NGN500,000 (c.$660) for individuals and NGN5 million (c.$6,600) for corporate accounts.

Early in 2023, the Governor of Kaduna state, Nasir El-Rufai, addressed the economic hardship being inflicted on people as a result of the CBN’s policy on cash withdrawal limits, alleging that “CBN mopped up over NGN2 trillion of the old notes but only printed NGN300 billion of the new notes”.

In response to the growing crisis, the House of Representatives sent an invitation to the CBN governor to address the House and explain the policy and strategy to them.  He ignored the invitation until an infuriated Speaker of the House threatened Emefiele with arrest.  He then, reluctantly, appeared before them on the day of the deadline for withdrawal of the old notes.  During his meeting with lawmakers, Emefiele extended the deadline date to deposit the old naira notes to 17 February, 2023, which also meant holders of the old notes could spend them till 10 February.

It was initially reported that the cash shortage was caused by banking authorities failing to release enough new notes.  However, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), has reported that it has conducted raids in which officers had arrested bank managers for allegedly hoarding the new notes in vaults rather than putting them in ATMs and giving them to customers.  

Following a legal challenge initiated by the APC-run northern states of Kaduna, Kogi and Zamfara, on 09 February 2023, the Supreme Court waded into the crisis, suspending the deadline for withdrawal of the old notes.  On the same day, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both called on the Federal Government to push the deadline for implementation back to alleviate the growing hardship being experienced by Nigerians.  On 13 February 2023, Ekiti, Bayelsa, Sokoto and Rivers joined the group of states lodging the legal challenge to the CBN strategy.  The Supreme Court heard the case on 15 February but immediately adjourned the case until 22 February amid the expectation of an address to the nation by the President.  

On 15 February 2023, President Buhari addressed the nation (a full transcript of the address is available at Annex A).  Following the address, he ordered the release of the old format N200 notes back into circulation alongside the new format notes of N200, N500 and N1,000 denominations until 10 April.  This step, broadly in line with the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank, is designed to ease the hardship being experienced by millions of Nigerians and has been met with mixed reactionsThe move leaves the old format N500 and N1,000 denominations as no longer legal tender.  Some commentators stated that the move would save many small businesses from failure.  Significant dissatisfaction exists at the continuing scarcity of the new bank notes amid suspicion that the banks are witholding the new format notes. 

It is noteworthy that the extension will allow Nigerians to sustain their businesses beyond the presidential elections due on 25 February 2023 and the state and local council elections due to take place on 11 March 2023.  It is illuminating that the President stated that “this new monetary policy has also contributed immensely to the minimization of the influence of money in politics”.  The aim is admirable, with the timeline being compressed in order to maximise the impact on electoral fraud and vote-buying, but the implementation of the strategy has, to a large extent, been muddled and possibly counterproductive.   

 

The Impact of the Strategy on Social Cohesion

Since early February, banks across the country have been closing their doors to customers due to the scarcity of the new format of bank notes.  Particularly affected have been banks in Lagos, Ogun and Abuja.  The crisis is affecting multiple banks including Fidelity Bank, First Bank, Zenith Bank, Access Bank and Guaranty Trust Bank.

Small businesses that depend on day-to-day cash transactions have been unable to access their funds or manage their cashflow.  Point Of Sale operators are being forced to shut down as they are unable to withdraw cash to service their businesses.  This has resulted in a suppression of commerce compounded by the fact that the customers were also unable to access cash to spend in the markets.  Worst hit were businesses that handle perishable goods.

Millions of Nigerians do not have bank accounts and in many families the main earners have been struggling to support their families due to their inability to acquire cash.  One estimate says that approximately 40% of Nigeria’s adult population does not have a bank account, particularly those living in rural areas. Even for those that have an account, the shortage of new naira notes is leaving many people unable to pay bills and buy sustenance.  The CBN policy of moving towards a cashless society is unrealistic as the country currently lacks the infrastructure to facilitate such an ambition.

Businesses that did have POS payment facilities were forced to close and those that stayed open are charging exorbitant interest rates, adding further misery to the already struggling people of Nigeria.

Some banks have been attacked as patrons find the ATM machines unable to dispense the non-existent new currency.  Customers are queueing for hours to withdraw the very limited amounts of cash the CBN will permit banks to issue.  Anecdotal information tells of people queueing for hours, only to be told they can only have N3,000 due to the shortage of new notes.  The banks are in a difficult position, but their customers are suffering extreme hardship.  One customer was allowed to withdraw just one thousand naira – and then only because they pleaded that they would not be able to pay for transport to reach home again.  Fights have broken out and anyone fortunate enough to be able to withdraw cash risks being robbed by desperate citizens and opportunistic thieves.  Amid threats against bank staff, the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees have threatened to withdraw their services of its members nationwide following attacks on some commercial banks.

Inflation has also surged, as those with cash available impose punitive interest rates on ordinary customers.  Anecdotal information indicates that money changers are charging N6,000 for a N20,000 transaction.  A survey by one Nigerian newspaper revealed that Point of Sale (PoS) transaction charges jumped 400% in most cities across the country in the first week of February.

Some Nigerians have also been unable to purchase essential medications without access to cash.  This has impacted to such an extent that the Governor of Borno State ordered the release of N300 million worth of drugs to government hospitals and called on hospitals to issue them free to patients. 

Violence and protests have been spreading across the country as a result of the upheaval including; 

  • Commercial drivers refusing to accept old format notes in Ibadan, Oyo State leading to widespread stranding of commuters generating significant tension;
  • Protestors barricading streets with bonfires in Ondo Town, Ondo State and in Sango Ota, Ogun State;
  • Protestors setting fire to a branch of Access Bank in Udu Udu LGA, Delta State;
  • Protests locking down the Eleko Axis Of Kwara State Polytechnic in Ilorin;
  • Security forces being forced to fire warning shots as protestors blockaded the CBN office on the ring road of Benin City, Edo State;
  • Protests erupting in Port Harcourt on Ozuoba Road in the Rumuosi area;
  • Violent protests taking place in Mokola and Sango in areas of Ibadan in Oyo State.

 

Political Implications and Fallout

The timing of the transition – within weeks of the Presidential election and months of the State and local council elections – could not have been worse.  The move has triggered widespread hardship and discontent among countless millions of Nigerians – most of whom are entitled to vote in the upcoming polls.  

The social impact cannot have been overlooked in the planning of the strategy and, indeed, according to some commentators, it was probably considered a desirable outcome.  This is reflected in comments by the All Progressive Congress (APC) Presidential candidate, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who has publicly alleged that the move was designed to damage the APC’s election prospects.  Coming at the same time as a fuel shortage and pricing crisis, the bank note change out is generating very high levels of frustration and anger among the population.  

Atiku Abubakar of the main opposition PDP backed the policy in principle but said it had been implemented poorly, while Peter Obi of the Labour Party urged Nigerians to be patient, saying the reforms would have long-term benefits.

If Tinubu’s allegations are correct, and the crisis is contrived for political reasons, it would have the potential to light the fuse of an explosive situation.  Tinubu has reportedly warned that he would set the country ablaze if he loses the election unfairly.  The veracity of that report is unknown, but the political veteran has long been known as a kingmaker, initially in the Peoples’ Democratic Party, and latterly the All Progressive Congress.  It is widely accepted that his wealth and influence is sufficient to shape the political landscape of the country, and that may be the basis for the report.  

The political position of the CBN Governor is itself fueling speculation that the strategy is politically inspired.  Emefiele was appointed to the position in 2014 after the previous Governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi was ousted after illuminating the issue of missing revenues.  Emefiele has been Governor since then and exposed his political ambitions when in 2022 he sought to run as the APC presidential candidate.  The Supreme Court ruled against his candidacy, and this has led to speculation that the unhelpful timing of the currency exchange might be simply a case of settling political scores.

Interestingly, if Tinubu is correct, and the instability triggered by the CBN strategy reflects back onto the APC at the polls, the Presidency will most likely go to a northern candidate, breaking the long-standing so-called Zoning Arrangement irreparably.  Such an outcome will have dangerous political implications and could lead to widespread social unrest as the south rejects the result.  Following the 2011 elections, thousands of Nigerians died in sectarian and political violence when the north felt it had been robbed of the Presidency.  It is very likely that the south will feel equally cheated, resulting in a wave of political violence across the mid-belt states and targeting some communities in the southern states.

 

What to Expect

The Supreme Court decision has bought the government some time, but the outcome is not going to change; the bank notes will be changed.  However, how quickly they will be introduced remains to be seen. Some analysts suggest it will take another 3-6 months – which is beyond the elections and into the first term of the new Presidency.  

Meanwhile, the average Nigerian will continue to suffer great hardship caused by the shortage of hard currency.  This will undoubtedly lead to more frequent outbreaks of unrest at banks as well as an elevated level of risk posed by destitute people being forced into street crime in order to sustain their families.  Other negative effects include;

  • Pedestrians leaving banks are likely to be more frequently targeted by the desperate of the opportunists;
  • Motorists sitting in traffic, already at risk from marauding gangs of armed robbers will become even more heavily targeted;
  • Small businesses – especially those that handle cash such as beer parlours, street vendors, hair salons etc or that trade in consumables (rice, cooking oil etc) – will be more likely to suffer theft and robbery.
  • The predatory gangs that have existed for years will become even more energetic in their activities and could pose an elevated threat to individuals and small businesses.

In the event that the APC loses the Presidential election, there is a significant risk of widespread political violence in protest at the perceived ‘rigging’ of the election by the CBN.  

There is also a heightened risk of sectarian violence in mixed communities and along sectarian fault lines in some areas including, but not limited to, Kaduna, Benue, Plateau, Kano City and parts of Lagos. 

To try and assist their customers, some banks have waived fees for transferring money, others opened on Saturday and Sunday. However, other banks have been forced to close due to the threat of violence to their premises and staff. Arete will continue to monitor notices/advice from the banks and other institutions, along with the ongoing situation, and provide updates accordingly.

Crude Oil Theft, Pipeline Security Contracts, Piracy and Elections – A Perfect Storm of Drivers of Instability

Oil Theft and Economic Strain

The Nigerian economy is currently under intense strain, particularly in respect of foreign currency reserves and inflows.  At the end of November, Governor Godwin Emefiele of the Central Bank of Nigeria stated that “The official foreign exchange receipt from crude oil sales into our official reserves has dried up steadily from above $3.0 billion monthly in 2014 to an absolute zero dollars today”, The single greatest earner of foreign currency has, for decades, been the oil and gas sector.  However, the CBN chief attributed the atrophy of this sector’s ability to generate foreign currency inflows to the relentless and expanding industrialised theft of the country’s crude oil and condensate production. 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the oil and gas sector represents a huge opportunity for Nigeria, with global supplies having become strained as a result of economic sanctions imposed on Russia.  However, Nigeria has been unable to exploit the potential this global crisis represents and its foreign currency reserves continue to dwindle.  This is becoming critical as evidenced by the CBN governors comments and a swathe of recent changes in monetary policy relating to foreign currency and banking regulations.   

With Europe now unequivocally cut off from the major supply route for Russian gas since the destruction of the Nordstream 1 pipelines, and the failure to commission the Nordstream 2 pipeline through the Baltic, the question is whether Nigeria can ramp up its production and export levels to fill the supply gap in Europe.  The sea routes to Europe’s markets from Nigeria are relatively short and this reinforces the merits of trading hydrocarbons with European countries.  

Europe’s requirement for LNG supplies is buoyant and Nigeria has capacity to produce 22 million tons per annum (mtpa) from Bonny.  The recent commissioning of train 6 has not yet generated the benefits for the economy that were envisaged though.  For Nigeria to fail to step into the supply gap and increase LNG exports to Europe could be economically – and politically – damaging. 

So can Nigeria exploit the prevailing global economic environment to generate a reversal of fortunes and stabilise the economy?  While clearly a potential opportunity exists, Nigeria faces significant challenges, noting that in late September, media sources reported a 13.5% year on year drop in crude oil output.  This is very significant at a time when these other massive new market opportunities are opening up.   

The following graphic is taken from the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report and shows the steady year-on-year and month-on-month decline in crude oil output.

Industrialized Theft of Hydrocarbons

Pipeline vandalism and lack of investment in pipeline infrastructure are intrinsically linked to the challenges facing the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources.  Chronic threats/risks to the security and physical integrity of pipelines, particularly in the Niger Delta, undermine confidence among domestic and foreign investors.  The apparent inability of oil companies to secure their pipelines is partly responsible for a wave of divestment by the International Oil Companies, an example of which is the planned major divestment by Shell of its remaining onshore oil production assets.  Shell would likely complete the divestment by the time of the elections were it not for a legal challenge to the process centred around a $1.8 billion settlement claim against the operator by host communities in the Niger Delta.

Onshore gas is less problematic from a security perspective due to its volatility and the technical and safety challenges associated with removing it in volume from the closed systems operated by the oil companies. However, Nigeria’s production of associated gas – that which emanates from the same wells and reservoirs as the crude oil production – is entirely dependent upon the ability of the oil companies to continue to pump oil.  With pipelines now so heavily attacked by thieves and vandals that, according to some sources, as much as 90% of oil that leaves the wellheads is stolen before it reaches the export terminals, there is a significant risk that oil companies will shut in their fields.  This will directly impact on gas production.  

Conversely, with oil being far less profitable than gas for the operating companies, it is possible that the oil companies might take a pragmatic position and adopt an elevated tolerance for theft of crude oil as long as the gas continues to flow.  The downside of such pragmatism is that operators are responsible for the environmental impact of their operations, and as we have seen in the past, they face litigation even for loss of containment events caused by deliberate interventions by communities, criminal elements and militants.  Against such a background, it is understandable that they might decide to divest.   

The Nexus with Piracy

On the maritime front, the point is made in shipping media that when the Dangote refinery comes on stream, the facility will likely export refined hydrocarbon products via tankers.  There could be fewer tankers exiting the onshore terminals in the Delta and more off Lekki.  The cargo will change as well from crude to refined product.  That will change the target set available to pirates and maritime armed robbers off the Lekki area and beyond.   However, in late November 2022, Martha Pobee, an Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) of the UN, warned of a shifting situation in the Gulf of Guinea.  She warned that “Pirate groups are adapting to changing dynamics both at sea and in coastal areas,” going on to say; “In this respect, the recent decrease in instances of piracy may in part be attributable to the shift by criminal networks to other forms of maritime and riverine crime, such as oil bunkering and theft, which they likely view as both less risky and more profitable”.  She urged regional States and their regional and international partners to accelerate their efforts to establish security in the Gulf of Guinea, referring to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, signed in June 2013 as the benchmark.

Strategies to Avert a Crisis

The Dangote refinery will also rely on oil from the Delta region to operate.  That feedstock will need to be brought in either via pipelines or tankers.  If it is via pipeline, the line could be targeted onshore by thieves and vandals.  It could also be a target for politically inspired vandalism / sabotage.  If the feedstock is coming in via tanker, that increases the costs and also relies on existing output and terminals in the Delta.  It is likely that Dangote has been or very soon will be lobbying government to resolve the security dilemma in the Niger Delta Region.  

In response to the challenges in the region, we have seen a re-energised focus in government on the seemingly intractable challenge of securing the pipeline network in the Niger Delta.  The Federal Government has realised that crude oil production is vital for the economy and security of the infrastructure is critical to success.  

Recently, we have seen the award of a Niger Delta-wide contract to the former MEND militant leader, Government Ekpemepulo – aka Tompolo.  As at mid-October, the status of this contract remained unclear as a result of strain between Tompolo and other former militant leaders – notably Dokubo Asari. However, by the end of November, pipeline security contracts with Tompolo companies were in place and operational in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers States. 

According to local media reports, Tompolo’s company, Tantita Security Services, has been directly involved in:

  • The discovery of a 4km illegal pipeline running from Yorke Flow Station to an offshore loading point.  It was just one of 15 illegal connections to the Trans Escravos Pipeline.
  • 06 October 2022 – Arrest of an illegal oil bunkering vessel and its crew in the Escravos area.
  • 07 October 2022 – Arrest of a 1,500 metric tons capacity crude oil tanker, MT Deinmo, IMO number 7210526 with eight crew members at the Escravos River in Warri Southwest LGA.
  • By 10 October, a total of 58 illegal connections had been discovered by Tantita Security Services in Delta and Bayelsa States.
  • 15 October, TSS reports the discovery on preceding days of another illegal connection behind a military post in the Ogulagha Community in close proximity to the Forcados Terminal.

Tompolo was keen to demonstrate his company’s capability as a significant sum of money had reportedly been paid at an early stage – before the contract had been signed.  Despite numerous claims of ‘discovery’ of oil theft infrastructure and operations, Tompolo and his organisation would almost certainly have had foreknowledge of the many oil theft operations in the Burutu Kingdom and the wider area, including into Bayelsa. Tompolo’s Chief of Security in Tantita Security Services is one Keston Pondi – formerly a senior Delta State MEND commander in Camp 5.

In November, despite growing support among influential actors, Tompolo was still faced with demands for inclusion by security companies and organisations that are closely associated with former militants.  In Rivers, Asari Dokubo has been pacified and is now supportive of the contract and High Chief Edwin Clark has called for people in the region to support the contract.  However also in Rivers, The Onelga Security Planning and Advisory Committee (OSPAC) demanded inclusion in the Tantita Security Limited surveillance contract, and in Delta State, a speedboat operated by Tompolo’s company local subsidiary was attacked and the engine stolen.  This may have been purely incidental, but it cannot be ruled out that a group seeking inclusion was sending Tompolo a message.

The key challenge facing Tompolo is to demonstrate capability, competence and integrity in the delivery of the contract.  The problem he faces is that the youths who are directly involved in the operational theft of the hydrocarbons are very small fish in a big pond where some very large fish also swim.  The youths are expendable, and any number of arrests will only scratch the surface of the problem that is driven by powerful actors, who drive the operations from afar.  

The economic emergency created by the dwindling foreign currency reserves, and the election campaign which is now underway will perhaps focus minds in Abuja and energise the review of options for securing the region’s pipeline infrastructure.  Arete sources indicate that at least one of the presidential candidates intends to make the issue of industrialised oil theft a key election issue.  That same candidate has reportedly pledged to address the challenge to the country’s prosperity that this illicit industry represents, should he win the Presidency.  Any response will likely see the deployment of high-tech surveillance solutions that have not previously been used in the region and it is likely the new technology will be integrated with existing command and control structures that will see Tompolo’s companies responding to highly accurate but perishable intelligence.  Thus, it is expected that, given time, Tompolo’s companies will be seen to be an effective response to the oil theft problem. 

Conclusion

We should expect the issues discussed in this analysis to become hot topics in the election campaign and we will continue to monitor and add our analysis in the coming months.  The scale of the theft of crude oil is such that the problem will not be fixed quickly or without major pushback from powerful vested interests.  The entire Niger Delta region faces a period of strategic change, and the ending of the industrialised theft of hydrocarbons will not come about without massive investment in the region.  The question is, where will the funding be generated for such a project?

A Review of Stability in the Niger Delta

Background

August 2022 has seen a number of events in the Niger Delta that threaten to destabilise the region again.  The key drivers of instability remain centred around the exploitation of the region’s primary source of revenue – its hydrocarbon resources.  The exploitation of these resources permeates almost every facet of the socio-political character of the region, with contracts for service companies and security suppliers becoming hotly contested sources of tension between communities, companies and political actors at the Local Government Area (LGA) and State levels.  

This nexus of commercial interests and drivers of instability has been the enduring feature of the region since the 2009 Presidential Amnesty Program was introduced to end the militancy in the region.  In August 2022 we saw the issues re-emerge and resulting in the possibility of increased inter-communal conflict.

The region is not a simple monoculture when it comes to crime and violence.  Cultism, ritualism and robbery are an enduring feature of life for the people of the region.  Recent weeks have highlighted the levels of risk facing both indigenous people and visitors, the latter including people travelling to the region for work.  However, this analysis will focus on how the competition for economic advantage arising from oil and gas contracts is a significant driver of instability.

Oil and Gas under Siege

The surge in pipeline vandalism, illegal oil and condensate tapping and artisanal refining is contributing to huge environmental damage across the region, the loss of lives in fires and explosions at bunkering sites and illegal refineries, and an increase in competition between the gangs involved in the illegal industry of oil theft.  Fires and explosions at illegal refineries have increased significantly in 2022, with major events occurring in the Ohaji-Egbema LGA, Imo State, in April 2022 and Ukwa West LGA, Abia State, in May and again on 21 August.  In August, a tanker that was conveying illegal petroleum products exploded in Eleme LGA of Rivers State. These incidents all resulted in multiple deaths.  

The environmental impact of the pipeline tapping, and illegal refining is massive.  Many illegal refineries dispose of the residue from their unsophisticated refining techniques by simply pouring the tar-like reside into the nearest waterway.

The economic impact of the bunkering and artisanal refining is also huge.  It was reported in July that 90% of oil that should be reaching the main terminal at Bonny is lost to crude oil thieves.  One commentator said in August that,” If you pump 239,000 barrels of crude oil into either of the Trans-Niger Pipeline or the Nembe Creek Trunk Line they will receive 3,000 barrels. It got to a point where it was no longer economically sustainable to pump crude into the lines and a force majeure was declared”.  Condensate lines are also heavily targeted as this by product of gas production requires almost no further refining and can simply be mixed with genuine petrol to provide income for the bunkering gangs and also the downstream fuel outlets that enjoy enhanced profit margins.

Illegal bunkering has also expanded dramatically in the last 12 months so much so that the Nigeria Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) recently reported that the nation’s oil output dropped by 12.5 per cent to 1.4 million barrels per day, including condensate, in the first half of 2022, down from 1.6 mbpd in the corresponding period of 2021.  One media source also reported that bunkering cartels stole between 200,000 and 400,000 barrels of crude daily during the period.  

Powerful Forces Threaten Stability

The biggest threat to stability in the region at present is the competition between the powerful cartels behind the bunkering.  In this context, Bayelsa State has witnessed a spate of oil and gas related targeted killings in recent weeks.  

On 12 June, the former MEND militant leader known as Commander Ebi Albert was shot dead in a targeted killing in the Biogbolo suburb of Yenagoa.  He was one of the first tranche of militants to embrace the amnesty.  His killing was the latest in a series of targeted assassinations of former militant leaders in the state.

Also in June, gunmen killed Francis Kolubo, the paramount ruler of Kalaba community in Yenagoa LGA, together with the chairman of the Community Development Committee (CDC), Samuel Oburo.  The murders reportedly were the result of fierce opposition by the two victims to the establishment of a crude oil bunkering camp on the outskirts of the community.  They believed that such a development would hinder the further development of the community by the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company.  The pushback against their plan by the community leaders triggered a spate of attacks on NAOC pipelines by the bunkering gang, who subsequently secured a pipeline surveillance contract from NAOC.

In early July, also in Yenagoa LGA, gunmen in military fatigue shot dead a former militant leader, Indukapo Ogede at a hotel at Okutukutu.  He was the Coordinator of Operations for Darlon Oil and Gas Servicing, an indigenous pipeline surveillance company.

As the 2023 elections loom over the horizon, the Federal Government has realised that this illicit parallel industry is a strategic and potentially existential threat to the nation.  The oil and gas sector generates the vast majority of the country’s foreign currency earnings, and the strategic losses being suffered on lines such as the Trans-Niger Pipeline (TNP) that feeds Bonny Terminal have now reached a level of criticality that can no longer be ignored.  

As the country faces a crippling shortage of foreign currency reserves – witness the recent crisis over repatriation of profits by foreign airlines resulting from government measures to protect its reserves – the Federal Government has decided to attack the problem at its roots – in the Niger Delta.  However, the question of whether this chosen strategy will help or drive further instability in the region remains unanswered.

The Government Acts – But is the Solution Likely to Work?

The recent award of a massive pipeline surveillance contract to the former MEND leader Government Ekpemepulo, AKA Tompolo, has generated significant tension in the region, as many other powerful influencers and former militants feel that the award disenfranchises them. Indeed, the tension has extended beyond the region, resulting in a challenge by the Amalgamated Arewa Youth Groups (AAYG), a northern entity.  This challenge itself has been rejected by the Ijaw youths from the six states of Niger Delta who have publicly stated that the contract, worth more than N4 billion per month, will actually help reduce crude oil theft in the region.  Former MEND militant leaders also pointed out that the AAYG, a coalition of approximately 225 northern youth groups, should focus more on the problems in the north of the country.

AAYG protesters also stormed the NNPC headquarters in Abuja calling for the revocation of the contract and the resignation of the Oil Minister, Timipre Silva – a former governor of Bayelsa State with alleged links to MEND leaders in the state.  

The Ijaw Youth Council Worldwide (IYC), countered that Tompolo would help save the country billions of naira being lost through oil theft and pipeline vandalism.  The former MEND commander, Oyimi 1, who is also Chairman of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Dreams of Niger Deltans (MADND), said Tompolo would not be distracted by the AAYG comments.

However, on 05 September, the coordinator of the group, Muktar Adamu, announced the group had dropped its objection to the contract award, saying “the award of the contract was transparent and well-advertised, and followed due process”.  The apparent reason was that they had seen that the contract had not been awarded to Tompolo directly, but to a company in which he has an interest.

While Tompolo’s two companies had contracts covering part of Bayelsa, Delta, Ondo Imo and Rivers States, three other companies were awarded the other contracts.

Former militants and community leaders in both Bayelsa and Rivers issued statements criticising the award of a region-wide contract to a single contractor, claiming they should also have benefited from the opportunities arising from the contracts.  

A former militant leader in Bayelsa who identifies himself as General Lamptey, said there was no way Tompolo’s companies would be allowed to work in those areas of the state where local leaders that should have benefitted. He further stated that people on the ground would resist the surveillance contractors of Tompolo’s companies.  

In Rivers State, militant leaders in the Kalabari areas, which they claim hosts 83 kilometres of pipelines (referring to the Nembe- Creek Trunk Line (NCTL)), stated that ignoring Ateke Tom and Dokubo Asari would lead to a situation where the surveillance contractors would not be able to work in Rivers State. 

In the north-west of the region, community leaders in Delta State called on the Federal Government to award a separate contract to a company owned by an Urhobo indigene where pipelines transit areas populated by Urhobo communities.  Similarly, in Edo State, speaking on behalf of the oil producing communities and stakeholders in the State, Chief Dr Patrick Osagie Eholor called on the Federal Government and Tompolo to engage in a dialogue and “carry those people along”, stating that they have competent people in the OML30 licence block who can take care of the Trans-Forcados Pipeline (TFP) in that area.   

Responding, in an interview in early September, Tompolo explained that he would be engaging with major militant leaders in Rivers State – including Dokubo Asari and Ateke Tom – and they would realise the way ahead.  He made it clear that all the major players would be included in the overall delivery of the contract, with plans to meet key players in Ondo, Imo and Rivers States.  The former leader of the IYC, Chris Ekiyor, explained that the people protesting against the contract were simply impatient and need to engage with Tompolo to understand how the contract would be delivered.

The Ijaw National Congress (INC), the overarching body of all Ijaws, set up a committee to reduce tension arising from the pipeline surveillance contract.

Nevertheless, on 11 September, media reported that Asari threatened to confront and disarm any personnel working on the Tompolo contract who enter the Kalabari lands in Rivers State.

 

Can the Challenge Be Met?

In late August, the Senior Special Assistant to President Muhammadu Buhari on Media and Publicity, Mallam Garba Shehu, said the federal government would soon go public with the identity of highly-placed Nigerians behind oil theft in the country.  He implied that the ‘big men’ behind the industrialised theft of the nation’s wealth included members of the political elite and the security organs.   His assertion that the cartel includes senior people in the armed forces was an echo of a 2019 statement by Rivers State Governor, Nyesom Wike.  He claimed that the cost of such operations was beyond the reach of low-level community based criminal gangs.  Illustrating his point is the case of the MV. Heroic Idun, a 3 million barrel capacity very large crude carrier, which allegedly managed to lift 3 million barrels of crude illegally while in Nigeria waters.  Its subsequent escape to Equatorial Guinea remains contentious and largely unexplained.

Sheu’s words might herald a forthcoming clash between Tompolo’s contractors and powerful actors who will use the security forces to protect their operations.  More likely is a pragmatic balance being reached and the oil theft continuing after a suitable interval in which the contract will be hailed as a success.  The contract award can be viewed as an extension of ‘Operation Dakatar Da Bararrwo’, which was launched on 01 April.  Since its launch, 23,110,102.59 litres of diesel have been seized while crude oil was put at 39,664,420.16 litres or 230,882.73 barrels.  For kerosene, about 649,775.38 litres were confiscated; while PMS had recovery of 345,000.49 litres, Sludge 380,000 litres, and LPFO 66,000 litres.  During the operation, 85 suspects were arrested with 72 Boats while 23 vehicles were also seized.  At first glance, these figures are impressive.  However, they represent a mere skimming of the surface and the arrest and disruption of the very lowest levels of the illicit activity.  The major cartels that steal on an industrial scale will remain untroubled by such operations.

Militants and Surveillance Contracts

Sylva and Kyari decided to award the contract to Tompolo based on his history of leading the highly franchised militant groups in the first decade of the century and his handling of a pipeline surveillance contract in Delta State in 2014-15 with Oil Facilities Surveillance Limited.  Some senior military leaders as well as some governors in the region pushed against the award.  

Awarding pipeline surveillance contracts to former militant leaders is not unprecedented.  In 2014, a contract was awarded to Oil Facilities Surveillance Limited, which was owned by APC chieftain, Chief Emami Ayiri and the PDP’s Chief Michael Diden, AKA Ejele, to secure pipelines in Delta State.  Other contracts were awarded in Bayelsa to ‘Macaiver’ and in Rivers State to Farah Dagogo and Dokubo Asari under the overall control of Ateke Tom.  The contracts ended in 2015 ahead of the forthcoming elections.  Since then, a patchwork of contracts has been awarded to various companies.  

The government perception is that of all the contractors awarded lucrative contracts, only Tompolo has succeeded in securing pipelines.  

Can Tompolo Succeed?

It is reported that he has reached an understanding with the commander of the JTF that it will work collaboratively with his companies.  Tompolo is also perceived by the government as someone who knows the terrain, who understands the bunkering business and who commands a substantial number of men who will aggressively attack the problem of policing the pipeline networks.

Tompolo has mounted a significant and successful diplomatic campaign to win over his detractors in the region and beyond.  Indeed, in the first week of September, the AAYG reached an understanding with Tompolo and the leader of the Itsekiri youth movement (the Itsekiri Leaders of Thought), who met with Tompolo on 11 September to work out a protocol whereby the Itsekiri and Ijaw can both benefit from the contract.  The following day, the Itsekiri leaders began recruitment for the contract indicating a satisfactory outcome to the meeting.

At his headquarters in Oporoza in the Burutu Kingdom of Delta State, he has also held meetings with a succession of former militants, community leaders, journalists, security forces commanders, bunkering gang leaders, and pressure groups.  His efforts appear to be bearing fruit and the hope is that the status quo will be maintained in the region but only time will tell.

 

Strategic Impact of the Insurgency in the North West

Introduction

At the end of March 2022, Arete published a deep dive report into the attack on the Abuja Kaduna train that took place on 28 March.  At the time, the details of that incident were slowly becoming clearer, but the motivation and the impact of the incident remained uncertain.  In the four months since the attack, a picture has emerged of a much deeper-rooted problem for the Federal Government than a single group carrying out an isolated attack for quick financial gain.  What has become apparent is that the Nigerian Government has yet another insurgency to address, but this time it is happening right on the doorstep of the seat of government.  The implications of this, as we enter the election campaigning period ahead of next year’s elections, are profound.  

An Expanding Problem for the Government

In the intervening period since the end of March, insurgents based in Niger State have:

  • Continued to kidnap travellers plying the road between the capital land Kaduna – the gateway to the North.  
  • Attacked the security forces – particularly in and around Suleja, which is the key point between the areas in Niger State where they have their bases and the target rich Abuja-Kaduna corridor.
  • Attacked a convoy of the Presidency in Katsina State – the President’s home state.
  • Attacked Kuje Prison in the Federal Capital Territory, releasing hundreds of inmates including a large number of jailed insurgents.
  • Attacked a patrol of the elite 7th Guards Brigade in Bwari, a satellite town of Abuja lying to the north-west of the capital

The insurgents have demonstrated capability and intent to mount bold attacks in areas that previously had been regarded as relatively secure compared to other parts of the country.  It is believed that the insurgents are now present and occupy bases in six local government areas of Niger State and mount their attacks into the FCT and Kaduna State from these areas. 

Clearly, this evolving threat presents a massive challenge to the authority of the government at a time when the security situation in many parts of the country is becoming one of the main subjects discussed by people examining the political future of the nation.  The boldness of the attacks and the proximity to the seat of government for the country have galvanised these discussions both within the government and among its political opponents.  But could the emergence of this new challenge to the authority of the state have been predicted?  A body of thought that says it could is gathering strength and momentum.  

So, what were the drivers behind the formation of this powerful new group?

Anecdotal information indicates that the insurgents, some reports numbering them in tens of thousands (although the figure is more likely to be less than a thousand), are comprised of youths who had previously been mobilised to act as enforcers in the previous elections in 2019.  They were paid and provided with weapons to ensure the vote went a particular way and they were also promised jobs and other benefits after those election.  It is suggested that these promises were quickly forgotten by the political sponsors and patrons, leaving a large number of disgruntled and resentful youths in possession of firearms.  

Since the 2019 elections, we have witnessed the North-West geopolitical region become the most unstable, with the highest rate of kidnapping and almost daily attacks on communities by gangs of roving bandits who travel on motorcycles and pick-up trucks.  The timeline and geography of this evolution fits with the narrative.  

Could this situation have been foreseen?

There is a precedent for type of event with an almost identical sequence of events occurring in the Niger Delta following the 2003 elections, i.e., when large numbers of youths who had been armed by political patrons to support their election campaigns were abandoned once the elections were over. 

In this regard it could be argued that the situation in the North-West could have been anticipated and the drivers of the instability addressed before the situation deteriorated to its current extent.  

Conclusions

The collapse of security in the North-West over the last three years has been widely discussed and the details of the individual incidents are well known.  However, the developments since the March 28th attack on the train have taken on a new, and much more threatening, dimension for the Federal Government.  Against a background of widespread, diverse and expanding security challenges throughout the country, the situation in the North-West threatens to become a major political liability for the APC in the forthcoming elections, with some well-placed commentators suggesting that the APC already might be mortally wounded by it.

The security organs of the state continue to wrestle with the challenge of finding a solution to the situation, but to date they have been reacting to an adversary who enjoys a secure operating base and considerable freedom to move, giving them the initiative and the confidence to strike wherever and whenever they choose.  While the immediate impact is being felt in the FCT-Kaduna-Niger tri-State border areas, the insurgent campaign threatens to have enormous impact on the elections, resulting in a profoundly destabilising effect on the nation as a whole.  Some commentators are starting to talk about the ‘Balkanisation of Nigeria’, which is a scenario that would have huge strategic implications in the wider regions around Nigeria. 

 

Timeline of Events in the FCT-Kaduna-Niger Tri-State area – April-July 2022

26 April – Attackers release images of some of the abducted train passengers.

06 May – The pressure from the families of the abducted Abuja-Kaduna passengers may have forced the Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC) to put a hold on the resumption of train services within that route.  

12 May – Three Nigerian police officers were killed when an ISWAP cell ambushed a police team in the town of Suleja in Nigeria’s north-central state of Niger, near the country’s capital city.  

15 May – The train attackers release one of the hostages – a heavily pregnant woman.  In a video message circulating on social media, the woman said the abductors told her she had been freed on “compassionate grounds”.  

20 May – The Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) suspended the resumption of train services on the Abuja-Kaduna route.  

29 May – The train attackers’ withdraw their previous threat to stop feeding the over 60 abducted passengers of the Abuja-Kaduna bound train and to start executing the victims 

31 May – video released showing passengers pleading for government intervention.  One of the passengers was a course-mate of VP Osinbajo when they were at Lagos Law School.

08 June- Two of the abducted passengers of the Abuja-Kaduna train regain their freedom after spending 72 days in captivity.  

15 June – 11 of the abducted train passengers are released by their captors.

21 June – President Muhammadu Buhari has directed increased efforts toward rescuing kidnapped railway passengers still in custody and bringing the case to a close.  Garba Shehu, Senior Special Assistant to the President on Media and Publicity, on Tuesday said upon the President’s approval, rescue efforts are taking a two-lane approach, the kinetic and non-kinetic, to ensure the captives’ safe release.  Shehu said the kidnappers made a demand for the release of their own children and upon the settlement of that issue, they let go eleven of the victims, even though more were expected.

29th June 2022 – Mohammed Al’Amin, one of the remaining 50 hostages of the abducted Abuja-Kaduna train passengers was shot by his captors.  The incident occurred during “friendly exchanges of fire at the forest between the abductors that are guarding the victims and preventing them from possible escape.” Although the victim was critically wounded but still alive and in need of medical attention, appeals to the insurgents to release the wounded victim for access to medical care were “vehemently refused”.

04 July – ISWAP claims responsibility for another attack in Suleja, killing a policeman

05 July – ISWAP attacks Kuje Prison in Abuja, which housed more than one thousand inmates.  They attacked using explosives to breach the walls and then entered the prison with small arms.   600 inmates including 67 Boko Haram terrorists were said to have been freed during the attack. The attackers were able to operate inside the facility for almost four hours without facing any response.

07 July – 7 abducted train passengers were released by the insurgents.  Families of the released passengers stated that ransoms of 100m naira per victim and 200m naira for a Pakistani were paid.    200m was paid in Naira and the remaining 600m was paid in the equivalent in dollar value.  These released captives stated that the terrorists celebrated when they returned to the camp with prisoners they had released from Kuje Prison..  This indicates that the train attackers and the prison attackers are the same group.

10 August – 7 further abducted train passengers were released, 6 members of the same family including 3 children aged between 18 months and 7 years old, along with an unrelated 60-year-old woman.  It is not clear if any ransom was paid to the terrorists for their release.

Russia In Africa – A Strategic Evolution

Background

Moscow’s attempt to destabilise the West has backfired spectacularly, with Europe demonstrating greater cohesion and resilience than was perhaps anticipated, NATO being reinvigorated and, in all likelihood, expanding to incorporate two powerful and geographically important new members in Finland and Sweden.  

This unexpected outcome from the invasion of Ukraine will likely encourage Moscow to draw NATO and European attention away from its eastern frontiers and refocus their efforts elsewhere once the war in Ukraine is concluded.  One of the most likely future focal points for Russia will be Africa.

The African continent is rich in mineral resources, some of which are not found in significant volumes in Russia.  It is also a growing market for various products ranging from foodstuffs and technology to weapons and energy.  Moscow already has a footprint in Africa, with relationships existing or emerging in countries throughout the continent.  These relationships include trade and commercial agreements, diplomatic ties, military cooperation agreements, and energy – including nuclear technology.

The scene is set for a rapid expansion of Russian presence on the continent in parallel with burgeoning Chinese investment in the region as well as an increasing focus on Africa’s potential among numerous western countries.  Following Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, the race for expanding influence in Africa between the three power blocks could develop into a significantly destabilising force in some parts of the continent.

However, Moscow is not having it all its own way in Africa.  The vote in early March 2022 on the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine was opposed by only one African nation – Eritrea.  The African Union and ECOWAS also joined the strong international consensus of condemnation of the Russian attack. The current AU Chairman, Senegal’s President Macky Sall, as well as AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, also criticized Russia’s unprovoked war, noting that did not stop the former from accepting an invitation to Moscow in early June 2022.

Of the 54 African states, 28 voted to condemn the Russian invasion with 16 countries abstaining and 9 choosing not to vote. Ultimately, the vote has been a surprising condemnation of Moscow from a continent where the worldview of many leaders is shaped around non-alignment.  This, combined with enduring resentment of the impact of the various proxy wars fought on the continent during the Cold War, a focus on diplomatic etiquette, and a desire to remain non-aligned in the face of great power rivalries, makes the outcome of the vote quite remarkable.

The vote also exposed divergence of governance norms across the region and demonstrated that Africa’s future relations with Russia will be variable and likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

The countries that refused to condemn Russia have leaders who have been heavily co-opted by Moscow, including Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Bourhane of Sudan, and Malian Colonel Assimi Goïta.  Those leaders were not elected in any recognisable democratic process and are heavily propped up by Russian patronage and mercenaries.

The leaders of Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe all benefit from Russian weaponry, disinformation, or political support and none of them would benefit from a democratic process that could remove them from power.

Other countries, including Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa, abstained or did not vote probably as a result of an ideology of non-alignment.

It is evident that Moscow has a lot of work to do if it wants to supplant the West in Africa, but how can it successfully achieve this potential aim?

 

Moscow’s Aims

Following the virtually unchallenged Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its consolidation of lands occupied by Moscow-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow ramped up its strategic effort to gain further traction and influence in Africa.  It sees the continent as the next frontier for expansion of its political, military, and economic interests in response to growing pressure from the West.

In November 2019, leaders from up to 40 African nations gathered in Sochi on Russia’s Black Sea coast for the inaugural Russia-Africa Summit.  Many of them represented nations that Russia had no particularly strong history with.  The summit established a formal partnership with the aim of strengthening existing and potential political, security, economic, legal, scientific, technical, humanitarian, information, and environmental cooperation. The Russian team stressed to the African delegations that this cooperation offered a way for African states to affirm their sovereignty and resist European and American coercive diplomacy.  The latter point underlined that the continent was on the cusp of a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ with three main protagonists;  Moscow, Beijing, and the West all vying for influence and cooperation.

Russia began developing its position on the continent two years earlier, through a number of low-key and covert operations, but its efforts were constrained by budget limitations.  This effectively forced Moscow to rely on diplomatic and military means to gather influence and support rather than an investment of large amounts of hard currency.  

Most recently, on 03 June 2022, President Macky Sall – Chairman of the African Union – met with President Putin in Moscow where they discussed “…freeing up stocks of cereals and fertilisers, the blockage of which particularly affects African countries…”.  The agenda also covered expansion of political dialogue, economic relations, and humanitarian cooperation between Russia and African nations. Sall, visited Moscow at the invitation of Putin and was accompanied by the Chadian Chairman of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat.  During the meeting, Putin took the opportunity to take a swipe at the West, saying “I would like to recall that our country has always been on the side of Africa, has always supported Africa in its struggle against colonialism.”  Read it here.

From the point of view of geostrategic security, there are three key threads to Moscow’s strategic aims in the continent. 

Firstly, establishing a presence in the southern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden which would undoubtedly present a threat to NATO’s southern flank, as well as the strategically vital choke points for international maritime trade that pass the Horn of Africa and the Suez Canal.

Secondly, after a less than impressive performance by its armed forces in the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow will be seeking to re-establish its credentials as a great global power.   It has arguably suffered significant loss of ground in this respect,  both diplomatically and militarily.  It has also been severely diminished economically.  Establishing a strong presence and degree of influence in Africa will remind the world that Russia is a country that must not be ignored.

Thirdly, establishing itself as a major external power on the continent would force the West to focus even greater efforts and resources into the continent in order to counter Russia’s influence while at the same time conducting aggressive influence operations among African nations to attack the standing of the West.  To some extent, as we shall see below, this is already happening.  

In terms of trade, Africa is still a relatively small but growing market for Russian goods compared to Europe and Asia.  Africa trades more with India, China, and the US than with Russia.  Nevertheless, in 2022, Russian trade with Africa has grown by 34%.  The importance of this should not be underestimated.  As it feels the weight of sanctions imposed by the West, Moscow views trade with African nations as a strategic opportunity. 

President Vladimir Putin has said Africa is one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities and has spoken about offering:

  • political and diplomatic support
  • defence and security help
  • economic assistance
  • disease-control advice
  • humanitarian-relief assistance
  • educational and vocational training

Where Russia Already Has a Presence

Between 2014-19, the African continent – excluding Egypt – accounted for 16% of Russia’s major arms exports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  80% of these exports went to Algeria with the remaining 20% spread across the rest of the continent.

Against this relatively modest position, Moscow’s defense relationships with African nations are growing.  Since 2015, military cooperation agreements have been signed with over 20 African countries. Read more about it here.

In 2017-18, Russia had weapons deals with Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Equatorial Guinea.  These included fighter jets, combat, and transport helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and engines for fighter planes. Full story here.

Russia has also been active in the Central African Republic (CAR), officially helping to support the embattled UN-backed government against an array of rebel groups.  This support has seen the Russian private military company (PMC), the Wagner Group, active in the country, providing security to the government and supporting indigenous forces in the protection of key economic assets.  Wagner group has also been reported to be active in Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Mozambique.

State-owned Russian companies have been mining bauxite in Guinea, diamonds in Angola, and winning concessions to produce off-shore gas in Mozambique.  Lukoil have interests in Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria and is reportedly seeking exploration and mining licenses in the Republic of Congo.

Russia is also offering nuclear power technology to several African countries, including the construction of the first nuclear plant in Egypt, financed by a $25bn (£19bn) loan.

Russia’s footprint in Africa is set to expand.  Its current presence is illustrated in the following maps:

Source: https://www.mining.com/russias-comeback-in-africa-favours-profit-over-long-term-influence-analyst

 

Source:  https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/39567/POLITICS-Russia-influence-in-Africa

Strategies

Russia’s strategy for increasing its influence in Africa takes several forms, including:

  • Political engineering and supporting counter-government activities
  • Electoral engineering and influencing voter behaviour through misinformation and disinformation
  • Direct military support to Moscow-friendly regimes or opposition groups using Wagner group.
  • Exchanging arms for resources.

The principal characteristic of the strategy is that Moscow co-opts the elites in the target countries in order to gain advantage that greatly outweighs the investment required to achieve that position.  This is a strategy that suits Moscow, given the financial constraints imposed on it.  This strategy requires no long-term investment or even relationship building and pays no attention to establishing strong relationships with the population.  It relies almost completely on influencing key individuals in the power structures through coercion, personal reward and manipulation.  The most frequently identifiable strategy relies on political support and deployment of Wagner troops in countries with natural resources on Moscow’s shopping list.

This has been the approach adopted by Moscow in Central African Republic where Moscow propped up President Touadéra.  The same strategy has been seen in support of Denis Sassou-Nguesso in the Republic of Congo, Ali Bongo in Gabon, Filipe Nyusi in Mozambique, Andry Rajoelina in Madagascar, Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe, Salva Kiir in South Sudan and Alpha Condé in Guinea.  This list is not exhaustive. Read about it here.

In the African countries where Russia has become most entrenched – Libya, the CAR, and Mali — there is growing evidence of it deliberately undermining the United Nations, deploying mercenaries, and violating human rights.  These all have a highly destabilising effect on the countries concerned and potentially for regional neighbours.

In Libya, where Russia has its strongest military presence, there is evidence of efforts to undermine the UN process aimed at establishing a constitutionally based, unified government through its support for a parallel government in the east of the country led by the warlord Khalifa Haftar.

In CAR, the National Security Advisor is a Russian and the Presidential guard comprises of Wagner mercenaries.  They are also very active around gold and diamond mines and increasingly aggressive towards the UN peace keeping force in the country.

In Mali, Russia began an influence operation in 2019 based on disinformation aimed at damaging the standing of the UN and the French operations in the country, as well as the democratically elected president, Ibrahim Keita.  Amid claims of widespread human rights violations involving Wagner mercenaries, the Russians have used their veto in the UN Security Council to supress any attempt to investigate the massacres.

As well as providing support to democratic leaders, Moscow has also weighed-in in support of undemocratic alternatives as they did in Libya, where they supported the warlord Khalifa Haftar.  Elsewhere, it is reported that the August 2020 coup in Mali led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, was planned in Russia while members of the Malian army participated in extended training.  Since early 2021, Wagner troops have been operating alongside Malian troops, including participating in atrocities against civilians which they have attempted to blame on French troops, who have since withdrawn from the country. In Sudan, Russia reportedly urged military leaders to resist the planned transition to civilian rule. 

In conducting these operations, where it aligns with and supports indigenous military factions, Moscow has ensured that its proxies in those countries have supplanted the democratically elected powers and created enduring hardship for the greater populations.  

Russia has also been active in manipulating voter behaviour in elections in Africa – a tried-and-tested strategy employed by Russia in western polling exercises. 

This usually involves widespread and multifaceted influence operations using media, social media, and other messaging channels.  The basis of the strategy is to disseminate supportive messaging for their favoured candidate, coupled with unfavourable representations from opposition candidates, the dissemination to the media of flattering, albeit dubious, poll results, and the unqualified and timely approval of election results by a pseudo-election monitoring organization, such as the Association for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC). These methods were highlighted in the recent elections in Madagascar, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, among others.

Russia also carries out well-structured information operations in target countries with the aim of altering voter behaviour, influencing public opinion against the West and undermining democracy.  Its campaigns typically support chosen candidates and denigrate those that are unfriendly towards Moscow’s ambitions.  Additionally, Russia has established a broader campaign to undermine democracy by disseminating reports and whispering campaigns about the weaknesses of democracy and the futility of supporting candidates who strongly support democratic principles.  As in all effective influence operations, the psychology is subtle, suggesting there is little to choose between the various political systems and therefore no real advantage to democracy.  The end state aim is to encourage a sense of inevitability among the voters who will then passively accept whoever is elected to represent them.  The message is usually that nobody is any better or worse than the alternative.

In those countries where Moscow is already close to the incumbent leader, it will continue to work very hard to keep that individual in place.  An example is the support for Alpha Condé’s candidacy for a third term in Guinea in 2020, which the country’s constitution prohibits.  When Condé faced widespread opposition to the proposed extension of his term, the Russian Ambassador, Alexander Bregadze, attempted to neutralise the opposition with a carefully constructed statement in which he said, “constitutions are not a dogma, a Bible or a Koran… it is the constitutions that must adapt to reality, not the reality that adapts to the constitutions.”   Russia’s interest in the continuance of the regime is less subtle.  Guinea has the largest reserves of bauxite in the world and Bregadze now heads up the operations in Guinea of Rusal, Russia’s largest aluminium company.  

However, Moscow does not always have its way, and the ousting of Condé in a coup in September 2021 set them back. The departure of South Africa’s Jacob Zuma in 2018, a reliable friend of Moscow, saw his replacement, Cyril Ramaphosa immediately cancel a deal with Moscow to build a nuclear power plant.  This saved South Africa from a huge debt commitment and weakened Moscow’s leverage over the country.  Russia apparently used the prospect of investment in nuclear energy technology to leverage elite capture in the country and disseminated disinformation and created tension to influence its internal politics.  Russia has used investment in nuclear programs to influence other African countries, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia.

Russia has also supplied surveillance technologies to a number of autocratic regimes in Africa, including Uganda and Rwanda, to help them control their political rivals and civil society groups. 

Russia has traditionally worked hard to influence governance in Africa by exploiting characteristics of democracy such as elections, free media and news platforms – in an effort to manipulate outcomes that are supportive of its interests.  At the same time, it seeks to sow seeds of dissent and disillusionment among the populace about the merits of democracy.  An African leader who gains or retains power through elections, even flawed elections, gains a powerful legitimacy and that serves Russia well insofar as it also legitimises the relationships and presence in the country enjoyed by Russian organisations – including its mercenaries.  The basis of this strategy is that it is hard to criticise the presence of a Russian interest when it has been invited there by a legitimate, democratically elected leader.

With regards to Moscow’s arms trade with the continent, it remains to be seen whether it will be able to fulfil orders already in place or offer future orders as many of its arms plants are reportedly struggling to manufacture weapons systems due to embargoes and sanctions imposed since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

 

“Dezinformatsiya” and Influence Operations

Following the reality check of the UN vote in March 2022, Russia will likely ramp up its efforts to regain traction and expansion of its interests in Africa.  One of the primary tools that it will use to achieve this aim is disinformation.  Disinformation is the intentional dissemination of false information with the intent of advancing a political objective.

 

In October 2019, Facebook removed dozens of fake accounts operating in Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan, that had been engaged in a long-term disinformation and influence campaign aimed at promoting Russian interests.  The accounts were linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group who has long-standing ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.  Prigozhin has been indicted for interfering in U.S. elections.  The deactivated accounts give us a glance into the nature of Russian disinformation campaigns in Africa.

 

Russian disinformation campaigns are a growing concern for African countries where information is a commodity that can be unreliable at the best of times.  Local political and economic interests as well as erroneous interpretation and unreliable sources shape the messaging in many African media sources. 

 

Prigozhin’s involvement was confirmed by a report from the Dossier Center, a Russian investigative organisation headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian oligarch who fell out of favour with Putin, and also a detailed and in-depth investigation by Facebook.  Other disinformation was prevalent on Instagram.  A stark example was found to be occurring in Mozambique, where just a month before the October 2019 elections, numerous pages emerged that exclusively promoted the Frelimo ruling party.

 

The pages targeting Libya were more complex and perhaps more subtle.  These pages fell broadly into two categories, the first of which were supportive of Khalifa Haftar, the Russian-backed rebel commander trying to undermine the UN-recognized government and seize Tripoli with the support of Wagner Group mercenaries.   The pages included messaging that Haftar would stabilise the country and bring peace and security.  This strategy was backed by a second set of pages that asked readers to consider how much better things were under Muammar Gaddafi.  Between them, these pages accounted for 90% of the Russian content.  The remaining 10% were supportive of one of Gaddafi’s sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.  The latter is regarded as a potential presidential candidate.  Moscow is actively supporting both Haftar and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and is thought to be attempting to bring the two together.

 

The impact of this influence operation was significant, with 9.7 million interactions and the posts were liked by 1.7 million accounts.  However, there is evidence that the campaign was flawed.  In some of the responses, people challenged the messaging, particularly the premise that things were better under Gadaffi.

 

Similar pushback has been seen in other countries.  In Mozambique, the designers of the campaign demonstrated a stark degree of naivety when they launched a disinformation strategy suggesting the opposition party had agreed a deal with the Chinese government to allow the latter to dump nuclear waste in the country.  The designers obviously failed to appreciate that opposition parties do not sign agreements with foreign governments.

 

The volume of disinformation campaigns in Africa is surging, but African governments in targeted countries do little to address disinformation campaigns as in many cases it is a supportive narrative.  It is even possible that some of them are complicit in the overall strategy.  Russia is not alone in spreading disinformation in Africa.  In Libya, at least 6 nations have been detected using disinformation as a strategic tool.  Nevertheless, Russia has been proven to be the principal participant in the campaign to shape the thinking of millions of Africans.  

 

To put the extent of the problem into context, Tessa Knight, a South Africa-based researcher with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab stated, “Every time I have set out to search for coordinated disinformation in advance of an election or around conflicts, I have found it. I have not investigated an online space in Africa and not found disinformation. I think a lot of people are not aware of the scale of disinformation that is happening in Africa and how much it is distorting information networks.”

 

Part of the problem is that social media platforms pay less attention to removing false content in Africa than in other parts of the world.  This possibly reflects an assumption that the target audience is less sophisticated and therefore the damage is less than in Europe or the Americas.  This is a false assumption and the burgeoning use of mobile technology across the continent ensures that a wide audience participates in the debates triggered by these campaigns.

 

The following graphic illustrates the extent of known influence operations in Africa as 26 April 2022:

Disinformation campaigns that have been detected and publicly documented,  Source:  Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Payback – What Will it Cost Africa

Russia has been characterised as an autocratic kleptocracy, in which opposition figures are neutralised through various means ranging from judicial action and imprisonment to assassination.  It has also shown disdain for the international rules-based order and complete contempt for internationally recognised national borders.  The impact of such a political culture if introduced into African states could be profound.  The former characteristic can be found in countries across the continent, but the latter characteristic could have disastrous impact on Africans were it to become part of the African political culture.  

For all its problems, Africa has generally respected international borders – even those drawn up by colonial powers in ignorance of cultural and tribal considerations.  Were Moscow to influence African states to the extent that they started to eye the resources in neighbouring countries, cross-border conflict could escalate into all-out war between nations.

The Russian strategy in Africa has led to a loss of freedoms, particularly in Mali, where opposition leaders and journalists who have challenged the legitimacy of the new regime have been arrested for questioning and threatened by youth militias sponsored by the junta.

 

Conclusions

Russia is clearly focussing heavily on expanding its influence and leverage in numerous African countries.  Its strategy is aggressive and disruptive, creating instability and insecurity in previously stable, democratic countries.  This presents a threat to political and economic stability and, where Wagner force mercenaries are present, to societal stability and security.

At the level of corporate operations, companies should incorporate disinformation campaigns into their threat assessments and risk analysis templates.  In certain countries, if active in the extraction of minerals or hydrocarbons, companies’ operations could well become a target for Russian disruption, i.e., of the workforce through disinformation, or even direct targeting by proxies acting on behalf of Russian interests.

In short it is likely Russia will continue to pursue a policy of expansion across the continent, and this will likely accelerate after the war in Ukraine reaches a conclusion.  This will likely be to the detriment of Europe and the West unless steps are taken to mitigate it.